Opinion
No. 76-3502.
September 20, 1976.
Bruce W. Nelson pro se.
Lawrence T. Girard, Decatur, Ga., for Rosenthal-defendant-appellee.
Appeal from The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
ORDERBefore GODBOLD, DYER and HILL, Circuit Judges.
On August 30, 1976, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a summons under the provisions to Title 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602 requiring that the defendant, accountant, Morris Rosenthal, produce certain records in his possession and control pertaining to a certain client, Bruce Nelson. The time for appearance was set for 9:00 a.m., E.S.T. September 13, 1976.
26 U.S.C.A. § 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized —
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
The summons called for:
All records of Bruce W. or Lonna J. Nelson, Pizza Ring # 5, Pete's A Pie, Craighead Kennels, or Aranaire which are currently in your possession.
Records of any and all work performed by you or your employees for the aforementioned individuals or businesses. To include, but not limited to:
(1) All workpapers used to prepare books, records, computer runs, financial statements, year end summaries, schedules, applications, or tax returns.
(2) Retained copies of the above.
(3) Correspondence for, from, or on behalf of the above.
(4) Records showing amounts received by you or your employees as a result of work done for or on behalf of the above.
On September 10, 1976, the plaintiff, Bruce Nelson, appeared pro se in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and presented his motion for a temporary restraining order naming only his accountant as a defendant. A complete copy of the complaint is attached as an appendix to this opinion. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant from producing the records summoned by the IRS. The district court declined to enter any temporary restraint. On September 13, 1976, upon motion of the plaintiff, this court stayed compliance with the summons in order that this matter might receive more thorough consideration.
In an attempt to expedite this matter the court contacted counsel for the defendant and Regional Counsel for IRS as well as the United States Attorney's office. Counsel for the defendant expressed his desire to cooperate fully with the court in this matter, but indicated his neutrality with regard to the merits. The Internal Revenue Service through the Department of Justice indicated it would not file a brief in the matter.
While denominated an emergency appeal, it would appear that the pro se plaintiff may be seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant him the relief sought. Upon careful consideration we decline to grant such relief, or to issue any other ruling that would require the district court to act on the matter favorably to the plaintiff.
It is, of course, clear that temporary restraining orders are not appealable. Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 1969); Chandler v. Garrison, 394 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1967); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1965); Ross v. Evans, 325 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1963).
Even a cursory reading of the plaintiff's complaint reveals that his controversy is with the Internal Revenue Service. However, neither the Commissioner nor any of his agents are named as a defendant. Instead, the gravamen of the complaint is a threatened breach of an implied contract between the plaintiff and his personal accountant. The threatened breach, it is asserted, results from the fact that an Internal Revenue agent has caused a summons to be issued and served upon the defendant-accountant under the provisions of Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. The summons requires the defendant to appear to give testimony and to produce certain records relating to the financial affairs of the plaintiff. It is the alleged threat that the defendant-accountant will voluntarily respond to the summons that brought the plaintiff to the district court.
Plaintiff has carefully not invited the Internal Revenue Service to this litigation by naming it or its agents as parties. However, he instinctively recognizes that he is really seeking relief against that agency when, in his prayer for a temporary restraining order, he demands restraint of "all enjoining Defendants [sic], and each of them, and their agents . . . from examining investigation [sic] or observing all records . . . concerning the Plaintiff . . . that are in the possession of [sic]/or control of the Defendant . . . .
It is to be noted that there have been no proceedings instituted by the government under Title 26 U.S.C.A. § 7604 or otherwise to obtain an order of court enforcing the summons.
In light of the fact that under United States v. Miller, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); Fisher v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 93 S.Ct. 611, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), there is little, if any, likelihood that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in this litigation based upon his claimed Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights (or First and Ninth Amendment assertions raised in a memorandum), we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to issue temporary restraint. We pretermit any decision as to the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain this action apparently between two Georgia citizens based upon an alleged anticipatory breach of contract.
In a Memorandum of Points and Authorities the plaintiff also implies that the summons is being improperly used for a criminal investigation. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971).
Thus, the application of the plaintiff for "reversal" on appeal or mandamus is hereby DENIED and the case remanded to the district court for such further proceedings as it deems necessary.