He argues the testimony of the chemist would have confirmed his theory. Whether to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37. Van Winkle v. State , 2016 Ark. 98, at 10, 486 S.W.3d 778, 786 (citing Nelson v. State , 344 Ark. 407, 412, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001) (per curiam)). Trial counsel must use his or her best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to the client.

The petition was denied, and this court affirmed the order. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). On February 19, 2008, petitioner filed in the trial court a pleading, asking the court to "rule on the merits of the issues" under the "nunc pro tunc rule."

The decision of whether to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37. See, e.g. , Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam). When assessing an attorney's decision to not call a particular witness, it must be taken into account that the decision is largely a matter of professional judgment that experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not in and of itself proof of counsel's ineffectiveness.

This court will not consider new matters not raised in the Rule 37 petition for the first time on appeal, unless they are so fundamental as to void the conviction. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 415, 39 S.W.3d 791, 797 (2001) (per curiam). Frazier contends that counsel failed to raise a Brady claim when it came to light, at trial, that Sharon Watts had given investigators detailed statements describing the relevant events.

The result was the same in Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001). Nelson claimed that his attorney should have contradicted the witness who testified against him by producing evidence that it had rained on the night in question after the witness testified that it had not rained.

The decision of whether or not to call a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37.1. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001). Trial counsel must use his or her best judgment to determine which witnesses will be beneficial to his client.

Camargo, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255. The burden is on appellant to provide facts that affirmatively support his claims of prejudice. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam); seeLong v. State, 294 Ark. 362, 742 S.W.2d 942 (1988) (placing burden on a petitioner under Rule 37.1 to allege grounds which show a factual basis for some entitlement to relief). Conclusory statements cannot form the basis of postconviction relief. Long, 294 Ark. 362, 742 S.W.2d 942.

[17-19] Generally, the decision whether to call a witness is a matter of trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule 37. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) ( per curiam); Coulter, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d 826. This applies to expert witnesses.

Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts and that provide no showing of prejudice are insufficient to warrant Rule 37 relief. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 413, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001) (per curiam). The burden is entirely on a petitioner to affirmatively support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim with factual substantiation sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective and to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's poor representation.

Conclusory allegations unsupported by facts and which provide no showing of prejudice are insufficient to warrant Rule 37 relief. Nelson v. State, 344 Ark. 407, 413, 39 S.W.3d 791, 795 (2001) (per curiam). Barber asserted in ground two of his amended petition, and reasserts in his second point on appeal, that his counsel purposely delayed his trial and otherwise failed to protect his right to a speedy trial.