New Oil, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank

4 Citing cases

  1. Thunder Basin Coal v. Southwestern P.S.C

    104 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 69 times
    Holding that "an entity or individual subject to impleader under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14 ... is never an indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b)"

    Wyo. Stat. Section(s) 34.1-2-610 cmts. 1-2 (1977). Wyoming has adopted the official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code and Wyoming courts rely upon them to interpret provisions of the Code. See, e.g., New Oil, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank of Commerce, 895 P.2d 871, 874 n. 2 (Wyo. 1995). The test for partial repudiation, upon which Thunder Basin bases its claim, is whether the aggrieved party suffered substantial impairment of the value of the contract.

  2. In re Summit Hosiery Mills, Inc.

    Case No. 00-51047C-7W (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2000)

    However, even where such a name change occurs, the financing statement remains effective as to a security interest in collateral owned at the time of the name change and collateral acquired within four months after the change. Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie, 227 Ga. App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537 (1997); Fleet Factors Corp. v. Bandolene Industries Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 519, 634 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1995); New Oil, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, 895 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1995). It is undisputed that the four knitting machines sold by the Trustee are the same knitting machines referred to in the 1997 financing statement and hence were not acquired more than four months after the Debtor changed its name.

  3. In re Straight

    BAP Nos. WY-96-1, WY-96-3 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Apr. 14, 1997)

    The description of collateral in a security agreement need not be specific, but it must "reasonably identif[y]" the collateral in question. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-110; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-105(a)(iii) ("`[C]ollateral' means the property subject to a security interest. . . ."); New Oil, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, 895 P.2d 871, 873 (Wyo. 1995) (description of collateral sufficient if it makes it possible to identify items with reasonable effort and inspection); Wailes v. Rocky Mountain Pre-Mix Concrete, 783 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1989) (must have a reasonable identification of collateral). The Bank's Security Agreement states, in relevant part:

  4. In re Straight

    207 B.R. 217 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 23 times
    Turning to Wyoming law "to determine the relative priority of competing liens."

    The description of collateral in a security agreement need not be specific, but it must "reasonably identif[y]" the collateral in question. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-110; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-9-105(a)(iii) ("`[C]ollateral' means the property subject to a security interest. . . ."); New Oil, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, 895 P.2d 871, 873 (Wyo. 1995) (description of collateral sufficient if it makes it possible to identify items with reasonable effort and inspection); Wailes v. Rocky Mountain Pre-Mix Concrete, 783 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1989) (must have a reasonable identification of collateral). The Bank's Security Agreement states, in relevant part: