See id. at 234 (1), 378 S.E.2d 857 (a "landlord's potential liability [to a tenant] could rest on the special landlord-tenant relationship, even for acts [by the landlord's employee] which occurred in other than normal office hours and in other locations than the apartment complex"). See also TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings , 264 Ga. App. 456, 462 (1) (b), 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003) (an employer is shielded "from liability for torts that their employees commit on the public in general, that is to say, people who have no relation to or association with the employer's business"); New Madison South Limited Partnership v. Gardner , 231 Ga. App. 730, 734 (1), 499 S.E.2d 133 (1998) ("[T]he theory of negligent hiring/retention applies even if the tort was committed outside the scope of employment where there is a special relationship such as landlord-tenant between the tortfeasor and the victim and the tortious conduct arises out of the relationship."). However, a special relationship between the injured party and the employer is not always required for the employee tortfeasor to act "under color of employment" in committing a tort.
So Perry was not acting under color of employment when he committed the tort. Instead, "[w]ith regard to [CSYG and Gebremichael], at the time [of the tortious act, Smith] was merely a member of the general public[,]" New Madison South Limited Partnership v. Gardner , 231 Ga. App. 730, 735 (2), 499 S.E.2d 133 (1998), so CSYG and Gebremichael were entitled to judgment on her claims for negligent hiring and retention. Lear Siegler , 184 Ga. App. at 28-29, 360 S.E.2d 619.
Id.; Lincoln v. Tyler, 258 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1) ( 574 SE2d 440) (2002). Even if we were to hold that Barron left the scope of his employment when he exited his truck (see, e.g., New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732-733 (1) ( 499 SE2d 133) (1998)), Keystone's failure to move for a directed verdict on this issue allowed the jury to find that Barron was acting within the scope at some point between the time he first crossed into the Englands' lane and the time he left the gas station. Since there was therefore some evidence to support the jury's verdict that Barron was acting within the scope of his employment during the entire altercation with the Englands, we must deny Keystone's motion for new trial as well.
Nelson, supra. See id. at 145-146; New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732-733 (1) ( 499 SE2d 133) (1998). Cf. Howard, supra at 681 (because store security guard approached suspected shoplifter to accomplish ends of employment — to prevent shoplifting — and for no personal reason, question of fact remained as to whether employer could be held liable for guard's tortious actions under respondeat superior theory).
Harvey Freeman Sons, Inc. v. Stanley, 259 Ga. 233-234 (1) ( 378 SE2d 857) (1989). As an exception, negligent hiring and retention may be found when the employee has committed a tort "outside scope of employment," where there is a special relationship, such as landlord-tenant, between the employer and the victim and the tortious conduct arose out of that relationship. Harvey Freeman Sons, Inc. v. Stanley, 189 Ga. App. 256, 257 (1) ( 375 SE2d 261) (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 259 Ga. at 233-234 (1); see also TGM Ashley Lakes v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 462 (1) (b) ( 590 SE2d 807) (2003); New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 734 (2) ( 499 SE2d 133) (1998). However, Govea and Gomez do not argue that any special relationship existed between Jairo and Chamblee.
Herrin is not liable to Ergle for injuries resulting from Edwards' commute home. New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 734 (2) ( 499 S.E.2d 133) (1998); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Stegall, 184 Ga. App. 27, 28-29 ( 360 S.E.2d 619) (1987).New Madison South Ltd. Partnership, supra.
Thus, even aside from the fact that Mrs. Clark was expected to be available to the tenants 24 hours a day, the landlord's potential liability could rest on the special landlord-tenant relationship, even for acts which occurred in other than normal office hours and in other locations than the apartment complex. Id.; see also New Madison South c. v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 734(2) ( 499 S.E.2d 133) (1998). In this case, Mr. Dester was not acting within the course and scope of his employment, and Mrs. Dester's relationship with Mr. Dester arose out of her marriage to him, not out of his employment with Jenkins Construction.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) New Madison c. v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732 (1) ( 499 S.E.2d 133) (1998). If the act is within the class of activities performed on behalf of the employer, the master is bound, even though the employee is not authorized to perform the particular act or is forbidden to perform the particular act. Bacon v. News-Press Gazette Co., 188 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 373 S.E.2d 797) (1988). Only where the employee's alleged misconduct is entirely disconnected from his employer's business and wholly personal to himself will the employer escape liability.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Heyward, 82 Ga. App. 337, 341 (1) ( 60 S.E.2d 641) (1950). See New Madison South, L.P. v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732-733 (1) ( 499 S.E.2d 133) (1998). The test of a master's liability for his servant's tort is whether the act "was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the master's business for accomplishing the ends of his employment. If a servant steps aside from his master's business to do an act entirely disconnected from it, and injury to another results from a doing of the act, the servant may be liable, but the master is not liable. Where the tort of the employee is wholly personal to himself, it is not within the scope of his employment, and the master is not liable". [Citations punctuation and emphasis omitted.
" Id. "Thus, the test of liability is whether the tort was done within the scope of the actual transaction of the master's business for accomplishing the ends of his employment." New Madison South, L.P. v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732, 499 S.E.2d 133, cert. denied (1998). "The test is not strictly dependent on whether the incident occurred during the time covered by the employment or at the place of business.