No. 01-03-01245-CR
Opinion issued October 7, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 209th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 932856.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices KEYES and ALCALA.
EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.
After a jury found appellant, Julian Javier Nelson, guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery, the trial court found true the enhancement paragraph, which alleged a prior conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and assessed his punishment at 30 years' confinement. In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because it was the product of an illegal search and seizure. We affirm.
Facts
On December 7, 2002, Thuan Van arrived at work. He sat in his car in the parking lot outside his employer's business waiting for the business to open. While Van was waiting, a man, later identified as appellant, drove up in a white Buick and parked near Van's car. The man got out of his car, approached Van, and asked him for a cigarette, which Van gave him. Suddenly, the man drew a gun, placed it against Van's head, and demanded his money. The man took Van's wallet and left; the wallet contained cash, credit cards, and Van's driver's license. Two days later, Officer Dorris, who was on patrol, saw a white Buick illegally parked in front of a fire hydrant, directly in front of a stop sign and blocking a moving lane. Dorris pulled up next to the Buick and saw appellant in the car with a passenger. Dorris got out of the patrol car to tell appellant to move his car. He made eye contact with appellant from about five feet away, but appellant put the car into gear. Dorris put his hands in the air, indicating that appellant should stop the car, and shouted, "Stop," but appellant drove away. Dorris activated his emergency patrol lights and followed the Buick. He could see a lot of downward movement in the vehicle, which led him to believe that something was underneath appellant's driver's seat. Appellant eventually stopped, and Dorris approached the car. Immediately on reaching the vehicle, Dorris saw that the passenger had marijuana in his hand in his lap. Appellant and his passenger continued to make nervous movements in the car. In response to Dorris' request for identification, appellant stated that he did not have any. After performing a quick pat down, Dorris arrested appellant, put him in the back seat of his patrol car, and proceeded to recover the narcotics in the Buick and look in the area of the car where he had seen appellant making movements. Dorris found a Cobra pistol with a large clip with live rounds inside. After finding the weapon, Dorris searched appellant's pockets, finding an identification card and several credit cards belonging to Van. Van's wallet was also recovered from the glove compartment of appellant's car. Van subsequently identified appellant in a lineup as the man who robbed him. At a pretrial motion to suppress, appellant argued that the evidence should be excluded as a result of an illegal arrest. Dorris testified that he observed appellant sitting in his car, which was illegally parked. When he stopped appellant's vehicle, he saw the passenger holding onto marijuana. Once appellant was arrested, Dorris searched the vehicle and recovered the wallet in the car's glove compartment and a handgun. Dorris testified that he also searched appellant's pockets and found identification and credit cards belonging to Van. Van also testified as to the events of the robbery. However, he was unable to identify the handgun found in appellant's car as that used in the robbery. The trial court ruled that the wallet and cards found in appellant's pockets were admissible, but the handgun would not be admissible. Discussion
In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In particular, appellant argues that Dorris had no probable cause to initiate the stop, and, therefore, Dorris's recovery of Van's identification and credit cards from appellant's pocket was the fruit of an unlawful stop. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that depend on credibility, while we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Id. Thus, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure and probable cause. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Wilson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). A violation of a traffic law provides sufficient authority for an officer to stop a vehicle. See Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). A routine traffic stop is a temporary investigative detention. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984). Moreover, an officer's observation of a traffic violation provides probable cause to arrest the driver. See Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Here, the record establishes that appellant violated Texas Penal Code section 42.03(a)(1), which provides that a person commits an offense if he obstructs a street. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 42.03(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Therefore, Dorris had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant's car and probable cause to arrest appellant, its driver. See Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (finding police officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to arrest the driver when the police officer observed the driver commit a traffic violation). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.