Specifically, "whether to order a strict foreclosure or a foreclosure by sale is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, to be exercised with regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case." New England Savings Bank v. Lopez , 227 Conn. 270, 284, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). "A judgment of strict foreclosure, when it becomes absolute and all rights of redemption are cut off, constitutes an appropriation of the mortgaged property to satisfy the mortgage debt."

Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Burgos, 227 Conn. 116, 120, 629 A.2d 410 (1993). Furthermore, because the appraisal process outlined in § 49-25 is "primarily intended to give the court a valuation by which to judge the fairness of the highest bid received"; Bryson v. Newtown Real Estate Development Corp., 153 Conn. 267, 274, 216 A.2d 176 (1965); it provides the trial court with "guidance on the . . . question of whether to approve the sale. . . ."New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 279, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993); see also Fidelity Trust Co. v. Irick, 206 Conn. 484, 490, 538 A.2d 1027 (1988) (trial court sits as court of equity in foreclosure suit and, therefore, can refuse to confirm sale, in sound exercise of discretion, when highest bid is inadequate). If the procedure outlined in § 49-25 is to accomplish this end fairly and equitably, then a mortgagor must be afforded the opportunity to challenge the court-ordered appraisal prior to a final determination by the court regarding the sale of the property. As we noted in New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 279, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993), the procedure set forth in § 49-25 also "provides the basis for the reduction in the amount of a deficiency judgment permitted to the party who moved for the foreclosure by sale, required under [General Statutes] § 49-28."

See Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman , 149 Conn. App. 177, 191–92, 90 A.3d 219 (2014).In support of its claim that the sales price from a foreclosure sale is not reliable for the valuation of damages, the plaintiff cites to New England Savings Bank v. Lopez , 227 Conn. 270, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). In that case, the defendants claimed that the trial court's use of the foreclosure sale price of the property—instead of the property's fair market value—to calculate a deficiency judgment violated their right to due process.

(Emphasis in original.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 276, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). "To determine whether such procedural due process requirements apply, the court must first determine whether a party has been deprived of liberty or property by some action of the government. . ."

Eichman v. J J Building Co., 216 Conn. 443, 451, 582 A.2d 182 (1990). Lastly, in New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 278-79 n. 10, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993), we concluded that "without such a determination [of fair market value of property] there would be no way to determine whether the mortgagee was entitled to such a judgment and, if so, the amount thereof." Thus, it is clear that § 49-14 (a) should not be read to allow a deficiency judgment when a deficiency cannot be calculated based on the value of the property in accordance with the statute.

They argue that there is an inequity in the proceeding because the plaintiff creditor may bid at the foreclosure sale knowing that the tax liens may be reimbursed by the defendants, whereas other bidders are constrained in their bidding because they are not entitled to add the real estate tax liens to the deficiency. Our analysis is guided by the decision of our Supreme Court in New England Savings Bank v. Lopez , 227 Conn. 270, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). In Lopez, our Supreme Court rejected the mortgagors’ claim that "the trial court improperly calculated the deficiency judgment by failing to add to the amount of the successful bid at the sale the amount of the real estate tax lien on the property."

The plain language of § 49-14 clearly authorizes an "evidentiary hearing" as "the only available means of satisfying a mortgage debt when the security was inadequate to make the plaintiff whole. New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, [ 227 Conn. 270, 278 n. 10, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993)], citing D. Caron, Connecticut Foreclosures (2d Ed. 1989) § 9.05A, p. 158." Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Voll, supra, 38 Conn. App. 206-207.

"`At common law, a mortgagee was required to elect between a foreclosure action or an action on the underlying debt.'" New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 278 n. 10, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). If the mortgagee recovered successfully on the debt, "the mortgage [was] released. If [the mortgagee chose] to take the land and to make it his own absolutely, whereby the mortgagor [was] totally divested of his equity of redemption, the debt [was] thereby paid and discharged: And if it eventually prove[d] insufficient to raise the sum due, it [was] the mortgagee's own fault, and at his risk." M'Ewen v. Welles, Administratrix of Samuel Welles, 1 Root 202, 203 (1790).

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 278 n. 10, 630 A.2d 1010 (1993). "While foreclosure by sale automatically establishes the value of the property, a strict foreclosure does not have this secondary consequence.

Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 420, 717 A.2d 676 (1998). See also State v. Guess, 244 Conn. 761, 779-80, 715 A.2d 643 (1998); Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 514-16, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993); Newman v. Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 100, 663 A.2d 980 (1995); accord New England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 227 Conn. 270, 281, CT Page 14088 630 A.2d 1010 (1993); Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 495, 429 A.2d 946 (1980); Canton Motorcar Works, Inc. v. DiMartino, 6 Conn.App. 447, 453, 505 A.2d 1255, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 802, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). The lifesupport statutes are clearly closely related to any common-law duty in this case.