Opinion
No. 3:19-cv-01611-HZ
02-10-2021
KEVIN NESBIT, Plaintiff, v. JASON TUCK, doing business as Happy Valley, OR City Manager; STEVEN CAMPBELL, doing business as Director of Public Safety for the City of Happy Valley, OR; and CITY OF HAPPY VALLEY, Defendants.
Kevin Nesbit 14705 SE Badger Creek Road Happy Valley, OR 97086 Pro se Plaintiff Gerald L. Warren Aaron Hisel Law Office of Gerald L. Warren and Associates 901 Capitol Street NE Salem, OR 97301 Attorneys for Defendant
OPINION & ORDER Kevin Nesbit
14705 SE Badger Creek Road
Happy Valley, OR 97086
Pro se Plaintiff Gerald L. Warren
Aaron Hisel
Law Office of Gerald L. Warren and Associates
901 Capitol Street NE
Salem, OR 97301
Attorneys for Defendant HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Kevin Nesbit brings this action against Defendants City of Happy Valley ("City"), City Manager Jason Tuck, and City Director of Public Safety Steven Campbell, alleging due process violations in connection with a traffic citation. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons discussed, the Court grants Defendants' Motion.
BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2018, two Clackamas County Sheriff's Deputies issued Plaintiff a citation for Driving a Motor Vehicle While Using a Mobile Electronic Device under Oregon Revised Statute § 811.507. Tamlyn Decl., Ex. 1 ("Def. Ex. 1") at 1, ECF 26-1. On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff made the required first appearance, via a City provided form, by pleading "not guilty" and requesting a trial. Id. at 3. Plaintiff requested the trial notice be sent to 14705 SE Badger Creek Rd, Happy Valley, OR, 97086. Id. On June 7, 2018, a trial notice was sent to Plaintiff to inform him that his trial was scheduled for June 20, 2018. Id. at 4; Tamlyn Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 26. When Plaintiff failed to appear at his trial, Judge Emily Oberdorfer found him guilty of the traffic violation and entered judgment against him. Def. Ex. 1, at 1. The judgment included a $1,000 fine for the violation and a $15 suspension fee, which Plaintiff has paid in full. Id. at 5-6, 15.
Despite being informed that he cannot "simply rely on what [his] complaint says" and needed to "submit [his] own evidence in opposition" to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Def. Mot. 2, ECF 23. The Court therefore accepts Defendants' uncontroverted version of the facts in analyzing the motion. To the extent that Plaintiff did attempt to submit evidence, it appears he has altered the two envelopes he attached to his Response in an attempt to deceive the Court and manufacture a disputed issue of fact. See Pl. Resp. 6-7, ECF 29; Def. Reply 7-10, ECF 30 (explaining Plaintiff's alteration and noting he used a similar tactic in an attempt to deceive the Clackamas County Circuit Court). Because the authenticity of the envelopes does not change the legal analysis, the Court need not resolve the issue.
On June 25, 2018, Plaintiff called the Happy Valley Municipal Court and spoke to Kim Carrier and Defendant Campbell about missing his trial date. Campbell Decl. ¶¶ 1-4, ECF 24; Carrier Decl. ¶¶ 1-3, ECF 27. Over the next few days, Plaintiff gave ever-shifting explanations for why his attempts to notify the municipal court of his temporary address in California did not succeed. Campbell Decl. ¶¶ 2-4. However, Plaintiff admitted to Campbell that he received the trial notice at his home in Happy Valley but that it had ended up in a roommate's mail slot. Id. at ¶ 4; Pl. Resp. 2, ECF 29 (asserting he "specifically told [Defendants] the mail slots are in the house not a mail slot operated by the US Post Office").
On June 28, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the municipal court requesting a new trial. Def. Ex. 1, at 13. In that letter, Plaintiff acknowledged that he made a "few mistakes," "missed [his] court date," and that he should have called the municipal court to verify it was aware that he was on an out-of-state work assignment. Id. He did not, however, claim that he never received the trial notice. Id. On July 9, 2018, Plaintiff wrote another letter to the municipal court in which he stated that he would proceed with an appeal if the court did not grant his request for a new trial. Id. at 17. He asserted that he was under the mistaken impression that he had misplaced the trial notice when he wrote the first letter but had come to learn after an "intensive investigation . . . with the help of some witnesses namely the US Post Office and a neighbor . . . . that the notice was never sent to [his] address[.]" Id. Judge Larry Blake, Jr. denied Plaintiff's request for a new trial on July 18, 2018. Id. at 19.
Plaintiff appealed the traffic citation to the Clackamas County Circuit Court. Hisel Decl., Ex. 1, ECF 28. In response to the City's motion to dismiss his appeal, Plaintiff argued that the municipal court sent his trial notice to the "wrong address" and that he "deserved his day in court." Id. at 31, 38. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on September 10, 2018 and denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on October 12, 2018. Id. at 28, 42.
Plaintiff initiated this action on October 7, 2019. Compl., ECF 1. He filed his Amended Complaint on December 12, 2019. Am. Compl., ECF 6. He alleges the City mailing his trial notice to the wrong address and Defendant Campbell and Tuck's failure to "order the court [to] give [P]laintff a new trial" were "clear violation[s] of Due Process." Id. Plaintiff "prays for a judgment in the amount of $1,015.00 in traffic citation fees," the cost of the filing fee for his appeal, a "5% increase" in vehicle insurance estimated at "$300 year," and "punitive and monetary damages in the amount of 2.500,000 [sic]." Id. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 23).
STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011). If the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim as to the existence of a material issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support its claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Heck preclusion doctrine; (3) Plaintiff's supervisory claims against Campbell and Tuck fail as a matter of law; and (4) Campbell and Tuck are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the first three arguments are dispositive, the Court need not reach the qualified immunity issue.
"Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court." Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Instead, such jurisdiction is vested solely in the United States Supreme Court. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (giving the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over certain appeals of the final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state).
"The clearest case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when 'a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision[.]'" Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). The doctrine bars lower federal courts "from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment." Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) ("[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.").
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine asks:
[I]s the federal plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment, or does he present some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party? If the former, then the district court lacks jurisdiction; if the latter, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.
Additionally, "[i]f a federal plaintiff seeks to bring a forbidden de facto appeal, that federal plaintiff may not seek to litigate an issue that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judicial decision." Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the "inextricably intertwined" language is "not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal" but rather a distinct, second step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis, triggered only where the action contains a de facto appeal). "A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling." Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
Typically, "Rooker-Feldman does not bar a federal plaintiff from" bringing an action based on "extrinsic fraud," such as a claim "that an adverse party engaged in 'conduct which prevented a federal plaintiff from presenting his claim in [state] court.'" Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859 (quoting Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004)). But if the "extrinsic fraud" claim was itself brought before the state court and adjudicated, Rooker-Feldman will bar a subsequent federal action raising that issue. Id. at 860 ("[E]ven assuming that the misconduct that the Reussers allege rises to the level of extrinsic fraud, such claim was itself separately litigated before and rejected by an Oregon state court.").
In his appeal of the traffic citation, Plaintiff claimed the municipal court mailed the trial date notice to the wrong address. Hisel Decl., Ex. 1 at 6 (Plaintiff arguing the "Happy Valley Municipal Court fail[ed] to notify [him] of [his] court date in a timely manner . . . . violat[ing his] rights to a fair hearing" and that "the notice was never sent to [his] address . . . but to a previous address"). The Clackamas County Circuit Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, as well as Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Id. at 28, 42; see also Am. Compl., ECF 6 (Plaintiff alleging he "requested a reconsideration from the courts but it was denied"). Thus, the state court has already been presented with, and rejected, Plaintiff's claim that his traffic infraction conviction was reached in violation of his due process right to fair notice.
Here, Plaintiff claims he was denied due process when the Happy Valley Municipal Court "inaccurately mailed" his trial notice to the wrong address. Am. Compl. He alleges the municipal court's error caused him to fail to appear at his trial, which in turn caused the court to find him guilty of the traffic violation. Id. He seeks a reversal of the fine assessed by the court and the filing fee for his appeal. Id. In other words, Plaintiff makes the same inadequate notice argument already rejected by the state court. He then asks this Court to grant him relief from his state court judgment on the basis that it was handed down in violation of his due process right to fair notice. Under Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff's federal claim is an impermissible de facto appeal of the state court judgment. The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's inadequate notice claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff's cause of action is also barred, in part, by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Heck holds that a plaintiff may not bring a "§ 1983 suit [that] would 'necessarily imply' or 'demonstrate' the invalidity of the earlier conviction," unless the plaintiff can also show that the conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff's traffic violation conviction has not been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by a habeas writ. Thus, Plaintiff's inadequate notice claim is Heck-barred because finding in Plaintiff's favor on that claim—i.e., that he was convicted of a traffic violation without constitutionally adequate process—would "necessarily imply the invalidity" of his conviction. Heck, 529 U.S. at 487; see also Ng v. Miki, 98 F. App'x 651, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Heck-doctrine to traffic violations); Dauven v. Oregon, 44 F. App'x 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff contests the merits of his traffic ticket conviction, those assertions are plainly Heck-barred. See Am. Compl. (alleging his traffic violation "defies the laws of physics"); Pl. Resp. 1-2 (arguing he "disputes the material facts of the citation" and offering various explanations for why he is not guilty of the violation). --------
However, Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendants Tuck and Campbell for failing to order the municipal court to give him a new trial does not fall under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because that alleged injury was not "caused by a state court judgment, but rather . . . an adverse party[.]" Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. And the Court need not decide whether the claims against Tuck and Campbell are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment because the claims fail on the merits. Plaintiff's theory of liability against Campbell and Tuck hinges on his allegation that they "have the authority to order the court [to] give the plaintiff a new trial but both refused to." Am. Compl. Unsurprisingly, Campbell and Tuck have no authority to order the municipal court to grant Plaintiff, or anyone, a new trial. Campbell Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5; Tuck Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF 25. Thus, Defendants have established that Plaintiff cannot prove his theory of liability as to Campbell and Tuck and they are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [23].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 10, 2021.
/s/_________
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ
United States District Judge