Opinion
Civ. 3:22-CV-253
05-17-2023
EDWARD NESGODA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ROONEY, et al., Defendants.
Mariani Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Factual Background
This civil rights lawsuit comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by one of the named defendants, Cristopher Rooney. (Doc. 12). This motion to dismiss alleges that, as to this individual defendant, Nesgoda's civil rights complaint is flawed on a number of scores. As discussed below, we agree and recommend that this motion to dismiss be granted.
We note that there is also a motion to dismiss filed by the District Attorney's Office of Schuylkill County, Rooney's co-defendant. (Doc. 7). We will address that motion thorough a separate Report and Recommendation.
The well-pleaded facts in Nesgoda's complaint, which control the assessment of this motion to dismiss, recite that on or about February 21, 2019, Defendant Rooney, a state trooper, filed a series of state criminal charges against Nesgoda, including Terroristic Threats-Terrorize Another; Terroristic Threats-Serious public Inconvenience; and Disorderly Conduct-Create Hazard/Offensive Condition. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Nesgoda was arrested, had an initial appearance on these charges and remained confined for some six weeks until he was able to post bail. (Id., ¶¶ 16-18). Thus, Nesgoda recites that by April 2019, he was released on bail from these state charges to what Nesgoda describes as “onerous” conditions of release. (Id.) On July 10, 2019, the district attorney's office then filed a Criminal Information against Nesgoda charging him with these state offenses. (Id., Exhibit A). Nesgoda asserted his innocence, proceeded to trial, and on February 14, 2020, was found not guilty of these offenses. (Id., ¶ 23).
Based upon these factual averments Nesgoda's complaint, which was filed on February 23, 2022, asserted the following claims against Defendant Rooney: federal civil rights claims grounded in false arrest, malicious prosecution, and failure to intervene. (Id.) (Counts I, II and V). Nesgoda then pursued state law common law claims of defamation, false arrest, and malicious prosecution against the district attorney's office. (Id.) (Counts IV, VI, VII). Finally, in his complaint Nesgoda has filed a damages claim premised upon the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Id.) (Count VIII).
Defendant Rooney has now moved to dismiss this complaint citing a host of legal deficiencies in Nesgoda's averments as they relate to this defendant. (Doc. 12). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss should be granted, in part, and denied, in part, as follows: The motion should be GRANTED with respect to Counts I, IV, V, VI and VIII of the complaint, but DENIED as to the remaining counts of the complaint without prejudice to the renewal of any defenses through a properly documented motion for summary judgment.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal __U.S.__, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when dismissing a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by the mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather in conducting a view of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (Id., at 1950.) Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment.”) However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is against these benchmarks that we evaluate Nesgoda's claims against Defendant Rooney.
B. Defendant Rooney's Motion to Dismiss Should be Granted, in Part, and Denied, in Part.
A number of the claims against Defendant Rooney set forth in Nesgoda's complaint encounter insurmountable legal obstacles. Therefore, Rooney's motion to dismiss should be granted in part, as discussed below.
1. The Complaint May Be Time-Barred, at Least in Part.
At the outset, these claims may run afoul of the statute of limitations. It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.' 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the ''continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.'' Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991). In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n.9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983)). The consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, Nesgoda's federal civil rights claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution would have become ripe, been readily apparent, and attained the degree of permanence which would have triggered Nesgoda's obligation to timely file this lawsuit when Nesgoda was acquitted of these state charges on February 14, 2020, (Doc. 1, ¶ 23). Yet, Nesgoda's complaint was not filed until February 22, 2022, more than two years later.
Thus, on the face of the complaint itself, Nesgoda's claims are presumptively time-barred. For his part, while Nesgoda does not directly dispute this chronology, he appears to advance some sort of tolling argument, asserting that he attempted to file the complaint electronically on the evening of February 13, 2022, but due to some dispute with the clerk's office regarding whether the plaintiff's filing fee had been processed, he was required to resubmit the complaint on February 22, 2022, the filing date noted on the court's docket. (Doc. 14, at 7-9).
Beyond presenting a cautionary tale concerning the dangers of waiting to file a complaint on the eve of the statute of limitations, these averments may create a factual question regarding the wholesale application of the statute of limitations as a bar to all claims in this case. However, even if we accept that this factual dispute precludes complete dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds, it remains clear that at least some of the plaintiff's claims are untimely and should be dismissed.
For example, in Count I of his complaint, Nesgoda brings a federal civil rights claim grounded in allegations of a false arrest. As to such civil rights, false arrest claims, the law is clear concerning when a claim accrues. On this score, it is well settled that:
Federal law, not state law, determines when a limitations period begins to run. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law, the statute of limitations runs from the moment that a claim accrues. Id. And a claim accrues when the last act needed to complete the tort occurs.....For a false arrest, that is the moment when legal process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the moment of release. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390-91, 127 S.Ct. 1091.Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018).
In the instant case, Nesgoda's complaint alleges that he was arrested in February of 2019 and after initial proceedings were conducted was released on bail some six weeks later, in April of 2019. Therefore, the two year limitations period for the false arrest claim, which would begin to run at the time of release, commenced in April of 2019 and would have expired by April 2021. Nesgoda's complaint was then filed some ten months later in February of 2022, well beyond the limitations period prescribed by law. Thus, as to Count I, this claim is time-barred.
By the same token, Count VI of Nesgoda's complaint brings a state common law false arrest claim against the defendants. Applying the same, settled claims accrual analysis which courts have adopted to false arrest claims brought as civil rights violations pursuant to §1983, the statute of limitations on this false arrest claim began to run in April of 2019, and the two year limitations period would have expired 11 in April of 2021. Therefore, this claim would also run afoul of the applicable limitations period.
Likewise, Count IV of the complaint, which alleges a state law defamation claim, is also time-barred. In this regard the law is also clear. By statute in Pennsylvania: “The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within one year: (1) An action for libel, slander or invasion of privacy.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5523(1). According to Nesgoda, the defamatory acts alleged in his complaint were the criminal charges lodged against him. To the extent that these charges were defamatory, this alleged defamation commenced in February of 2019 and concluded no later than when he was acquitted in February of 2020. Given Pennsylvania's one year statute of limitations on defamation claims, in order to be timely filed this defamation claim should have been lodged with the court no later than February 2021. It was not. Instead, another year elapsed before Nesgoda filed the defamation claim set forth this complaint in February of 2022. Therefore, this claim is also time-barred and should be dismissed.
Accordingly, at a minimum, Counts I, IV and VI of the complaint are time-barred and should be dismissed.
2. Nesgoda's Failure to Intervene Claim also Fails as a Matter of Law.
Count V of Nesgoda's complaint brings a constitutional failure to intervene claim against Rooney, asserting: “Each Defendant had a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene from the moment prior to plaintiff's actual arrest on February 21, 2019, to immediately prior to the formal “Not Guilty” verdict of the Jury regarding the criminal charges against Plaintiff on February 14, 2020, to prevent the constitutional violations of Plaintiff s federally protected rights as claimed herein, but no Defendant did so”. (Doc. 1, ¶ 68). This claim also fails as a matter of law for a single, simple reason. Typically failure to intervene claims are confined to a post-conviction correctional context when prison staff allegedly fail to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force against an inmate. Indeed, as recently as August 2021, the Third Circuit has refused to acknowledge a failure-to-intervene claim in the context of a criminal arrest and prosecution, noting that:
[W]hile the Sixth Circuit has extended failure-to-intervene liability to the false arrest context, holding that an officer is liable if he “observes or has reason to know” of a false arrest and has “a realistic opportunity to intervene,” Bunkley v. City of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552, 565-66 (6th Cir. 2018), we have not done so to date. Nor need we today . . . .Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 246 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2021).
Given the current state of the law in this circuit, which declines to recognize a failure to intervene claim in a criminal arrest and prosecution context, at a minimum this particular claim fails on qualified immunity grounds. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that should be considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for civil damages brought pursuant to section 1983 “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). To determine whether an official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1) whether the official violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first).
A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. To be clearly established, there does not have to be a case that is directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,741 (2011)). In determining whether a right is clearly established, courts must not define the right “at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074.) Rather, the analysis should focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).
In this regard, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. It is the plaintiff who bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the claimed violation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.”).
To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may look to cases from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit courts. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017)). Unpublished cases cannot establish a right because they do not constitute binding authority. El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). In rare cases, the unlawfulness of a government official's conduct may be established from the obviously unlawful nature of the defendant's conduct “even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
Judged by these legal benchmarks, Nesgoda's failure to intervene claim against Trooper Rooney fails because it is evident that the constitutional right he asserts simply is not clearly established in the context of criminal arrests. Far from there being a controlling Supreme Court decision or a robust consensus of circuit court authority supporting this failure to intervene claim, the Third Circuit has expressly refused to extend this doctrine beyond its settled correctional confines to the setting of a criminal arrest and prosecution. Lozano, 9 F.4th at 246 n. 4. Therefore, this claim is also subject to dismissal as a matter of law.
3. Nesgoda May Not Bring Damages Claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Further, Count VIII of Nesgoda's complaint which asserts a claim for damages premised upon the Pennsylvania constitution also fails as a matter of law. As we have previously noted in this regard:
To the extent that the plaintiff[] [is] pursuing a pendent state constitutional claim for damages, it is clear that this claim fails, since “Pennsylvania law does not include a statutory equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for damages because of a federal constitutional violation.” Gary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., No. 1:13-CV02540, 2014 WL 2720805, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2014). Accordingly, “[t]he prevailing view in this circuit is that ‘Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for damages in a suit alleging violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' ” Hamilton v. Spriggle, 965 F.Supp.2d 550, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2013) citing Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 207 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Farrell v. County of Montgomery, No. 05-3593, 2006 WL 166519, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2006); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, No. 031212, 2005 WL 283628, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2005). Thus, the state constitution does not provide legal footing for any damages claims like
those made by the plaintiff in this case. Simply put, “[n]o Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 Fed.Appx. 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011). Therefore, this claim for damages premised upon alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.Best v. Merakey USA, No. 3:19-CV-1124, 2020 WL 12740398, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2020).
Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
4. Nesgoda's Remaining Claims Are Not Subject to Dismissal on the Pleadings.
As for Nesgoda's remaining false arrest and malicious prosecution claims leveled against Defendant Rooney, these claims which are cast as both constitutional and common law torts share a common element: Nesgoda alleges that the was arrested and prosecuted without probable cause. In his motion to dismiss, Rooney challenges these averments, and invites us to dismiss these claims because he contends that Nesgoda has failed to assert sufficient facts to support his claim that probable cause was lacking here. Recognizing that the parties' dispute turns on the question of probable cause, a matter which can rarely be addressed on the pleadings alone, we recommend that the court deny Rooney's motion to dismiss these claims, without prejudice of consideration of this issue on a more fully developed factual record through a properly documented motion for summary judgment.
We recommend this court mindful of the fact that the plaintiff's claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution implicate his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and now Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. Const. amend IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under § 1983. See Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)). To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, to succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “that the officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant'; and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.'” Meyers v. Wolkiewicz, 50 Fed.Appx. 549, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Similarly, to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a claimant must show that:
(1) [The] defendant commenced a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; (3) defendant “initiated the proceeding without probable cause”; (4) defendant acted maliciously or with a purpose apart from bringing plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff “suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)). We note that in a case where a claim of malicious prosecution is brought against a police officer,
Police officers (as opposed to prosecutors) may be liable for malicious prosecution if they “conceal or misrepresent material facts” to the prosecutor. Halsey, 750 F.3d at 297 (quoting Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004)). In particular, an officer is liable if he “fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, makes false or misleading reports to the prosecutor, omits material information from the reports, or otherwise interferes with the prosecutor's ability to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to prosecute.”Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Finnemen v. SEPTA, 267 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017)).
On this score, the existence of probable cause for an arrest is typically a question of fact for a jury, unless the evidence “reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may determine the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F.Supp.2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010). But in any event, the question of probable cause is often a fact- bound determination which presents an issue that is not amenable to resolution on the pleadings alone.
So it is here. In his complaint, Nesgoda has alleged that Rooney instituted these charges without probable cause and failed to consider certain unidentified, but allegedly exculpatory, facts. In our view, construing the complaint liberally and viewing the facts alleged in a light favorable to the plaintiff, Nesgoda has alleged sufficient facts at this stage to support the inference that this arrest was made without probable cause, and accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against him arising out of that arrest were initiated without probable cause. Thus, it would be inappropriate to dismiss his claims at this early stage in the proceedings. Instead, the question of the legal sufficiency of these claims should await another day, and another motion in the form of a fully documented motion for summary judgment where we may foray beyond the pleadings to an examination of the underlying and undisputed facts.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendant's motion to dismiss, (Doc. 12), be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: The motion should be GRANTED with respect to Counts I, IV, V, VI and VIII of the complaint, but DENIED as to the remaining counts of the complaint without prejudice to the renewal of any defenses through a properly documented motion for summary judgment.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.