Opinion
CAUSE NO. 1:20-CV-304-DRL-SLC
09-15-2020
WESLEY L. NELSON, Plaintiff, v. M. FAIRFIELD and MOORE, Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
Wesley L. Nelson, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint alleging two guards at the Allen County Jail used excessive force against him on July 10, 2020. ECF 6. "A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court still must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. "In order to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law." Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
Wesley L. Nelson alleges Officers M. Fairfield and Moore used excessive force when they came to his Allen County Jail cell on W-Block between 4:30 pm and 6:30 pm on July 10, 2020. At the time, Mr. Nelson was a convicted prisoner. See United States v. Nelson, 1:16-cr-46 (N.D. Ind. filed July 27, 2016). The "core requirement" for an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment is that the defendant "used force not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hendrickson v. Cooper , 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). "[T]he question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers , 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Mr. Nelson alleges he was first struck after he backed back away from the guards because he feared they were trying to put him in a chokehold. He does not allege they put him in a chokehold, so that does not state a claim for excessive force. Rather, he alleges they struck him as he resisted and while he was unrestrained. These allegations do not plausibly allege their use of force was intended to do anything other than restore discipline. Based on his allegations about those initial strikes, he has not stated a claim. However, he also alleges when he relented and laid on the floor face down, they punched him in the head and neck though he was not resisting. Only this allegation has the potential of stating a claim.
Mr. Nelson also makes allegations about events that occurred later on E-Block. He does not allege any defendants were involved in these events, so these allegations do not state a claim.
Finally, he names Allen County Sheriff's Department as a defendant, but he does not explain why, other than perhaps because it employs the two guards. That does not state a claim because there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009).
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Wesley L. Nelson leave to proceed against Officers M. Fairfield and Moore in their individual capacities for striking him in the head and neck while he lay face down on the floor of W-Block between 4:30 pm and 6:30 pm on July 10, 2020, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) DISMISSES all other claims;
(3) DISMISSES Allen County Sheriff's Department;
(4) DIRECTS the clerk to request Waiver of Service from (and if necessary the United States Marshals Service to serve process on) M. Fairfield and Moore at the Allen County Sheriff Department with a copy of this order and the complaint (ECF 6), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);
(5) ORDERS the Allen County Sheriff Department to provide the United States Marshal Service with the full name, date of birth, social security number, last employment date, work location, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive service if it has such information; and
(6) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), M. Fairfield and Moore to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10- 1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.
SO ORDERED.
September 15, 2020
s/ Damon R . Leichty
Judge, United States District Court