Opinion
CV176040424S
04-15-2019
Robin Nevelos v. Carly Marie Kreshpan
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Tanzer, Lois, J.T.R.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Tanzer, J.T.R.
The plaintiff, Robin Nevelos, instituted this action to recover money damages for personal injuries claimed to have been sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident on Interstate 84 East in Cheshire, Connecticut on June 27, 2017. The defendant, Carly Marie Kreshpan, was the operator of a motor vehicle which collided with a vehicle operated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims she sustained injuries to her left forearm, left wrist, chest pain, pain and suffering, both mental and physical, and inability to participate in and enjoy her usual activities.
The matter was heard by the court on April 2, 2019. The defendant disputes damages, causation and liability for causing the injuries. Thus, the issue before the Court is the amount of fair, just and reasonable compensation for injuries sustained by the plaintiff and caused by the defendant.
"[I]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blasco v. Commercial Linens, LLC, 133 Conn.App. 706, 709, 36 A.3d 737 (2012). "It is well established that [t]he trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness ... The trier can, as well, decide what— all, none, or some— of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Hryniewicz, 51 Conn.App. 627, 633, 724 A.2d 531, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 904, 731 A.2d 310 (1999). The trier of fact must evaluate the credibility of both testimonial and documentary evidence. See Coombs v. Phillips, 5 Conn.App. 626, 627, 501 A.2d 395 (1985) (per curiam).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The plaintiff testified as did her husband. Additionally, the plaintiff submitted documentary evidence. Based on the evidence, the court finds as follows: The plaintiff was traveling home from work on I-84 at about 4:45 p.m. There were three lanes with cars mostly on the right. The plaintiff got into the left lane because the right lane was congested. The collision occurred when the plaintiff saw the defendant’s car coming sideways towards her. The plaintiff moved as far left as she could and applied her brakes as hard as she could. The back end of the defendant’s car hit the plaintiff’s car perpendicularly. The plaintiff’s airbag deployed, her glasses came off and her car ended up close to the jersey barrier. She felt pain in her left arm, wrist and chest. During the accident, the only thing she saw was that she had "T-boned" the defendant’s vehicle. It was when she got out of her car that she saw the defendant’s car had multiple damages and that multiple vehicles were in disarray on the highway. She saw a motorcyclist laying on the ground; she learned the motorcyclist was a fatality. The plaintiff was transported by ambulance to the hospital where her wrist was x-rayed. She had pain and discomfort in the wrist and pain in her chest from the impact of the seat belt. She had anxiety, was sent home, and told to rest. The pain persisted for about a week. She was out of work for about 3 days
The plaintiff continues to be very anxious and fearful about being on the highway and driving. She never had anxiety as driver or passenger in a car before the accident. She was not anxious about driving prior to the accident. She was a very confident driver. Now, she tries not to go anywhere. Presently, she drives through the area of the accident because she has to go to work. This triggers a sense of not being in control. Her anxiety as a passenger may be worse than as a driver because she feels no control. Before the accident she and her husband would take day trips and short vacations out of state by car; since the accident, they do not take car trips. She does not like to fly.
The plaintiff did not have prior treatment for anxiety about driving. She has not sought medical treatment for her anxiety since the accident but resorts to self-help books, breathing exercises and is learning meditation. Her gynecological doctor prescribed Xanax after the accident for her anxiety, as was done for her anxiety when her father died but she has taken the Xanax very rarely.
DAMAGES
The parties stipulated that the plaintiff has a life expectancy of 27.5 years. They further stipulated that her medical expenses and lost wages total $2,746.96. They are at issue over what is reasonable compensation for her pain and suffering and loss of her ability to participate in and enjoy her usual activities as a result of her anxiety. Damages awarded for emotional distress may be valid "even though it is not substantially based on incurred medical expenses." Oakes v. New England Dairies, Inc., 219 Conn. 1, 13-14, 591 A.2d 1261 (1991). "The test is whether the amount awarded, aside from medical expenses, falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages ..." Id. at 15. Emotional injury is compensable in a negligence action where it is "a natural and proximate consequence of a physical injury." Malloy v. Sally Beauty Supply, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-16-6027295-S (January 5, 2017, Vacchelli, J.) (63 Conn.L.Rptr. 680). In consideration of the evidence, the court awards the plaintiff $2,746.96 in economic damages and $18,000 in noneconomic damages for a total of $20,747 compensatory damages.
CONCLUSION
Judgment may enter for the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $20,747 plus costs.