Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-02-2152
November 20, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Plaintiffs, Teresa and Larry Neumeyer, filed this action pro se on November 26, 2002, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are Jeffery Beard, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") and Kenneth Kyler, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon ("SCI-Huntingdon"). Presently ripe for disposition are the Plaintiffs' and the Defendants' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 15 22).
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (Doc. 12), and Motion to Strike (Doc. 29) were disposed of by separate Orders by this Court. (Docs. 34 and 33, respectively)
I. Summary Judgment Standard.
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue of fact is "genuine' only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the nonmoving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-694 (3d Cir. 1988) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is initially upon the movant. Forms, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 314, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem. 725 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983). Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Id. The nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file" designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In doing so, the court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id., quoting Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985); Goodman v. Mead Johnson Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
II. Statement of Material Facts.
The material facts are largely undisputed by the parties. The Plaintiffs, who are citizens of Michigan, arrived at SCI-Huntingdon on various dates, including May 28, 2001, and May 27, 2002, to visit Mrs. Neumeyer's father, Preston Pfeifly, who was an inmate at the prison. On both of the stated dates, the Plaintiffs parked their vehicle on the prison's property. According to DOC policy, any visitor's vehicle parked on prison property is subject to search. There are 4 foot by 3 foot signs posted at all entrances of the prison and before entering the visitors' parking lot which put visitors on notice that their vehicles and personal property are subject to search. (Doc. 24). The prison policy does not require Correction Officers ("CO's") to have a search warrant, probable cause or a reasonable suspicion before they decide to search a vehicle of a prison visitor parked on prison property. The vehicles of prison visitors parked on prison grounds are subject to random searches after the owner gives written permission for the search. If the visitor refuses to give permission for the search, then the visitor will not be allowed to enter the prison to visit any prisoner on that day or any further visits until authorization is given by the prison Facility Manager. (Doc. 16, pp. 4-5).
On May 28, 2001, and May 27, 2002, the Plaintiffs' vehicle parked on prison property was randomly selected for searches by the CO's of the Drug Interdiction Unit (DILI). The DILI was started in 1995 by the DOC to deal with the introduction of drugs and prohibited items into state prisons. (Doc. 24, Attachment #1, pp. 3-4). Before both of the searches were conducted, Mrs. Neumeyer signed a written consent to search vehicle form. There is no claim that any contraband was discovered in the Plaintiffs' vehicle on either occasion. (Doc. 16, pp. 4-5). If a visitor parks his vehicle off of the prison property and out of the tower officers' sight, or the visitor is dropped off at the prison and the driver does not park the vehicle on prison property, then the vehicle is not subject to search by the CO's. Not every visitor vehicle is searched, and the vehicles to be searched are chosen randomly without any written standards as to vehicle selection and search techniques. (Doc. 16, p. 6). SCI-Huntingdon has prisoners who work and live outside of the prison and they could possibly access the vehicles of visitors parked at the prison. (Doc. 24, Attachment #1, p. 5).
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the searches of their vehicle as prison visitors by the DOC violates the Fourth Amendment. The Plaintiffs challenge the prison policy as well as the conduct of the prison officials in carrying out the policy, since they had no warrant and no suspicion of contraband. Plaintiffs state that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their vehicle and that the suspicionless searches at issue did not meet the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Plaintiffs seek only declaratory and injunctive relief without any monetary damages. (Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ VII.21.). Defendants contend that since the Plaintiffs undisputedly consented to the searches, the Court should analyze this case under the First Amendment's right of association and should uphold the constitutionality of the DOC's policy that requires visitors to submit to searches when their vehicles are parked on prison property.
There is no personal involvement alleged by the Plaintiffs with respect to the searches of their vehicles by either Secretary Beard or Superintendent Kyler. Neither Defendant is alleged to have been present during the searches or to have participated in the searches. Further, the Defendants are not alleged to have played any role in the selection of the Plaintiffs' vehicle for the searches on the days in question.
III. Discussion.
A. Section 1983 Claim.
In a § 1983 civil rights action, the Plaintiff must prove the following two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct complained of deprived the Plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the law or the Constitution of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
It is well established that personal liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed upon a state official based on a theory of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 1546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976); Parratt, supra. It is also well settled in the Third Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a § 1983 case and that a complaint must allege such personal involvement. Id. Each named defendant must be shown, through the complaint's allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences upon which Plaintiff's claims are based. Id., As the Court stated in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998):
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity. (Citations omitted).
A civil rights complaint must state time, place, and responsible persons. Id. Courts have held that a defendant state official has the requisite personal involvement for section 1983 liability where: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
In this case, it appears that the Plaintiffs have named the two Defendants with respect to their roles in implementing and allowing the alleged unconstitutional search policy of prison visitors' vehicles to occur at SCI-Huntingdon. B. Fourth Amendment Claim.
We agree with the Defendants that the Fourth Amendment standards requiring an expectation of privacy and reasonableness which the Plaintiffs rely upon in this case are not applicable. Thus, the Plaintiffs' lengthy dissertation on the Fourth Amendment in their Brief is not relevant to the issue in this case. (Doc. 16, pp. 9-20). See Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 629-630 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The Fourth Amendment does not afford a person seeking to enter a penal institution the same rights that a person would have on public streets or in a home. It is clear that a prisoner does not have a due process right to unfettered visitation." Thus, a person "does not have a right to unfettered visitation of a prisoner that rises to a constitutional dimension." By seeking to enter a prison, "the visitor simultaneously acknowledges a lesser expectation of privacy." "Prison authorities have much greater leeway in conducting searches of visitors. Visitors can be subjected to some searches,. . ., merely as a condition of visitation, absent any suspicion.").
We do not find that a car search of a visitor parked on prison property is an invasive search, like a strip and body cavity search is, such that the prison officials must have at least a reasonable suspicion that the visitor has contraband prior to conducting a search of the vehicle. Compare Spear, 71 F.3d at 630 (Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion of contraband before prison officials can conduct a strip and body cavity search of visitor).
It is well-settled that convicted prisoners, their family and spouses have no constitutional right to visitation. See Young v. Vaughn, 2000 WL 1056444 at *2 (E.D. Pa.); See Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1989); Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1985); Africa v. Vaughn, No. CIV. A. 96-0649, 1996 WL 65445, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1996); Walters v. United States, No. CIV. A. 94-1801, 1995 WL 144657, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 14, 1995); Buehl v. Lehman, 802 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F. Supp. 922, 934 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993); White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md. 1997), aff'd, 588 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1978). Further, there is no Pennsylvania prison regulation which explicitly mandates the admission of visitors. See Africa v. Vaughn, 1996 WL 65445 at *1 (E.D. Pa.).
In Flanagan, 783 F. Supp. at 934, this Court stated that "[v]isitation is a privilege subject to revocation at the discretion of the Warden when necessary to ensure security and maintain order in the institution. Prison authorities have discretion to curtail or deny visitation if they deem appropriate, and no due process right is implicated in the exercise of that discretion."
Since neither Pennsylvania law nor the Constitution confer upon outside persons, including family members such as Plaintiffs, the right to visit prison inmates, the search of the Plaintiffs' vehicle is not scrutinized under the Fourth Amendment standards, as the Plaintiffs argue it should be. Nor do we find that the DOC's policy regarding the searches of visitors' vehicles should be analyzed under the First Amendment's right to free association, as the Defendants urge us to do. (Doc. 24, pp. 4-5). We find that the Defendants' reliance on the First Amendment is misplaced. In DeWitt v. Wall, 2001 WL 1136090 at *3 (D. R.I.), the court stated that "the essence of prison visitation, is not the ideological association recognized by the Courts as protected by the First Amendment." (citations omitted). The DeWitt Court further stated that "[p]risoners have no associational right to receive visitors, whether it be a spouse, children [as in our case], or anyone else grounded in the First Amendment." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded by stating that "[f]reedom of association is inconsistent with an incarcerative penal system and the Plaintiff's status as a convicted person." Id.
The First Amendment right to associate has been interpreted to associate ideologically "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." DeWitt v. Wall, 2001 WL 1136090 at *3 (D. R.I.) ( Citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977).
Because we find no constitutional right to be implicated, either under the Fourth Amendment or the First Amendment, the DOC's searches of the Plaintiffs' vehicle, to be upheld, must only meet legitimate penological objectives. See Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991). Prison officials are afforded wide-ranging deference with respect to their policies and actions, especially relating to safety issues such as presented in our case. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977). In light of this deference, the prison officials do not have the burden to demonstrate affirmatively that their policy meets these objectives. Id. In this case, the Plaintiffs have not shown that the DOC's search policy of visitors' vehicles parked on prison property fails to meet the DOC's safety objectives which were identified in Kyler's Declaration. (Doc. 24, Attachment #1). Thus, the searches of Plaintiffs' vehicle do meet legitimate penological objectives, i.e. to prevent drugs and contraband in the prison and to reduce assaults in the prison. ( Id). See Justice v. Suits, 1992 WL 341293 (7th Cir.) (Illinois couple sued state prison officials under § 1983 alleging that the search of their car when visiting a prisoner violated their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit Court affirmed the District Courts' finding that, since state law did not afford outside persons the right of prison visitation, the prison officials' search of Plaintiffs' car was upheld as meeting legitimate penological objectives.).
Moreover, even if there was a fundamental right to visitation, the DOC policy which conditions a person's ability to visit a prisoner when the person parks his vehicle on prison property to the consenting to a vehicle search when randomly selected, would still be valid if "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," as the Defendants contend. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The factors for determining reasonableness are as follows:
1) a rational connection between the prison decision and the governmental interest supported; 2) the existence of alternative means of exercising the abridged right; 3) the impact of an accommodation of the abridged right on prison resources; and 4) the absence of alternatives for exercising the right at de minimis cost to penological interests. Id. at 89-91.Young, 2000 WL 1056444 at * 2.
We agree with the Defendants' contention that the DOC's policy to randomly search visitors' vehicles parked on prison property is clearly related to the legitimate penological interest of maintaining security in and around the prison by assuring that contraband is not introduced into the prison for the protection of the staff, the visitors and the inmates. (Doc. 24, p. 6). In fact, as Kyler avers, SCI-Huntingdon has outside prison work details and inmates who live outside the prison walls who may have access to visitors' vehicles parked at the prison. (Doc. 24, Attachment #1 at ¶ 13.). Thus, there is a rational connection between searching visitors' vehicles parked on prison property and prison security. "Visitors are a security risk, and deference should be given to prison officials' visitation decisions." Young, 2000 WL 1056444 at * 2 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Abu Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1998)). See also Spear, 71 F.3d at 630 ("Prisons are dangerous places for inmates, employees, and visitors.").
There were alternate ways to accommodate the Plaintiffs if they did not want their vehicle subject to searches. First, they could have parked off the prison property and outside of the tower officers' sight. Second, they could have had someone drive them to the prison and drop them off. They could also keep in contact with inmate Pfeifly through telephone calls and correspondence via the U.S. mail. ( Id. at ¶'s 12.-15.). Thus, the Plaintiffs had several alternative means of avoiding the search of their vehicle and still visiting with or communicating with Mrs. Neumeyer's father.
We concur with the Defendants that there is an adverse impact if the DOC were to abandon its policy of randomly searching visitors' vehicles parked on prison property. As stated, it is well-recognized that visitors to a prison are security risks. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984). As the Spear Court stated, courts have repeatedly "[struck] the balance in favor of institutional security, . . . and accord great weight to the `professional expertise of corrections officials.'" 71 F.3d at 630 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Defendants have shown that after the institution of the search policy and the DILI there was a reduction in inmate assaults on staff and inmate assaults on inmates as a result of the policy. ( Id. at ¶ 16.).
In our November 12, 2003, Order, we struck only the "I believe" phrase of the last sentence of ¶ 16. of Kyler's Declaration in ruling upon Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the entire sentence. (Doc. 33).
Therefore, the Defendants' action of implementing a prison policy which subjects visitors' vehicles parked on prison property to random searches is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, namely prison security. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. Accordingly, even if the Plaintiffs had a First Amendment associational right to visit their relative inmate, as the Defendants maintain, this right was properly restricted by the DOC policy.
There are no genuine issues of any material facts in dispute. We thus find that the Defendants are entitled to an entry of summary judgment.
IV. Recommendation.
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) be granted and that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) be denied. It is also recommended that judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 2003.Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within ten (10) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.