Opinion
SA-OO-CV-1481-RF
December 16, 2003
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, filed on October 9, 2003 and Defendant Officer Wang's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, filed on October 15, 2003, The above styled and numbered cause was submitted to a jury on September 18, 2003, and on that same day the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The Court entered its Judgment on the Jury Verdict on September 26, 2003. A hearing was held on the Rule 59 motion on November 17, 2003, and at that time the Court instructed the parties to file any additional briefing on the issue on or before December 12, 2003. Only the Defendant has done so, and the Court additionally considers these supplemental arguments. After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (Docket No. 104) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs instituted this action against Defendant Officer Philip Wang, among others, for violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged violations of their right to be free from the use of excessive force and for the violation of their right to due process. After a trial on the merits, the jury found in favor of Defendant on all counts and issues. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Plaintiffs now request a new trial based on (1) the improper introduction of evidence; (2) the fact that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; (3) the introduction of laboratory results evidence constituting unfair surprise; and (4) the improper and inflammatory closing remarks. Defendants respond that, as to each ground, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The decision to grant a new trial under Rule 59 rests soundly within the discretion of the district court. A new trial may be granted pursuant to Rule 59 "on all or part of the issues . . . for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." "Although Rule 59(a) does not enumerate grounds for a new trial, a district court may grant a new trial if the court finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive or inadequate, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course. Additionally, a new trial must be granted when the Court is unable logically to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict. And, when a motion for a new trial is based on evidentiary grounds, the court should not grant a new trial, unless `the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.'"
Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Pryor v. Trane Company, 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998).
Oyefodun v. City of New Orleans, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10008, *5-6 (E.D. La. 2001) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026.).
The Fifth Circuit favors the jury verdict and requires that the verdict stand on a motion for new trial, unless when viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence weighs so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable people could not disagree. "[A] judgment should not be set aside except for substantial reasons." However, a new trial is properly granted when the district court is "reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done." Here, the Court is certain that prejudicial error has overtaken the record.
Id. (citing Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1989)).
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R.MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2804 (2d ed. 1995).
Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 586 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1979)).
B. Plaintiffs' Grounds for New Trial
First, Plaintiffs argue that the introduction of evidence concerning drugs was improper and irrelevant. Relying upon Federal Rule of Evidence 401, Plaintiffs suggest that the introduction of evidence that drugs were found with Mr. New at the time of the arrest was ultimately used by the jury, not to prove probable cause for arrest, but rather to prove that Plaintiff is a "bad person." Plaintiffs claim that based upon the admission of this inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, the Court may grant a new trial. Defendant responds that the Court engaged in a lengthy analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 with respect to the evidence of cocaine possession. The Court gave the jury a limiting instruction with regard to that evidence, and admitted it for the purposes of establishing probable cause for the arrest, as well as for the jury's consideration of whether the Defendant Officer feared for his safety when Plaintiff reached into his back pocket.
See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1982).
Throughout the trial, the parties disputed whether Plaintiff Mr. New did in fact reach into his back pocket and if so whether he did in order to remove cocaine later found in the car.
The Court gave careful consideration to the admission of the evidence of cocaine possession during trial. The Court finds upon the instant motion, however, that the admission of the evidence related to cocaine possession was in error and that the error taints the jury's verdict. Moreover, the Court is dissatisfied with the manner in which the issue was addressed by the Court to the jury in the limiting instruction. The manner of the admission, and not necessary the admission itself, is grounds for a new trial because the evidence was not properly addressed before trial and the limiting instruction offered to the jury was given in haste with little clarity and precision. As admitted and instructed, the evidence's prejudice far outweighed its probative value. The evidence of drug possession is potentially relevant to the issues properly before the jury, including probable cause and the Officer's subjective perception of the events. Prior to the Court's ruling on such a determination, however, it is necessary for both parties to conduct discovery on the field test and the resulting allegations of possession. The Court needs consider the evidence and the arguments prior to the morning of trial. In his supplemental briefing, Defendant urges that additional discovery will not affect the course or result of trial. The Court disagrees because, even if all parties were to stipulate to the identification of substance found in Plaintiffs' car, the parties' concurrence would fail to cure the procedural errors that tainted the evidence and argument presented to the jury. This error may only be cured by a new trial in which the evidence is either excluded or admitted with a proper limiting instruction.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the verdict stands against the great weight of the evidence because the jury was swayed by the introduction of the cocaine possession. In evaluating this claim, the Court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Defendant in this case. The Court must, however, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. In so doing, the Court finds that the introduction of the cocaine possession was extremely prejudicial, both in the fact of its admission and, more importantly, in the manner of its admission. Plaintiffs point with specificity to portions of the trial transcript and testimony that weigh against the verdict, including portions of Defendant Officer Wang's testimony that he repeatedly beat Plaintiffs and treated them with an appalling lack of respect. It may be that the cocaine possession would be admitted upon a new trial, however the Court would do so only upon discovery and the Court's consideration of the evidence and the manner in which it might be admitted with a limiting instruction.
Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985).
Jones, 870 F.2d at 986-87.
Plaintiffs also argue that they suffered unfair surprise in the introduction of the lab test evidence, triggering the need for a new trial. Plaintiffs cite in support to Genmoora Corp. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. In that case, the Fifth Circuit set out a "strict test" allowing for "limited reversal" in the case of unfair surprise. The Court stated in Genmoora that a new trial is permitted when the testimony of an expert results in prejudicial surprise that is inconsistent with justice. Such is not the case here. Here, the parties dispute whether Plaintiffs had notice before trial of the laboratory test for identification of narcotics, but resolution of that issue is unnecessary because the Court refused to admit the field test and Plaintiffs knew that the field test identified the substance as cocaine. Thus, even if Plaintiffs were unable to prepare for every facet of the Defendant's presentation of the drug evidence, there was no unfair surprise of the issue, such as to merit a new trial.
Genmoora Corp. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 939 F.2d 1149, 1156 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's closing argument, referring to Plaintiff Mr. New as a "crack addict" who "loved his crack more than his life" was improper and inflammatory to a degree requiring a new trial. A court may grant a new trial in order to protect the interests of justice and fair play in response to inappropriate statements by counsel. The Court does not condone the comments made by Defense counsel in this instance, but is guided by the rule that "[e]ven if remarks are deemed improper . . . a new trial will not be granted unless, after considering counsel's trial tactics as a whole, the evidence presented, and the ultimate verdict, the court concludes that `manifest injustice' would result by allowing the verdict to stand." The Court does not find that two isolated comments, although inflammatory, serve to taint the entire proceedings of the trial, in the absence of the other errors surrounding the admission of the cocaine possession evidence. While the arguments made in closing statement for the defense alone would not merit a new trial, the preceding, related error does. Therefore, this ground alone does not trigger the need for a new trial, but the aggregate effect is one of manifest injustice due to procedural error.
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. (citing Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc., 886 F.2d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 1989)).
The Court finds that the process of the trial was sufficiently corrupted by the manner in which the Court handled the admission of the cocaine possession as to taint the jury's verdict. Therefore, the Court will, after careful consideration, disturb the verdict, grant Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, order discovery on the issue of cocaine possession, and schedule a new trial under separate order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion under Rule 59 (Docket No. 104) be GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk REOPEN the above styled and numbered cause.