New Jerseyans for Death Penalty

8 Citing cases

  1. New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections

    185 N.J. 137 (N.J. 2005)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that a reasonable counsel fee is determined independent of the fee arrangement between a party and counsel and stating that an attorney's expectation of payment has no bearing on the fee award

    The Appellate Division reversed, eliminating the 30% fee reduction after finding that the NJDPM's counsel "achieved a full measure of success." New Jerseyans for a Death PenaltyMoratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (2004). The panel also increased the fee enhancement from 5% to 25%, noting that the NJDPM's counsel faced a high risk of nonpayment because he represented the organization on a probono basis.

  2. NJ for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. NJ D.O.C

    861 A.2d 844 (N.J. 2004)

    October 28, 2004 Appeal from the 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530. Petitions for certification. 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530

  3. Levesque v. Cooksey

    Civil No. 00-3432 (JBS) (D.N.J. Sep. 16, 2004)

    Therefore, this Court finds the 41.1 hours of time spent in preparing the requested certifications to be fully compensable under law. See New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections and Devon Brown, 850 A.2d 530 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. June 16, 2004) (awarding petitioner full fee in connection with fee application where extra work was done to comply with the court's requests regarding fees). d. Defendants' Requests for General Deductions

  4. O'Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC

    429 P.3d 664 (Nev. App. 2018)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that billing records are not required to support an award of attorney fees so long as the court can calculate a reasonable fee

    Relatedly, attorney fees are permissible in pro bono cases, where there are likewise no billing statements. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622-23, 119 P.3d 727, 729-30 (2005) (discussing the public policy rationale in support of awarding attorney fees to pro bono counsel and concluding that such awards are proper); Black v. Brooks, 285 Neb. 440, 827 N.W.2d 256, 265 (2013) (concluding that if organizations are not awarded for recovery of statutory fees, they may decline to represent pro bono cases); see, e.g., New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530, 532 (2004) (explaining that when determining a reasonable fee to award in a pro bono case, courts should consider whether to increase the "fee to reflect the risk of nonpayment in all cases in which the attorney’s compensation entirely or substantially is contingent on a successful outcome") (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d as modified by 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005).Considerations when assessing an attorney fees award based on a contingency fee agreement

  5. N.L. v. M.B.

    DOCKET NO. A-4712-18T1 (App. Div. Dec. 18, 2020)

    Original jurisdiction is employed only where the record is adequate, making a remand unnecessary, and supports only one conclusion. See New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. D.O.C., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2004); Ladenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 219, 224 (App. Div. 2000).

  6. Committee of Petitioners v. Borough of Belmar

    DOCKET NO. A-2869-16T1 (App. Div. Apr. 24, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    See also BJMInsulation & Constr., Inc., 287 N.J. Super. at 517 (stating that the terms under which an attorney has agreed to provide representation to a client "is none of [the obligor party's] business"). In New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 15 (App. Div. 2004), we affirmed the enhancement the trial court awarded where the plaintiff's firm provided legal services pro bono without the benefit of any written retainer agreement. We reasoned that "the possibility of compensation, i.e. contingent compensation, inheres in the existence of the fee-shifting provision."

  7. Vas v. Roberts

    418 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 2011)   Cited 55 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding exercise of original jurisdiction proper where the question raised “implicates the public interest” and is “purely one of law [with] no facts bearing on that question ... in dispute”

    To this end, Rule 2:10-5 permits us to "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." Resort to original jurisdiction is particularly appropriate to avoid unnecessary further litigation, Pressler Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 2:10-5 (2011); See, e.g., New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (App.Div. 2004), aff'd as modified, 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005), as where the record is adequate to terminate the dispute and no further fact-finding or administrative expertise or discretion is involved, In re City of Plainfield's Park-Madison Site, 372 N.J.Super. 544, 552, 859 A.2d 1232 (App.Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630, 868 A.2d 1032 (2005); DKM Residential Properties Corp. v. Township of Montgomery, 363 N.J.Super. 80, 86, 831 A.2d 110 (App.Div. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 182 N.J. 296, 865 A.2d 649 (2005), and thus a remand would be pointless because the issue to be decided is one of law and implicates the public interest. O'Shea v. New Jersey Schools Construction Corp., 388 N.J.Super. 312, 319, 908 A.2d 237 (App.Div. 2006); In re Boardwalk Regency Corp. for a Casino License, 180 N.J.Super. 324, 334, 434 A.2d 1111 (App.Div. 1981), aff'd as modified, 90 N.J. 361, 447 A.2d 1335 (1982).

  8. O'Shea v. New Jersey Schools Construction Corp.

    388 N.J. Super. 312 (App. Div. 2006)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that exercise of original jurisdiction is appropriate when an issue is a question of law, no facts bearing upon that issue are in dispute, and the issue implicates the public interest

    That said, while we could remand to the Law Division for resolution because the judge did not address whether the SCC may under any circumstance permit subcontractor substitutions after the contract has been awarded, we choose to assert our original jurisdiction inasmuch as that issue is a question of law, no facts bearing on that question of law are in dispute, and the issue implicates the public interest.See R. 2:10-5; New Jerseyans For A Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (App.Div. 2004), aff'd as modified, 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005). We therefore turn to the question of whether the SCC may permit a prime contractor to substitute new subcontractors for those the prime contractor listed in its bid.