New Eng. Tel. Tel. Co. v. Natl. Merchandising Corp.

14 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Nat. Mdse. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm

    158 N.E.2d 714 (N.Y. 1959)   Cited 19 times

    ( Matter of City Ice Fuel Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., supra, p. 542.) We conclude, therefore, that the commission lacks authority to prohibit, either directly or indirectly, a lawful business enterprise from competing with the telephone companies in non-public service areas ( New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658; Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268, n. 9). The telephone companies, in seeking the regulation, also maintain that these covers could interfere with telephone service. It cannot be disputed that the commission has jurisdiction over such matters, and the scope of our inquiry in this area is to determine whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the commission's determination.

  2. Citizens Telephone Co. v. Tel Service Co.

    214 F. Supp. 627 (W.D.N.C. 1963)   Cited 3 times

    Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Miner, 11 Ill. App.2d 44, 136 N.E.2d 1 (1956). New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 141 N.E.2d 702, 63 A.L.R.2d 1085 (1957) is not contra because in that case the tariff did not relate to telephone directories. Since the prohibition (printed on each directory) is a part of every contract between the telephone company and its subscribers, if the defendant furnishes covers without the consent of the telephone company and invites and induces subscribers to use them in violation of their contracts with the telephone company, it is guilty of a multitude of tortious interferences with contractual relationships between the telephone company and its subscribers.

  3. Horn v. State

    556 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1976)   Cited 17 times

    This testimony is a reasonably accurate characterization of the relationship between the telephone company and its subscriber. Cf., New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 141 N.E.2d 702, 63 A.L.R.2d 1085 (1957). At the close of the State's case, Horn, through his counsel, made a motion for judgment of acquittal, essentially contending that the evidence was not sufficient to establish a violation of the statute because it did not show that the telephone and wire in question were property belonging to another.

  4. Utilities Comm. v. Merchandising Corp.

    220 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1975)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that Commission lacked statutory authority to enact a rule giving a telephone public utility a monopoly on advertising by its business subscribers

    Both involve the present complainant and both decisions were in its favor. New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp., 335 Mass. 658, 141 N.E.2d 702, 18 PUR 3d 343; National Merchandising Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 5 N.Y.2d 485, 158 N.E.2d 714, 29 PUR 3d 343. See also: Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266.

  5. Clairol, Inc. v. Cody's Cosmetics, Inc.

    231 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1967)   Cited 7 times

    The earlier cases in the State and Federal courts arising under § 7A were reviewed in Skil Corp. v. Barnet, 337 Mass. 485, 488-491. See New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp. 335 Mass. 658, 665-666. Recent cases are the Great Scott Food Mkt. Inc. case, 348 Mass. 320, 322-325, and the Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. case, 351 Mass. 283, 290-292.

  6. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mass. Life Ins. Co.

    351 Mass. 283 (Mass. 1966)   Cited 4 times

    Healer v. Bloomberg Bros. Inc. 321 Mass. 476, 477-478. Jays Inc. v. Jay-Originals Inc. 321 Mass. 737, 742. New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandizing Corp. 335 Mass. 658, 665-666. Great Scott Food Mkt. Inc. v. Sunderland Wonder, Inc. 348 Mass. 320, 323.

  7. Angell Elevator Lock Co. Inc. v. Manning

    348 Mass. 623 (Mass. 1965)   Cited 6 times
    In Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass. 623, 205 N.E.2d 245 (1965), the plaintiff brought suit against a former employee who had copied and sold his elevator lock with a few cosmetic alterations.

    See Barett v. Goodwin, 314 Mass. 279, 281. See also New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National MerchandisingCorp. 335 Mass. 658, 671. 3. Our cases establish that the mere copying and sale of an unpatented product does not furnish to its original manufacturer any basis for injunctive relief or damages. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 90-91.

  8. O'Malley v. Public Improvement Commission of Boston

    342 Mass. 624 (Mass. 1961)   Cited 6 times

    In the light of the authorities referred to below, it is plain that an assessment in excess of the benefit conferred would not be "reasonable" and, accordingly, we interpret § 7A in a manner which avoids doubts about its constitutionality. See Ferguson v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxn. 316 Mass. 318, 323-324; New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merch. Corp. 335 Mass. 658, 664; Worcester County Natl. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 340 Mass. 695, 701. In the earlier O'Malley case, 340 Mass. 542, 549, it was said that "nothing in" § 7 or § 7A "constitutes statutory authority . . . to require either a permit or a fee, as opposed to a betterment assessment, for a permit to connect with an existing sewer."

  9. Lubell v. First National Stores, Inc.

    342 Mass. 161 (Mass. 1961)   Cited 51 times
    In Lubell v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 342 Mass. 161, 163 (1961), we were concerned with the construction of G.L.c. 231, § 102C, inserted by St. 1958, c. 369, § 3, which permitted the Superior Court to transfer for trial in a District Court any action of tort or contract in which the Superior Court determined that the likelihood of recovery by a plaintiff, if the plaintiff were to prevail, would not exceed a certain amount.

    Ferguson v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxn. 316 Mass. 318, 322-324. New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. NationalMerchandising Corp. 335 Mass. 658, 664. Worcester County Natl. Bank. v. Commissioner of Banks, 340 Mass. 695, 701.

  10. Opinions of the Justices

    341 Mass. 760 (Mass. 1960)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that amendments to the urban redevelopment corporation law, G.L.c. 121A, which expanded the definition of eligible project areas and eligible uses within those areas and provided tax exempt status for private redevelopment corporations, did not violate the public purpose requirement in light of the prescribed standards set out in the statute and the regulatory controls derived therefrom

    The opinions already cited give general indication of where the dividing line lies. In the light of all these principles, to avoid serious constitutional doubts (see Ferguson v. Commissioner of Corps. Taxn. 316 Mass. 318, 323-324; New England Tel. Tel. Co. v. National Merchandising Corp. 335 Mass. 658, 664; Worcester County Natl. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 340 Mass. 695, 701), we are constrained to interpret the second sentence of the proposed § 6A sufficiently narrowly to ensure its constitutional validity. We think that this sentence, if enacted, would authorize cities and towns to agree that, for a reasonable period, the project will not be affected by amendment of those provisions of c. 121A (and of the rules, regulations, and standards) which, to furnish a sound basis for proceeding with the necessary investment, are proper and natural for inclusion in a contract for major construction affected with a public interest.