[57, 58] Our conclusion that the commissioner was properly appointed is consistent with our previous holdings that trial courts have a great deal of discretion to appoint commissioners and to make such orders concerning deposition procedure as justice may require. See New Castle v. Rand, 102 N.H. 16, 21-22, 148 A.2d 658, 662 (1959); Starkey v. Harvey, 98 N.H. 96, 97, 95 A.2d 140, 140 (1953). We also note in passing that, contrary to the defendant Tsoumas' argument, we find that the commissioner herein was a "person taking evidence in connection with [an official] proceeding," namely, the Blaeser civil litigation, and the deposition therefore could form the basis of a perjury conviction under RSA 641:1, II.
Ultimately the distinction between mandatory and permissive statutes depends upon the intent of the legislature. See New Castle v. Rand, 102 N.H. 16, 20, 148 A.2d 658, 661 (1959). It appears from the decree of the trial court that the judge denied the requests of the plaintiff for fines, costs, and attorney's fees, in part, because of the involvement of the town counsel in a prior matter of litigation in which he had represented Mr. Harvey and because the children of Mr. Harvey had done nothing to the property since the time of the conveyance.
The use of the word "may" in regard to the penalty for a first offense and "shall" for a second conviction is not controlling. See Newcastle v. Rand, 102 N.H. 16, 20, 148 A.2d 658, 661 (1959). The legislative history surrounding the passage of this amendment is at best equivocal.