Opinion
No. 2011–3067SC.
2013-01-30
Hassan NELSON, Respondent, v. GOOD GROUND MOTORS, LLC, Appellant.
Present NICOLAI, P.J., IANNACCI and LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Riverhead, Suffolk County (Allen M. Smith, J.), entered July 7, 2011. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,000.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified by reducing the award in favor of plaintiff to the principal sum of $346.42; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, who purchased from defendant a used SUV, together with an extended “standard” 90–day or 4,500–mile warranty, alleges in this small claims action that, due to inherent defects in the vehicle, he spent substantial sums repairing the vehicle. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff introduced into evidence paid bills for several repairs, as well as three estimates for the replacement of the vehicle's transmission. Following the trial, the Justice Court awarded judgment to plaintiff in the principal sum of $3,000.
Our review in a small claims action is limited to determining whether substantial justice was done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law ( seeUJCA 1807). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 A.D.2d 544 [1990] ). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court ( see Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d 125, 126 [2000] ).
The unrefuted evidence established that, on January 14, 2011, plaintiff had paid defendant $6,000 and had accepted delivery of a 2002 Saturn SUV which, at the time, had an odometer reading of 82,852 miles. The price included the purchase by plaintiff of a “standard” written warranty, which was provided by defendant, for “90 Days or 4,500 Miles,” subject to a $100 deductible. The bill of sale and the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Inspection Receipt, certifying that the vehicle had passed inspection, were dated January 14, 2011, and the “contract application” which contained the 90–day/4,500–mile warranty was dated, and became effective, on January 15, 2011. However, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Retail Certificate of Sale MV–50 form, which included defendant's certification that the vehicle had been sold to plaintiff on the date indicated, and that, at the time, the vehicle was “in condition and repair to render satisfactory and adequate service on the public highway under normal use,” showed a date of sale of February 12, 2011. At trial, defendant's witness indicated that the discrepancy between the dates on the bill of sale, warranty and related documents, and the date on form MV–50, had occurred because the title document to the vehicle which defendant had originally received had contained an incorrect signature, and that, after receiving a corrected title document, defendant had issued a new MV–50 form. Plaintiff claimed that his signature on the MV–50 form had been forged, a claim defendant's witness disputed.
A paid bill introduced by plaintiff into evidence, dated February 2, 2011, from Jiffy Lube for $146.62, appears to have been for “maintenance items” which were excluded under the written warranty that plaintiff had purchased ( seeGeneral Business Law § 198–b [b][4] ).
A paid bill dated March 4, 2011, for $328.15, which plaintiff introduced into evidence, from Garage Calabrese, Inc., for the removal of a defective transmission mount and the installation of a new transmission mount, fell outside the scope of plaintiff's warranty and the scope of the coverage required to be provided by General Business Law § 198–b (b)(2).
Plaintiff also introduced into evidence two separate bills, dated April 21, 2011 and May 3, 2011, for the sums of $371.30 and $75.12 respectively, for a power window motor and window switches. These items fell within the written warranty's coverage, a fact that defendant did not dispute. The odometer readings on those bills indicate that at the time they were incurred, the vehicle had been driven less than 4,500 miles following plaintiff's purchase thereof. Plaintiff's contractual warranty was for 90 days or 4,500 miles, without specifying whether it was for whichever came first or last. Since the warranty was on a form which had evidently been supplied by defendant, to the extent that it was ambiguous as to its scope, it was required to be construed against defendant ( see Interested Underwriters at Lloyds v. Ducor's, Inc., 103 A.D.2d 76, 80 [1984],affd65 N.Y.2d 647 [1985] ). As the two bills for window switches and a window motor fell within the 4,500–mile coverage of plaintiff's warranty, plaintiff is entitled to recover thereon.
Finally, plaintiff asserted that, on May 10, 2011, the vehicle's transmission had failed. He introduced into evidence a paid bill for towing and three estimates for the replacement of his transmission. These bills fell outside the temporal limit of the extended warranty plaintiff had purchased, and the odometer readings on these documents show that, at that time, the vehicle had gone more than 4,500 miles since the date when plaintiff had purchased it. Plaintiff failed to establish any connection between the earlier failure of the transmission mount and the subsequent failure of the transmission. Plaintiff thus had no right to recover those sums under his warranty.
As noted above, there is a discrepancy between the date of sale indicated on the bill of sale, inspection receipt and other documents, and the date of sale stated on form MV–50, which form contained a certification of fitness for intended use which is required under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417. Although Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417 states that “[t]he delivery of a false certificate shall raise [the] presumption that such certificate was delivered without an appropriate inspection,” we find that defendant's explanation of the discrepancy, which plaintiff failed to refute, was sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.
We therefore conclude that plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant for the window repairs that were performed on April 21, 2011 and May 3, 2011, for a total of $446.42, which sum was required to be reduced by $100 to reflect the deductible charge set forth in the warranty, and that to the extent that the judgment in favor of plaintiff exceeded the sum of $346.42, it failed to render substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UJCA 1804, 1807).Accordingly, the judgment is modified by reducing the award to plaintiff to the principal sum of $346.42, and, as so modified, is affirmed.