Opinion
09-28-1907
NELSON v. NEW JERSEY SHORT LINE R. CO. et al.
Ephraim Cutter, for complainant. Willard P. Voorhees, for defendant.
Suit by Meyer C. Nelson against the New Jersey Shore Line Railroad Company and others. On bill for a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant from taking land for railroad purposes without first making compensation. Injunction denied.
Ephraim Cutter, for complainant. Willard P. Voorhees, for defendant.
STEVENSON, V. C. After learning that an appeal had been taken in this case from the order advised by me denying the motion for an injunction on terms, it became my duty to set forth in writing the reasons for the order which I had advised. Before undertaking this work, a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain a railroad company from appropriating land before making compensation therefor was argued before me in the case of Menge v. Morris & Essex Railroad Company, 67 Atl. 1028. The argument and disposition of this motion involved the consideration of practically everything which had been presented and discussed in this Nelson Case, except the definition of the conditions to which the defendant must submit in order to prevent the issuing of an injunction. The opinion in the Menge Case, which has recently been filed, follows the decision in this case and discusses the same at some length, and might perhaps be referred to as a sufficient statement of the reasons which in my judgment sustain the order made in this case in which the appeal has been given.
In each of these cases the defendant, a railroad corporation, stood before this court as a trespasser, and the trespass consisted in the attempted appropriation of lands of the complainant for the defendant's railroad, in violation of the constitutional and statutory rules which protect private property owners against injustice and oppression on the part of corporations. The general rule was recognized that the writ of injunction will go to restrain such a trespass, even in the absence of any facts showing the inadequacy of the complainant's remedy at law. Pratt v. Roseland R. R. Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 150 (1892) 24 Atl. 1027, and cases cited on page 154; 1 Pom. Eq. Rem. p. 762; Kerr on Inj. (4th Ed. 1903) 85; Lewis on Em. Dom. § 631; Morris Canal Co. v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. 294 (1875); Hart v. Leonard, 42 N. J. Eq. 417 (Ct. of E. & A., 1886), 7 Atl. 865; Township of Franklin v. Nutley Water Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 601, 606 (1895), 32 Atl. 381. In 1871 Chief Justice Beasley sitting for the Chancellor expressed a doubt whether the modern English doctrine above set forth had been adopted in New Jersey. Erie R. R. Co. v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 283. 292. I think, however, that notwithstanding the peculiar reversal of Vice Chancellor Van Fleet's decision in Pratt v Roseland R. R. Co., supra, by the Court of Errors and Appeals without opinion or explanation (58 N. J. Eq. 585, 47 Atl. 1132), the modern English doctrine has been repeatedly recognized as in force in this state, especially since the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Hart v. Leonard, supra.
The rule under consideration, however, seems to rest upon the policy of restraining corporations from willful and intentional aggression as the authorities above cited amply show. But where the appropriation of the complainant's property is not of such a character—where the corporation has intended ingood faith to comply with the law, but finds itself by some accident or mistake in the position of a trespasser—the reason for the general rule to a large extent seems to fail, and the question whether or not an injunction should issue remains to be determined after due weight has been given to those considerations which are deemed important or controlling in all cases where a preliminary injunction is applied for to restrain an ordinary trespass. Wood v. Charingcross Ry. Co., 33 Beav. 290 (1883); Pickert v. Ridgefield Park R. R. Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 316 (1874); Lanterman v. Blairstown R. R. Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 1 (1877); Mettler v. Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 214 (1874); Ocean City R. R. Co. v. Bray, 57 N. J. Eq. 104 (1898), 37 Atl. 604. See, also, Peck v. Schenectady Ry. Co., 170 N. Y. 298 (1902), 63 N. E. 357, and the line of cases in New York known as the Elevated Railway Cases, 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. Rep. 146, Lahr v. Metropolitan E. Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. 269, 10 N. E. 528, Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496, 11 L. R. A. 634, 19 Am. St. Rep. 461, and Kane v. New York Elevated R. Co., 125 N. Y. 186, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 640. In such a case, —i. e., where there has been no willful or intentional violation of the complainant's rights —if the defendant corporation has the right to condemn the complainant's land and stands ready to institute and diligently prosecute condemnation proceedings, and also to pay into this court a sum of money sufficient to cover any possible award which may be made to the complainant in the condemnation proceedings, it would seem that the complainant is placed in substantially the same position that he would have occupied if the defendant had proceeded originally in strict compliance with all constitutional and statutory requirements. It would also seem that the case does not call for any punitive application of the law to the defendant corporation on account of any willful aggression on its part so as to make it necessary that both the corporation and the public should suffer from the temporary suspension of an important public work. An injunction, it seems to me, in the class of cases under consideration, would do the complainant no good whatever, but only do harm to the defendant corporation and the public, and in some cases a great deal of harm.
Applying these principles which are discussed at some length in the above mentioned opinion in the Menge Case to the present case, the conclusion was reached that the complainant was not entitled to a writ of injunction in the absence of any evidence that his remedies at law were not entirely adequate, provided the defendant would comply with terms which would secure beyond question to the complainant the recognition and enforcement of all his rights.
In regard to the terms upon which the injunction was denied, the propriety of which the defendant challenges by its appeal, little, If any, explanation, is necessary. The complainant's property has not been lawfully appraised, nor has any inquiry been made in regard to his damages. It may be that the sum of money heretofore paid into court includes an amount which would be awarded to him as the value of his land if he waived his constitutional rights and accepted the award precisely as if he had been made a party thereto. It may be that if the complainant declines to accept this award, as he has a perfect right to do, the portion of the fund which he would be able to take would revert to the defendant corporation which paid the same into court. A new condemnation proceeding to which the complainant is made a party will then result in ascertaining the value of his estate in the land taken, together with his damages. Whatever may be the status of any possible portion of the fund in court which represents the value of the complainant's estate, and which the other owners therefore cannot obtain for themselves, the fact remains that the defendant, the New Jersey Short Line Railroad Company, a private corporation, has assumed to take the private property of the complainant for the public use of a railroad "without just compensation first made" to the complainant. The complainant may disregard the condemnation proceedings which have been taken as utterly void as to him, and he may yet in a lawful proceeding to which he is a party, and by which he is bound, show that a substantially larger sum is justly due him for the value of his property and the amount of his damages than the residuum of the fund now in court which will remain after the owners who are parties to the condemnation proceedings have received their shares. It seems to me that, if I have not erred in making the defendant's case an exception to the general rule under which preliminary injunctions are issued against corporations restraining them from appropriating private property before making compensation, the defendant should be allowed the benefit of the exception only upon terms which practically place the private property owner in the same position as if the amount of an award binding upon him had been paid into court. The defendant railroad corporation while found to have acted in the matter without wrongful intent—without actual intent to violate the complainant's right—nevertheless is not without blame. The affidavits of the defendant, although denying notice of the complainant's occupancy, do not exclude the inference that careful inquiries duly prosecuted might have disclosed the occupancy and probably the lease of the complainant. The defendant corporation is not acquitted of wrongdoing by the decision of this court in this case. On the contrary, it stands before the court as a trespasser.This court merely adjudges that the railroad corporation is not an intentional or willful trespasser, and therefore should not he subjected to the hardship of an injunction, provided, however, this trespassing corporation will comply with conditions which put the complainant in substantially the same position as if he had been made a party to the condemnation proceedings, and his just compensation thus lawfully ascertained had been paid into court. The defendant cannot possibly suffer by the imposition of these terms, except so far as it may turn out that the amount of money which it has already paid into court, together with the amount which it now is required to pay, shall exceed the sum total of what is found due to the complainant and the other parties interested as owners. Any excess, of course, will be repaid to the defendant. It would seem that a railroad corporation which has, in fact, violated the constitutional rights of a landowner by appropriating his property ought not to complain of so slight an inconvenience. While the court, it seems to me, should require an amount to be paid which will certainly cover any award which may be made to the complainant, there is no difficulty in fixing an amount which the defendant can pay into court without suffering any very great inconvenience. The deposit of $400 called for in this case does not seem to me to be excessive.
In dealing with the question of the imposition of terms upon which an injunction of the general kind under consideration will be denied, reference may be made to the case of Attorney General v. Paterson, 60 N. J. Eq. 383, 45 Atl. 995, 48 L. R. A. 717, 83 Am. St. Rep. 642, although the situation presented by that case differs widely from the one presented to the court in this case.