In the superior court Hooks argued for the first time that his arrest and conviction would be expungeable from his record after lapse of a two-year period pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11361.5 and 11361.7. Hooks did not raise the issue at the administrative hearing or in any of his documents below and therefore under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine he is barred from raising the issue in the superior court or on appeal. ( Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.2d 182, 187; Nelson v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771]; Bohn v. Watson (1954) 130 Cal.App.2d 24, 37 [ 278 P.2d 454].) In any event, the expungement statutes would not prevent punitive action prior to the running of the two-year period.
(Cf. Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771].) But, aside from that matter, our attention has not been directed to any portion of the record which would support a conclusion that plaintiff possessed, or should have uncovered, knowledge of the relationship between defendant and Frances at such a time as to require, in the interests of fairness, a determination that such charges should have been earlier formulated and included in the first action.
We conclude that Kracksmith has forfeited this appellate claim. (See Simplon Ballpark, LLC v. Scull (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 660, 668 [holding that to avoid forfeiture of an appellate claim, the appellant must provide the trial court with “sufficient notice of the issue presented or the relief requested”]; Nelson v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788[“When a case is tried on the ‘assumption that a cause of action is stated, that certain issues are raised by the pleadings, that a particular issue is controlling, ... neither party can change this theory for purposes of review on appeal.' [Citation.]”].) In sum, we conclude that Kracksmith's and Boschal's compulsory joinder claim is moot, a justiciable controversy existed between Lisa and Kracksmith regarding the validity of its $1.5 million loan to Mitchell & Co. and the deed of trust relating thereto, and Kracksmith forfeited its appellate claim that Lisa could not state quiet title and cancellation of written instrument causes of action because she was not the borrower on the $1.5 million loan or the owner of the Grand Avenue property.