The Appellate Division reversed, eliminating the 30% fee reduction after finding that the NJDPM's counsel "achieved a full measure of success." New Jerseyans for a Death PenaltyMoratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (2004). The panel also increased the fee enhancement from 5% to 25%, noting that the NJDPM's counsel faced a high risk of nonpayment because he represented the organization on a probono basis.
October 28, 2004 Appeal from the 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530. Petitions for certification. 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530
Therefore, this Court finds the 41.1 hours of time spent in preparing the requested certifications to be fully compensable under law. See New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections and Devon Brown, 850 A.2d 530 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div. June 16, 2004) (awarding petitioner full fee in connection with fee application where extra work was done to comply with the court's requests regarding fees). d. Defendants' Requests for General Deductions
Relatedly, attorney fees are permissible in pro bono cases, where there are likewise no billing statements. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622-23, 119 P.3d 727, 729-30 (2005) (discussing the public policy rationale in support of awarding attorney fees to pro bono counsel and concluding that such awards are proper); Black v. Brooks, 285 Neb. 440, 827 N.W.2d 256, 265 (2013) (concluding that if organizations are not awarded for recovery of statutory fees, they may decline to represent pro bono cases); see, e.g., New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 850 A.2d 530, 532 (2004) (explaining that when determining a reasonable fee to award in a pro bono case, courts should consider whether to increase the "fee to reflect the risk of nonpayment in all cases in which the attorney’s compensation entirely or substantially is contingent on a successful outcome") (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d as modified by 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005).Considerations when assessing an attorney fees award based on a contingency fee agreement
Original jurisdiction is employed only where the record is adequate, making a remand unnecessary, and supports only one conclusion. See New Jerseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. D.O.C., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2004); Ladenheim v. Klein, 330 N.J. Super. 219, 224 (App. Div. 2000).
See also BJMInsulation & Constr., Inc., 287 N.J. Super. at 517 (stating that the terms under which an attorney has agreed to provide representation to a client "is none of [the obligor party's] business"). In New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J. Super. 11, 15 (App. Div. 2004), we affirmed the enhancement the trial court awarded where the plaintiff's firm provided legal services pro bono without the benefit of any written retainer agreement. We reasoned that "the possibility of compensation, i.e. contingent compensation, inheres in the existence of the fee-shifting provision."
To this end, Rule 2:10-5 permits us to "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." Resort to original jurisdiction is particularly appropriate to avoid unnecessary further litigation, Pressler Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 2:10-5 (2011); See, e.g., New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (App.Div. 2004), aff'd as modified, 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005), as where the record is adequate to terminate the dispute and no further fact-finding or administrative expertise or discretion is involved, In re City of Plainfield's Park-Madison Site, 372 N.J.Super. 544, 552, 859 A.2d 1232 (App.Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 630, 868 A.2d 1032 (2005); DKM Residential Properties Corp. v. Township of Montgomery, 363 N.J.Super. 80, 86, 831 A.2d 110 (App.Div. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 182 N.J. 296, 865 A.2d 649 (2005), and thus a remand would be pointless because the issue to be decided is one of law and implicates the public interest. O'Shea v. New Jersey Schools Construction Corp., 388 N.J.Super. 312, 319, 908 A.2d 237 (App.Div. 2006); In re Boardwalk Regency Corp. for a Casino License, 180 N.J.Super. 324, 334, 434 A.2d 1111 (App.Div. 1981), aff'd as modified, 90 N.J. 361, 447 A.2d 1335 (1982).
That said, while we could remand to the Law Division for resolution because the judge did not address whether the SCC may under any circumstance permit subcontractor substitutions after the contract has been awarded, we choose to assert our original jurisdiction inasmuch as that issue is a question of law, no facts bearing on that question of law are in dispute, and the issue implicates the public interest.See R. 2:10-5; New Jerseyans For A Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 370 N.J.Super. 11, 18, 850 A.2d 530 (App.Div. 2004), aff'd as modified, 185 N.J. 137, 883 A.2d 329 (2005). We therefore turn to the question of whether the SCC may permit a prime contractor to substitute new subcontractors for those the prime contractor listed in its bid.