Opinion
April 26, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barron, J.).
Ordered that the order dated March 31, 1998, is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
To be relieved from a default, a party must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable excuse and a meritorious defense ( see, Garkusha v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 259 A.D.2d 466; Domenikos v. Miranda, 255 A.D.2d 481; Chavez v. Errico, 255 A.D.2d 353). Contrary to the defendant's contentions, his conclusory assertions that he defaulted in his defense of the action because he was burdened by "mental and physical stress" and "financial strain" resulting from his defense of factually-related criminal charges that ultimately led to his conviction and disbarment ( see, Matter of Greenblatt, 212 A.D.2d 83), do not constitute a reasonable excuse ( see, Whitney v. Stewart, 175 A.D.2d 674; Smith v. Fritz, 148 A.D.2d 438; Zolov v. Donovan, 138 A.D.2d 484; Burks v. Weiss, 137 A.D.2d 646; Smallridge v. Macalaster Bicknell Co., 134 A.D.2d 880). Moreover, the defendant failed to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense. Thus, the court properly denied the defendant's motion insofar as he sought to vacate his default.
Nevertheless, "[i]t has long been held that courts have inherent power beyond that which is contained in the CPLR * * * to open defaults * * * and where the amount awarded on a default judgment has been perceived as excessive the courts have exercised their inherent power to modify or reduce the amount" ( Cervino v. Konsker, 91 A.D.2d 249, 253; see, Midnight Ears v. Clear-Vu Packaging, 81 A.D.2d 907; see also, Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325). Here, the complaint did not state a claim for punitive damages ( see, CPLR 3215 [b]; Chew Wah Bing v. Sun Wei Assn., 191 A.D.2d 361). Moreover, there is no indication in the record as to what proof, if any, the plaintiffs adduced at the inquest to satisfy their burden of establishing their entitlement to punitive damages ( see, Paulson v. Kotsilimbas, 124 A.D.2d 513; see also, Strauss v. 926 Park Ave. Corp., 184 A.D.2d 293). An unwarranted and excessive award after inquest will not be sustained, as to do otherwise "would be tantamount to granting the plaintiffs an 'open season' at the expense of a defaulting defendant" ( Brosnan v. Behette, 186 A.D.2d 165, 167; see also, Bohlman v. Bohlman, 114 A.D.2d 832). Under the circumstances at bar, the Supreme Court providently exercised its inherent power by vacating only so much of the default judgment as awarded the plaintiffs the principal sum of $400,000 for punitive damages.
S. Miller, J. P., O'Brien, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.