Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000467-MR
02-03-2017
CARRIE C. NELSON APPELLANT v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; SHELDON BERMAN; VICKI DUCKWORTH LETE; AND BONNIE CABELL APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Brian Gary Abell Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; SHELDON BERMAN; VICKI DUCKWORTH LETE; AND BONNIE CABELL: C. Tyson Gorman Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CI-003027 OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: DIXON, JONES, AND J. LAMBERT, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Carrie C. Nelson, appeals an order dismissing her claims against the Jefferson County Board of Education and Vicki Lete, the principal of the school where Nelson was previously employed as a teacher. Having reviewed the record, we vacate and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Nelson was a middle school teacher at Moore Traditional School ("Moore") from August 2007 to June 2011. She primarily taught 8th grade Language Arts during her time at Moore; in January 2011, she began working as a Reading Specialist. For the entirety of her time at Moore, Nelson was a non-tenured teacher employed on a year-to-year basis pursuant to Limited Contracts of Employment, which expressly stated a duration "for one year." At Lete's recommendation, Nelson's contract was not renewed after the 2010-2011 school year.
After filing an unsuccessful disability discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Nelson initiated this lawsuit against the Board in June of 2013. In her complaint, Nelson alleged that the Board discriminated against her on the basis of disability in violation of KRS 344.040. Discovery commenced. In April 2014, the Board moved for summary judgment. Nelson requested the trial court to hold the summary judgment motion in abeyance until discovery was complete. The court agreed with Nelson, but ruled that the Board could renew its motion in sixty days. It did so. Nelson then sought another abeyance and requested to amend her complaint. Nelson's requests were granted by the trial court.
Kentucky Revised Statutes. --------
Lete and others were added as defendants in July of 2014 along with several additional claims. In August of 2014, Nelson served additional discovery requests on Lete and the other defendants. Nelson voluntarily agreed to a response extension up to and including November 3, 2014. The defendants responded on that day. Along with their discovery responses, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Nelson found the discovery responses inadequate. Accordingly, she moved to compel the defendants to answer her requests and asked the trial court to hold the defendants' motion for summary judgment in abeyance until such time as discovery was complete. The trial court declined to rule on Nelson's motion to compel before addressing summary judgment. On February 3, 2015, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all counts. Nelson then filed a motion to vacate, which the trial court denied on March 4, 2015.
II. ANALYSIS
Nelson argues that the trial court prematurely rendered summary judgment against her when it did not at least consider her motion to compel prior to taking up the summary judgment motion. We agree with Nelson.
"Whether a summary judgment was prematurely granted must be determined within the context of the individual case." Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Ky. App. 2007). While there is no exact limitation on the time parties have to complete discovery absent a pretrial order, for the sake of judicial efficiency this time is not indefinite. Id. at 844. On appeal, if the issue of failure to allow for discovery is raised, "a reviewing court must . . . consider whether the trial court gave the party opposing the motion an ample opportunity to respond and complete discovery before the court entered its ruling." Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2010). A trial court's determination that a sufficient amount of time has passed for discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
The trial court determined that Nelson had adequate time to take discovery prior to summary judgment. Accordingly, it decided that it would not address Nelson's pending motion to compel until after it decided summary judgment. While Nelson's case as a whole had been pending since early 2013, Lete and many of the additional claims had just been added a few months prior to the summary judgment motion. After obtaining leave to amend, Nelson promptly served discovery requests. Those requests were not answered by Lete and the other defendants until November 3, 2014, the same day the summary judgment motion was filed. After reviewing the responses, Nelson filed a motion to compel in which she complained about defendants' failure to address a number of her requests. Nelson argued that several of her requests were directed towards issues relevant to the summary judgment. However, the trial court ruled that Nelson had already had an adequate amount of time to take discovery, and therefore, it would not consider the motion to compel until after ruling on the pending summary judgment motion.
Certainly, Nelson's case does not appear to be an overly strong one. Nelson's record at Moore is anything but spotless. This does not mean, however, that Nelson was not entitled to seek discovery from the defendants on claims that the trial court allowed her to add by amendment. It is also important to recognize that Nelson requested the discovery before the defendants filed for summary judgment. She was not requesting additional discovery. She was asking the trial court to compel the defendants to answer the discovery she had already requested. Moreover, Nelson did not delay in making her motion to compel.
These factors cause us concern. A defendant should not be able to escape its obligation to answer discovery requests that have already been propounded by the plaintiff by moving for summary judgment. If the defendant believes he or she should not have to answer, a motion for protective order is the appropriate remedy. In the absence of a protective order, Nelson was entitled to have the trial court consider her motion to compel before taking up summary judgment. This is especially so where there was no pretrial order in place that required Nelson to complete discovery by any specific date.
Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court should decide Nelson's motion to compel before addressing the summary judgment motion. Should the trial court determine that Nelson is entitled to some additional discovery, it can set proper timelines and schedules to guide the parties in completing that discovery in a timely manner such that all parties have an adequate opportunity to supplement the record prior to any renewed motion for summary judgment.
To be clear, we are not holding that Nelson is entitled to conduct wholesale discovery into perpetuity. We simply believe that Nelson was entitled to have the trial court rule on her motion to compel answers to discovery requests she propounded before defendants moved for summary judgment, or at least make a determination that the additional discovery she sought in those requests would not impact its determination on summary judgment.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Brian Gary Abell
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION; SHELDON
BERMAN; VICKI DUCKWORTH
LETE; AND BONNIE CABELL: C. Tyson Gorman
Louisville, Kentucky