Opinion
Record No. 0472-94-3
Decided: January 25, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE, James F. Ingram, Judge
Barbara Hudson for appellant.
James A. L. Daniel (Daniel, Vaughan, Medley Smitherman, P.C.; Robert J. Smitherman, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Barrow and Koontz
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
In this appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in providing in a final support decree that the husband was required to pay certain expenses for the maintenance of his wife and children. Therefore, we reverse the award of spousal support and, as a consequence, also reverse the trial court's award of child support. Furthermore, we find no error in the manner in which the court approved the transcript.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
The court ordered the husband to pay $300 monthly spousal support to the wife and, further, directed the husband to pay certain "debts on behalf of [the wife] and such payments shall be considered spousal support." The debts were specified and included loan payments, insurance premiums, and real estate taxes.
Although a divorce action was pending, these payments were not ordered as pendente lite support under the provisions of Code Sec. 20-103(A). See Taylor v. Taylor, 203 Va. 1, 5, 121 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1961); Taylor v. Taylor, 5 Va. App. 436, 441, 364 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1988). Rather, they were ordered in an appeal from an award of child and spousal support by the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Consequently, the award was final subject to modification only upon a showing of a change of circumstances. See Hiner v. Hadeed, 15 Va. App. 575, 577, 425 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1993).
The jurisdiction of a trial court to award support is statutory; Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 415, 429 S.E.2d 208, 214 (1993); Dixon v. Dixon, 244 Va. 539, 539, 423 S.E.2d 169, 170 (1992); Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 178-79, 355 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1987); and no statute authorizes a trial court to require a spouse to pay specific expenses as part of a final decree of support. On the contrary, the contents of a child or spousal support award, as prescribed by statute, contemplate an "amount of periodic support expressed in fixed sums." Code Sec. 20-60.3(6). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in requiring the husband to pay specific expenses in addition to an award of a determinable amount and the decree must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
CHILD SUPPORT
Because the award of child support was determined based upon the amount of the spousal support awarded, the award for child support must also be reversed so that upon remand it may be redetermined based upon the new spousal support award. See Code Sec. 20-108.2(C).
TRANSCRIPT
Finally, we find no error in the manner selected by the trial court to resolve the wife's claim that the transcript contained inaccuracies and omissions. The court referred the matter to a commissioner in chancery, who "reviewed the tapes . . . and compared [them] to the written transcript . . . in the presence of counsel" for both parties, and determined the transcript to be accurate.
For these reasons, the decree awarding child and spousal support is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.