Opinion
No. 1:00CV01007
January 17, 2002
JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered contemporaneously herewith,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [8] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Cathleen Nelson's Motion for Summary Judgment [12] is denied.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on motions for summary judgment by both parties. Plaintiff Cathleen Nelson claims that Defendant Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc. ("Thomasville") violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") when it required her to submit to a medical examination. Nelson also claims that her subsequent discharge violated the ADA, and she moves for summary judgment as to liability on both of these issues. Thomasville asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because the medical examination was proper under the ADA, and because Nelson does not meet the ADA definition of disabled. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion will be denied, and Defendant's motion will be granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff began working at Thomasville in 1981, and by all accounts her performance throughout her employment was exemplary. In 1992, Plaintiff was transferred to the cabinet department as a "Utility Operator #1." This position is the most skilled and highest paid non-supervisory position requiring Plaintiff to work at each of the various stages of the cabinet production line. (Adams Aff. ¶ 4.) During any given shift, the job could require any or all of the following: standing for up to GX hours, walking for an average of one hour, bending, pulling, pushing, twisting, reaching, continuous lifting of objects less than 15 pounds, and intermittent lifting of objects less than 30 pounds.
Plaintiff decries Defendant's failure to produce her performance evaluations and points to this as evidence of bad faith. Defendant asserts that the evaluations were simply misplaced and has conceded that they were satisfactory. We will assume for our purposes here that Ms. Nelson exceeded expectations in each of the missing evaluations. As will be explained, Plaintiff's performance evaluations are not relevant to the legal questions presented by this case.
Unfortunately, throughout her employment, Plaintiff was plagued by a long list of ailments that prevented her from working on many of the cabinet line positions, often relegating her to positions requiring less skill. (Adams Aff. ¶ 10.) Starting in 1988, Plaintiff began experiencing pain in her hands. In 1989, she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. By 1991, she was experiencing severe arthritis-related pain in her hands such that even small tasks caused discomfort. The pain was severe enough for Plaintiff's doctor to order work restrictions on the use of Plaintiff's hands. Plaintiff tried different medications, and Defendant attempted to accommodate her restrictions, but the pain persisted. In September 1998, Plaintiff's doctor concluded that Plaintiff would lose the use of her thumbs unless she had surgery.
Plaintiff's health problems were not limited to her hands; she also experienced pain in her back, neck, and hips, and she underwent cervical surgery in 1990. Plaintiff's back pain persisted, and in 1998 she was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Plaintiff went on medical leave from July 16 through August 31, 1998, because her doctor had prescribed work restrictions prohibiting Plaintiff from performing many essential requirements of her job. Defendant asked Plaintiff's doctor to provide a detailed list of any permanent work restrictions. Plaintiff's doctor directed Plaintiff to have a Functional Capacity Examination ("FCE") to determine any such restrictions. The FCE results indicated that Plaintiff should "avoid repetitive bending and static/sustained forward flexion (bending in trunk, knees straight)." (Def.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 28 at 2.) Further, the FCE imposed restrictions on the amount of weight that Plaintiff was permitted to handle. The FCE did not mention Plaintiff's hands, apparently due to a miscommunication between Plaintiff and the person conducting the examination.
Defendant's nurse evaluated the FCE and noticed the omission of any reference to Plaintiff's hands. However, Plaintiff had already returned to work, so Defendant decided to let her keep working until a second FCE could be performed. It was at this time, shortly after returning to work, that Plaintiff was diagnosed as needing surgery on her thumbs, and hence she was placed on leave again from October 8 through November 1, 1998. She then returned to work, and her doctor imposed no restrictions on her hands.
Plaintiff continued to experience pain in her hands, and continued to limit her own activity on the production line despite having no limits imposed by a doctor. (Def.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 237-38.) As Defendant became aware of Plaintiff's difficulties, it had another employee from its Safety Department evaluate Plaintiff's capacity to function on the job. He concluded that she was unable to perform her duties and should be demoted to a less demanding position. (Id. Ex. 39.) Defendant then requested that Plaintiff undergo a second FCE.
The second FCE focused on both Plaintiff's hands and back. It was conducted by a non-treating physical therapist. The results of the examination indicated that Plaintiff was precluded from performing most of the tasks included in her job description. These results were reviewed by a registered nurse at the doctor's office used by Defendant. She informed Defendant that Plaintiff was only suited for a "sedentary job which does not involve any repetitive lifting heavier than ten (10) pounds." (Id. Ex. 44.)
Plaintiff asserts that the second FCE was flawed because it was never evaluated by a doctor and because the therapist never observed Plaintiff on the job. Plaintiff cites no legal authority mandating any particular medical procedures, and the ADA itself contains no such provision. Even so, this argument might have carried more weight if not for the fact that Plaintiff's own doctor independently concurred with the results of the second FCE.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff remained at work in the cabinet department. After receiving the second FCE results, Defendant reviewed all available positions and found none that matched Plaintiff's restrictions. On April 28, 1999, Plaintiff was working on the cabinet line when Defendant terminated her employment. She was informed that the termination was based on the results of the second FCE, which indicated that she was unable to perform the necessary functions of her position.
Plaintiff subsequently asked her own doctor to review the FCE. He concurred that Plaintiff was only suited for a sedentary position. (Id. Ex. 46.) Plaintiff's medical problems continued unabated after her discharge. Plaintiff underwent spinal fusion surgery in November 1999. Recovery from this procedure took at least nine months, during which time Plaintiff was unable to perform even sedentary tasks.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where an examination of the pleadings, affidavits and other proper discovery materials before the court indicate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Where the evidence before the court could lead a reasonable juror to find for the nonmovant, a genuine issue of material fact exists and summary judgment is improper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). All of the facts must be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the burden is on the moving party to establish that no material factual issues exist.
A. Medical Examination
The ADA prohibits employers from requiring medical examinations of current employees unless the examination is "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(4)(A) (West 2001). The purpose of such inquiries is to allow employers "to determine whether an employee is still able to perform the essential functions of his or, her job." Porter v. United States Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.14(c)). An employer's request that an employee undergo a medical examination must be supported by evidence that would "cause a reasonable person to inquire as to whether an employee is still capable of performing his job." Sullivan v. River Valley School District, 197 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999)
Plaintiff does not dispute the propriety of the first FCE, nor does she dispute the results of the second FCE, which were later confirmed by her own doctor. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has failed to produce any evidence that the second FCE was job-related and consistent with business necessity because Plaintiff was performing her duties at the time she was directed to undergo the second FCE. However, Defendant has produced uncontested evidence of Plaintiff's long history of poor health, two recent extended medical absences, and Plaintiff's own admission that she was not performing all of the duties required of a Utility Operator #1 due to physical limitations. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Defendant to question whether Plaintiff was capable of performing her job. The mere fact that Plaintiff continued to perform her job in spite of the pain she experienced is not relevant to whether Defendant could request a medical examination under the ADA. See Johnson v. Goodwill Indus. of Eastern North Carolina, 5:97CV740 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
Plaintiff further contends that even if the second FCE were permissible under the ADA, it exceeded the permissible scope. Plaintiff cites no case law in support off this argument, but simply asserts that since Defendant's concern centered on Plaintiff's hands, the second FCE should have been limited to evaluating her hands. The ADA does circumscribe the permissible scope of medical examinations, requiring them to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. In interpreting this restriction, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has determined that medical examinations should be limited to determine whether an employee is able to perform "job-related functions." 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.14(c). The Sixth Circuit adopted the EEOC reasoning stating that the ADA does not permit "wide-ranging assessment[s] of mental or physical debilitation that could conceivably affect the quality of an employee's job performance." Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 812. In the case at bar, while it is true that the second FCE was not limited to Plaintiff's hands, it nevertheless did not go beyond evaluating Plaintiff's ability to perform job-related functions. Therefore, the second FCE did not exceed the permissible scope of medical examinations under the ADA.
B. Wrongful Termination
Plaintiff also claims that her termination violated the ADA. To establish a prima fade case of wrongful termination under the ADA, Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) she was discharged, (3) her job performance at the time she was discharged met her employer's expectations, and (4) the discharge gives rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination. Holbrook v. Michelin North America, Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001). Our inquiry begins and ends with the first prong of this test, whether Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability.
The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; . . . or being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). Plaintiff does not claim that she is disabled, but rather that Defendant regarded her as disabled. An employee is regarded as disabled when an employer mistakenly believes that the employee suffers from an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or when an employer mistakenly believes that an actual impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities when in actuality it does not. Holbrook, 252 F.3d at 703 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999)).
The fact that Plaintiff is not actually disabled as defined by the ADA is borne out by the recent Supreme Court opinion in Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Willaims, No. 00-1089, 2002 WL 15402 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2002). In that case, the Court decided that the plaintiff who suffered from various maladies including carpel tunnel syndrome that prevented her from performing manual tasks on the job was not substantially limited in a major life activity. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant regarded her as disabled because Defendant's interpretation of the second FCE disqualified her from "engaging in any job involving manual labor." (Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n at 18.) According to Plaintiff, this perception amounts to a substantial limit on a major life activity. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant must have regarded her as disabled when it requested a medical examination, or the request could not comport with the ADA restrictions on medical examinations. (Pl.'s Reply Br. Mot. Summ. J. at 5.) In other words, Plaintiff argues that the medical examination could not have been job-related and consistent with business necessity if Defendant did not regard Plaintiff as disabled.
The Third Circuit recently addressed this very argument and reached the opposite conclusion. The court stated that "a request for [a medical examination] that complies with [ADA] restrictions will never, in the absence of other evidence, be sufficient to demonstrate that an employer `regarded' the employee as [disabled]. . . ." Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 (3d. Cir. 2001). A proper request for a medical examination must be limited to evaluating whether the employee is fit for the specific job in question. Id. Such a request merely establishes that an employer has doubts about the employee's ability to perform her specific job, not that the employer regards the employee as substantially limited in a major life activity. Id.; see also, Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 811 ("A request that an employee obtain a medical exam . . . cannot itself prove perception of a disability because it does not prove that the employer perceives the employee to have an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the employee's major life activities.").
Similarly here, Defendant's request that Plaintiff undergo a second FCE is not sufficient to establish that it regarded Plaintiff as disabled. The request was supported by a reasonable belief about Plaintiff's capabilities and tailored to address the requirements of Plaintiff's job. Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment was based on the results of the second FCE. Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that Defendant regarded her as disabled as defined by the ADA. Therefore, her claim for wrongful discharge must fail.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
A judgment in accordance with this memorandum opinion will be entered contemporaneously herewith.