Opinion
Record No. 0306-94-1
Decided: January 17, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
William W. Nexsen (Timothy P. Murphy; Stackhouse, Smith Nexsen, on brief), for appellants.
Johnny C. Cope (Saunders, Stephenson, Cope, Olson Yoffy, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Elder
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
New Hampton (appellant) appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Agazina Morris (appellee). Appellant contends (1) the commission erred in determining appellee suffered from a compensable occupational "disease," and (2) appellee's condition was a pre-existing condition merely aggravated by her employment-related duties. The record establishes that carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease, and we affirm the commission's award of benefits. We hold the commission did not err in finding the evidence established a compensable occupational disease.
First, the record supports the commission's finding that appellee suffered from the condition known as carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Evans initially diagnosed a probable carpal tunnel syndrome and so advised appellee. While tests conducted in June of 1992 failed to confirm this diagnosis, there is no indication in the record that Dr. Evans changed his mind about appellee's diagnosis. Dr. Wilson also reported a "work related carpal tunnel syndrome" and a positive Tinel's test on appellee's right wrist. Finally, a third doctor, Dr. Treishmann, diagnosed appellee as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome before he performed surgery designed to alleviate appellee's symptoms.
Carpal tunnel syndrome is defined as a complex of symptoms resulting from compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with pain and burning or tingling paresthesias in the fingers and hands, sometimes extending to the elbow.
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1517 (1974).
Second, there is credible evidence in the record to support the commission's finding that appellee's carpal tunnel syndrome is a condition characterized as a "disease." See Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993) (holding that the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first qualify as a disease); see also Knott v. Blue Bell, Inc. et al., 7 Va. App. 335, 373 S.E.2d 481 (1988) (finding carpal tunnel syndrome was an occupational disease). The record reveals Dr. Evans referred to carpal tunnel syndrome specifically as a "disease," and his diagnosis satisfies the definition of disease enunciated in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), and Department of State Police v. Haga, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, 442 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1994).
Third, it was without error that the commission treated appellee's disease as a compensable occupational disease, in accordance with the six requirements of Code Sec. 65.2-400. On appeal, the commission's findings must be construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Piedmont, ___ Va. App. at ___, 438 S.E.2d at 773 (citing Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va. App. 503, 504, 330 S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986)). "Whether a disease is causally related to the employment and not causally related to other factors is . . . a finding of fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988) (citation omitted). We conclude that the medical opinions from three doctors, contained in the record, provide the credible evidence necessary to support the commission's finding. Medical evidence from Doctors Evans and Wilson showed appellee's condition could be traced to her employment with New Hampton. Furthermore, there was no evidence that appellee's prior right arm symptoms had any bearing on her development of carpal tunnel syndrome.
Credible evidence also supports the commission's findings that there was no substantial exposure to the causes of appellant's condition outside of her employment. Piedmont, ___ Va. App. at ___, 438 S.E.2d at 774. While evidence was presented as to appellee's personal and family history of tendinitis and appellee's non-work related activities in which her right arm was used, appellee is not required to prove the occupational activity caused her condition to the complete exclusion of any other contributing outside factor. " 'Reasonable degree of medical certainty' requires only that 'it is at least more probable than not that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment.' " Id. (quoting Ross Laboratories v. Barbour, 13 Va. App. 373, 377, 412 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1991)).
The decision of the commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.