Opinion
C. A. 3:24-2427-JFA-PJG
05-20-2024
John C. Nelums; Delmarshi Nelums, Plaintiffs, v. Hutchens Law Firm, LLP; PHH Mortgage Corporation; Cascade Funding Mortgage; John S. Kay; Jeanette McBride; Joseph Strickland; Sean Adegbola; Ashley Z. Stanley; Alan M. Stewart; Sarah O. Leonard; Gregory Wooten; Louise M. Johnson; LPS Default Solutions Inc.; W. Jeffrey Barnes, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiffs John C. Nelums and Delmarshi Nelums, proceeding pro se, filed this action seeking relief from a state foreclosure action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed this action on a self-styled pleading that seeks injunctive relief from a state court foreclosure action. The pleading is seventy-one pages long and is mostly incoherent legal jargon. But, the gist of the pleading is that the master in equity presiding over Plaintiffs' foreclosure action, Defendant Jospeh Strickland, is prejudiced and biased against them, and therefore, Plaintiffs ask this court to intervene and remove him from the case.
This is the third case before this court in which Plaintiffs sought relief from the foreclosure proceedings. In the first case, they sued numerous companies and organizations in state court claiming that their mortgage and note were not transferred properly. The defendants removed the case to this court, which granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See C/A No. 3:20-2932, ECF No. 43. In the second action, filed originally in this court, Plaintiffs sued the same defendants and their attorneys, along with other entities, claiming that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to launder money through real property transactions in violation of RICO and federal criminal law. The court found the lawsuit to be frivolous and summarily dismissed it. C/A No. 21-2161, ECF No. 15.
Here, Plaintiffs allege the other defendants engaged in a conspiracy with the master in equity “to rig bids in violation of the antitrust laws” and “to engage in criminal fraud related to those contracts.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiffs do not clearly explain who the other defendants are, but the Hutchens Law Firm, LLP, represented the defendants in the first lawsuit discussed above. Many of the individual defendants are either attorneys, legal staff, or real estate professionals involved in the foreclosure. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-18.) Defendant Jeanette McBride is the Richland County Clerk of Court. Plaintiffs cite to numerous statutes, laws, legal cases, and legal canons that do not appear to have any bearing on their foreclosure action. Plaintiffs do not clearly raise a legal cause of action in the Complaint or state with any coherence what relief they seek, but they broadly indicate that they seek an injunction. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 68-69.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint is not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).
Plaintiffs paid the filing fee in this case. (ECF No. 1.)
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed because it is frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (providing that a claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)); see also Ross, 493 Fed.Appx. at 406. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should also be denied. (ECF No. 2.) Of note, the pleading was filed twice on the docket-first as the Complaint (ECF No. 1), and second as a motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 2). The documents appear to be identical.
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiffs' Complaint is mostly unreadable, as it is seventy-one pages of legal jargon that does not provide a plain explanation of what this case is about, what relief Plaintiffs seek, and from whom they seek it. Thus, the pleading is neither “short” nor “plain,” and its incoherence prevents the court from understanding the Plaintiffs' theory for why the court has jurisdiction or how they are entitled to relief. Plaintiffs also fail to list recognizable legal causes of action and support them with facts that show which defendants are liable for each. See generally Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Even liberally construing the pleading in light of Plaintiffs' pro se status, the court is able to glean only that Plaintiffs are seeking to remove a master in equity from their state foreclosure action in a Richland County court. But such relief is generally not available in a federal court. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing, as exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the limited circumstances justifying federal court interference in state civil proceedings). And, Plaintiffs do not provide a coherent explanation of why they believe the master in equity is biased. Consequently, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' lawsuit is frivolous and should be dismissed.
Thus, it is also unclear how this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”); see also In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998) (requiring the court to sua sponte determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appear”).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).