Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2951-12T1
06-02-2014
NEPTUNE LODGING REALTY, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP PLANNING BOARD and HAMPTON INN AT JUMPING BROOK CORPORATE PARK, Defendants-Respondents.
R.S. Gasiorowski argued the cause for appellant (Gasiorowski & Holobinko, attorneys; Mr. Gasiorowski, of counsel; Alexis L. Gasiorowski, on the briefs). Kevin F. Sheehy argued the cause for respondent Neptune Township Planning Board (King, Kitrick, Jackson & McWeeney, attorneys; Mr. Sheehy, on the brief). Mark R. Aikins argued the cause for respondent Hampton Inn at Jumping Brook Corporate Park (Mr. Aikins, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-001068-12.
R.S. Gasiorowski argued the cause for appellant (Gasiorowski & Holobinko, attorneys; Mr. Gasiorowski, of counsel; Alexis L. Gasiorowski, on the briefs).
Kevin F. Sheehy argued the cause for respondent Neptune Township Planning Board (King, Kitrick, Jackson & McWeeney, attorneys; Mr. Sheehy, on the brief).
Mark R. Aikins argued the cause for respondent Hampton Inn at Jumping Brook Corporate Park (Mr. Aikins, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Neptune Lodging Realty, LLC, appeals from an order that dismissed its action in lieu of prerogative writs to challenge a decision by defendant Neptune Township Planning Board (the Board). We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Lawrence M. Lawson in his written opinion.
In 2009, Jumping Brook Corporate Park (Jumping Brook) applied to the Board for a Preliminary and Final Major Site Plan Approval of a corporate park at the intersection of Jumping Brook Road and New Jersey Highway Route 66 (Route 66). The development was planned for a site on 31.19 acres located in the C-1 Zoning District, which permits planned commercial development to "serve the regional need for retail, professional office and research facilities," including office space, hotels, lodging facilities, and restaurants. The project entailed two phases. Phase I included a 44,000 square-foot, two-story office building; a 180,000 square-foot, six-story office building; and a parking garage. Phase II consisted of a six-story, 109-room hotel, and a 7,000 square-foot, 270 seat restaurant.
Plaintiff, the owner of property on Route 66 in Neptune, was present at the hearing on Jumping Brook's application and voiced its objections. However, the Board granted the application in May 2009 with the adoption of Resolution 09-12 (the 2009 Resolution).
The resolution stated in pertinent part:
The Ordinance Section 412.18 prohibits parking in the front yard setback. The applicant proposes parking in the front yard setback for Phase II, thus creating a need for a variance.The requested variance was granted as part of the 2009 Resolution. The resolution also granted a waiver for parking in the front and side yards of the property but did not specify or limit the variance in the front yard setback to any one of the three surrounding streets.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the 2009 Resolution. Among the issues plaintiff raised in that action was that the Board acted arbitrarily by granting the approval without requiring evidence regarding the use of the restaurant, specifically whether it would contain a bar, since a bar is not a permitted use in the C-1 zone. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Board and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in June 2010. Specifically addressing plaintiff's argument regarding the Board's failure to require proof as to whether a bar was planned, the court stated,
Bars are not a permitted use in the zone. If the applicant intends to install a bar in the proposed restaurant, it must seek a use variance as well as necessary approvals. The argument is totally without merit.
Plaintiff did not appeal from that judgment.
Jumping Brook assigned the approvals to defendant Hampton Inn at Jumping Brook Corporate Park (Hampton Inn), who then sought to proceed with a smaller project in which only the hotel and restaurant would be developed. In January 2012, Hampton Inn made an amended application (the January Application) to the Board. Hampton Inn sought to realign the restaurant so that it fronted Route 66, which in turn required realignment of the parking areas, and to increase the square footage of the hotel. Hampton Inn and its expert witnesses took the position that these changes required waivers, rather than variances.
Plaintiff appeared and objected to the proposed amendments, arguing that the proposed changes required variances, not waivers. The Board disagreed and granted the amended application by adopting Resolution 12-10 in February 2012 (the February 2012 Resolution). In March 2012, plaintiff filed a second complaint in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the February 2012 resolution.
On March 25, 2012, while that complaint was pending, the Board heard and approved a second amended site plan application filed by Hampton Inn (the March Application). This application sought to enclose a previously approved pool, to revise the location for the generator, and to fortify a retaining wall and improve drainage. Hampton Inn further requested four variances related to signage, all of which were approved.
After voting in favor of the resolution and learning the construction would not be using union labor, Board member Eric Houghtaling, a union member, recused himself because of his strong feelings about non-union work. Houghtaling certified that he had no financial stake in the project.
Oral argument was held regarding plaintiff's challenge to the February 2012 Resolution. On January 22, 2013, Judge Lawson dismissed plaintiff's complaint, setting forth his reasons in a thorough and well-reasoned written opinion.
In this appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in affirming the Board's decision for the following reasons: (1) a variance was required for parking in the front yard of the relocated restaurant; (2) the applicant failed to address the need for a setback variance arising from the revisions to the hotel structure; (3) the Board improperly precluded inquiry as to the use of the proposed restaurant; (4) the plaintiff objector was unduly prejudiced by the discourtesy and comments of the Board members; (5) the Board's action was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the applicant was required to obtain a variance and failed to provide proof to support a variance; (6) the announced conflict/recusal of Board member Houghtaling created a need for discovery as to his possible conflict on the subject approval; and (7) the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the application it approved on March 25, 2012 because plaintiff had filed suit to contest the prior approval.
Public bodies possess a "peculiar knowledge of local conditions [and] must be allowed wide latitude in the exercise of delegated discretion." Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 296 (1965); accord Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005). A board's decision "enjoy[s] a presumption of validity, and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013). "In evaluating a challenge to the grant or denial of a variance, the burden is on the challenging party to show that the zoning board's decision was 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Kramer, supra, 45 N.J. at 296).
In his written opinion, Judge Lawson squarely addressed the issues raised by plaintiff in light of the applicable legal principles. In concluding that no variance was required for the proposed changes, Judge Lawson reviewed the history of the subject application, the variance previously approved, and the requested revisions in light of the applicable ordinances. He found that no variance was required and further, that the Board's decision was supported by adequate evidence. He concluded that plaintiff's argument regarding the Board's failure to require proof as to whether a bar would be included in the restaurant was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as that issue was found to lack any merit in the prior action. Judge Lawson criticized remarks made by a Board member to plaintiff as "completely inappropriate and unprofessional," but found that plaintiff "was given every opportunity to voice its objections and was not prejudiced by the Board's remarks." Judge Lawson rejected plaintiff's argument that discovery was required to explore a Board member's possible conflict of interest, finding he had no conflict of interest when he voted on the revised site plan in January 2012. Finally, Judge Lawson also rejected the argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the March application, finding that the January and March applications were unrelated.
Having reviewed the record, briefs, and arguments of counsel, we are satisfied we need not add to Judge Lawson's thoughtful analysis of the issues presented and affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in his opinion.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION