New Britain R.E. T. Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp.

11 Citing cases

  1. Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy

    336 Mass. 322 (Mass. 1957)   Cited 4 times

    Compare Kearns v. Nickse, 80 Conn. 23 (horse dealer entrusted with a horse by its owner, not shown to have had prior business with the dealer, with a view to sale to a named person for $100, held to have no authority to trade it for another horse). The defendants place some reliance on New Britain Real Estate Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp. 112 Conn. 613, where a dealer in automobiles sold a vehicle to one Cox by conditional sale and assigned the vendor's interest to finance company A. The contract and assignment were duly recorded. Cox became in default and, without the knowledge of finance company A, the dealer again sold the automobile to Cox on a new conditional sale contract.

  2. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. v. Pagan

    Civil No. 3:19cv1205 (JBA) (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Intent is determined by performing a contextual analysis. See New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp., 153 A. 658, 659 (Conn. 1931) ("[T]he construction to be accorded the instrument is dictated by the intent of the parties . . . in light of the circumstances under which it was executed.") (internal citation omitted). For example, in Engleman, a policyholder was found to have substantially complied with her policy's requirements when she discussed changing her beneficiaries with her insurance agent and an attorney and wrote a letter to her insurance company looking to effectuate the change.

  3. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Pagan

    Civil No. 3:19-cv-01205 (JBA) (D. Conn. Sep. 2, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    In Connecticut, intent is examined under all the circumstances presented. See New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp., 153 A. 658, 659 (Conn. 1931) ("[T]he construction to be accorded the instrument is dictated by the intent of the parties . . . in light of the circumstances under which it was executed.") (internal citation omitted). For example, in Engleman, a policyholder was found to have substantially complied with her policy's requirements when she discussed changing her beneficiaries with her insurance agent and an attorney and wrote a letter to her insurance company looking to effectuate the change.

  4. Grote v. A. C. Hine Co.

    148 Conn. 283 (Conn. 1961)   Cited 18 times

    Blakeslee v. Water Commissioners, 121 Conn. 163, 182, 183 A. 887; Baier v. Smith, 120 Conn. 568, 571, 181 A. 618. The intention of the parties to a contract is to be determined from the language used, interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. Ives v. Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427; Patzloff v. Kasperovich, 116 Conn. 440, 441, 165 A. 349; New Britain Real Estate Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 615, 153 A. 658. The trial court found, however, that the arrangement for the use of the Ford by the plaintiff was not a modification of the contract. The defendant seeks to substitute for that conclusion one to the effect that the understanding of the parties following the execution of the written contract constituted a modification of its terms.

  5. Auto. Accep. Corp. v. Univer. Corp.

    216 Md. 344 (Md. 1958)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the reservation of a legal title for security purposes under a contract of conditional sale constitutes an encumbrance and precludes the idea found in older definitions that encumbrance is limited to real property

    Since the elements of belief in, a right to believe in, and trust on the strength of, ostensible title in the buyer, evidenced by possession, are all entirely lacking in the instant case, the statute no more applies than it did in Mohr and Gunby. If the statute does not apply, it must follow that Automobile Acceptance got nothing. Code, 1951, Art. 8, § 2 (relied on by Judge Oppenheimer below, and found by the majority not to be applicable); Lynn Morris Plan Co. v. Gordon (Mass.), 146 N.E. 685; Colella v. Essex County Acceptance Corp. (Mass.), 192 N.E. 622; Commerce Union Bank v. Overall (Tenn. App.), 274 S.W.2d 15; Commercial Credit Co. v. Neel (Fla.), 107 So. 639; Federal Credit Co. v. Scoggins (Miss.), 130 So. 153; New Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp. (Conn.), 153 A. 658. As the majority opinion concedes (and Judge Markell in National Store Fixture Sales Co. assumed at page 608 of 196 Md.), there cannot be a second valid agreement of sale for the same chattel between the same parties, and Suburban Nash could not have enforced the second agreement against Thomas. Neither could have Automobile Acceptance since it derived whatever title and rights it got from Suburban Nash and not from Thomas.

  6. Saporiti v. Austin A. Chambers Co.

    134 Conn. 476 (Conn. 1948)   Cited 24 times
    Stating that "[t]estimony of the [party] as to the value of the furniture was proper, although no qualification other than his ownership of it was shown"

    The claim of law as to the measure of damages was undoubtedly sound. New Britain Real Estate Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 617, 153 A. 658. The furniture was not available, and indirect evidence of value was all that could be offered. In determining that value, the original cost of the furniture, the way in which its use had affected it, and the increased cost of buying new furniture were all elements which might properly be considered; Barker v. Lewis Storage Transfer Co., 78 Conn. 198, 201, 61 A. 363; Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 271, 85 A. 529; see Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 337, 122 A. 91; and, as indicative of the way the plaintiff and his wife had kept it, the testimony as to its condition was not so remote that the trial court could not in its discretion admit the evidence.

  7. Hansel v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co.

    49 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1946)   Cited 23 times

    So far as appears, it had no knowledge when they were returned whether Hastings' indebtedness to the plaintiff had been paid; but it could easily have ascertained the true fact; and the trial court could well conclude that it took the securities with knowledge of the lien and that the charge created by it still existed. When stocks which it originally held as collateral or any stocks lawfully substituted for them and so subject to the lien created by exhibit E were returned to it, it took them subject to that lien as a first charge upon them. It might lawfully return any of them to Hastings without liability to the plaintiff; but if it so disposed of them as to place them beyond the reach of the lien it would be liable for the damages so caused. Munson v. Munson, 24 Conn. 115, 126; 65 C.J. 39, 50; and see Terry v. Bamberger, 44 Conn. 558, 562, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,837, 14 Blatchf. 234; New Britain Real Estate Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 616, 153 A. 658; Terzano v. Clemente, 117 Conn. 267, 270, 167 A. 825. Much of the controversy in the trial court and before us turned on the question whether Hastings increased his indebtedness to the defendant beyond the limits fixed in exhibit F without the approval of the Hartford bank and the defendant.

  8. Shaw v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.

    120 Conn. 633 (Conn. 1936)   Cited 8 times

    Whether a particular provision in such a policy binds or confers rights upon only one or the other of the immediate parties, exclusive of any third party to be benefited under its terms, depends upon their intent, which is determined by construing the provisions of the policy in the light of circumstances shown to have existed when it was issued. Mullen v. Reed, 64 Conn. 240, 249, 28 A. 478; New Britain, R. E. T. Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 615, 153 A. 658; Baydrop v. Second National Bank, 120 Conn. 322, 327, 180 A. 469. The provisions in a policy governing the method by which the insured may exercise his power of appointment by changing the beneficiary, are ordinarily for the sole benefit of the insurer.

  9. Tassinary v. Moore

    446 A.2d 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    Gilbert v. Walker, 64 Conn. 390, 394, 30 A. 132; Coleman v. Francis, 102 Conn. 612, 615, 129 A. 718." New Britain R. E. T. Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 616, 153 A. 658 (1931). We conclude, therefore, that the complaint sets forth a cause of action in common law conversion, that it further sets forth sufficient facts to render the defendants' decedent, as a parent, prospectively liable through the operation of General Statutes 52-572, and that the granting of the motion to strike the complaint as legally insufficient was in error.

  10. Velasco v. Rojas

    1999 Ct. Sup. 2680 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    Gilbert v. Walker, 64 Conn. 390, 394, 30 A. 132; Coleman v. Francis, 102 Conn. 612, 615, 129 A. 718." New Britain R. E. T. Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corporation, 112 Conn. 613, 616, 153 A. 658 (1931) Tassinary v. Moore, 38 Conn. Sup. 327 (1982). I find plaintiff has sustained the burden of proving his complaint for conversion.