The defendant bank knew all the facts, and the other defendants had access equally with the plaintiff to all facts disclosed on the records. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 379. Augello v. Hanover Trust Co. 253 Mass. 160, 167.

The question for decision is whether, solely on the findings reported by the judge, considered as above stated, the decree was rightly entered. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 378. Melville Shoe Corp. v. Kozminsky, 268 Mass. 172, 174.

The plaintiff's appeal brings the case here. The facts found must be accepted as true since the evidence is not reported. The question to be determined is whether on those facts the decree was right. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377. Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 98. The facts relevant to the grounds of this decision are these: The defendant, on May 15, 1931, entered the service of the plaintiff as manager of the meat department of its store at Squantum.

Peabody v. Dymsza, 280 Mass. 341, 342. The entry of a final decree dismissing the bill imports the drawing of all rational inferences against the plaintiff so far as necessary to that result. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 379. Such decree must be affirmed if it could lawfully have been entered on the facts found.

No ground for estoppel is set out in the bill. Boston Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 291. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 379. Hamilton Manuf. Co. v. Lowell, 274 Mass. 477, 484. The decision was based on the first count. It is not disputed that the ground of liability stated in the second count would have been within the terms of the policy and would have justified, if not required, the insurance company to appear in the case even if it was under no liability for an injury caused as stated in the first count.

There is nothing in the record to shake that finding. Cleaveland v. Draper, 194 Mass. 118. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377. Meyerovitz v. Jacobovitz, 263 Mass. 47, 48. The soundness of the decree depends upon the interpretation of G.L.c. 206, § 23.

The only question before this court is whether, upon the facts found, the decree was rightly entered. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377. Commissioner of Banks in re Cosmopolitan Trust Co. 249 Mass. 144. Wood v. Culhane, 265 Mass. 555. The facts found in substance are as follows: "In 1754 John Doan owned a parcel of land in Boston at the southerly corner of Marlborough (now Washington) and School streets.

The lease was not given until 1923. There could be no estoppel by this act in giving the lease subsequent to the defendant's encroachment on the way. Boston Albany Railroad v. Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 291. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 379. A.W. Dodd Co. v. Tarr, 251 Mass. 189. The plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to remove the fence.

First Baptist Society in Brookfield v. Dexter, 193 Mass. 187, 189. Hale v. Blanchard, 242 Mass. 262, 264. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 378. The claims of the commissioner of banks, so far as they relate to collection of notes and the enforcement of stockholders' liability, are of no interest to the opponents of the orders for decrees.

The defendant never requested the plaintiff to furnish the stone. Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377, 379. The plaintiff has not argued that there was any novation.