ting solicitation of prostitution); Stoumen v. Munro (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 302 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 305] (solicitation of acts in violation of Penal Code section 288a); Coleman v. Harris (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 401 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 486] (either permitting solicitation of prostitution or permitting a female to loiter for purposes of soliciting a customer to purchase an alcoholic drink in violation of section 25657, subdivision (b), of the Business and Professions Code); Adler v. Department of Alcoholic BeverageControl (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 256 [344 P.2d 366] (permitting solicitation of acts of prostitution on premises); Maloney v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 104 [ 342 P.2d 520] (permitting gambling, bookmaking and related activities to occur on premises); Rosales v. Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 624 [ 341 P.2d 366] (permitting solicitation of prostitution on premises; serving alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons); Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 783 [ 333 P.2d 771] (permitting solicitation of prostitution on premises); Maxwell Cafe v. Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 73 [ 298 P.2d 64] (permitting solicitation, gambling, bookmaking on premises; permitting intoxicated persons to remain on premises and selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons).Stoumen v. Munro, supra, 219 Cal.App.2d 302 (permitting, inter alia, solicitations of sexual conduct violative of Penal Code section 288a); Morell v. Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 504 (permitting the solicitation of "lewd" acts, continual occurrence of conduct which was lewd, obscene, and constituted sexual perversion); Benedetti v. Department of Alcoholic BeverageControl (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 213 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 525] (permitting the solicitation of lewd acts); Kershaw v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 544 [ 318 P.2d 494] (permitting the solicitation of lewd acts, permitting patrons
Initially, Vasquez's assertion is factually inaccurate; SOLO argued in its trial brief, which it filed the first day of trial, that there is no private cause of action under the Automotive Repair Act.Moreover, Vasquez's reliance on Nelson v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 333 P.2d 771, is misplaced. In that case, the court declined to consider, in connection with an appeal of a post-trial judgment, the appellant's argument that the respondent failed to plead sufficient facts supporting an element of a certain cause of action.
In the superior court Hooks argued for the first time that his arrest and conviction would be expungeable from his record after lapse of a two-year period pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11361.5 and 11361.7. Hooks did not raise the issue at the administrative hearing or in any of his documents below and therefore under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine he is barred from raising the issue in the superior court or on appeal. ( Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.2d 182, 187; Nelson v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1959) 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771]; Bohn v. Watson (1954) 130 Cal.App.2d 24, 37 [ 278 P.2d 454].) In any event, the expungement statutes would not prevent punitive action prior to the running of the two-year period.
The contention is without merit. At no time before or at the commission hearing did petitioner object that the notice provided by the letter was inadequate, and even assuming that the "reasons" given in the letter were inadequately detailed, petitioner cannot complain now. ( Nelson v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 787-788 [ 333 P.2d 771]; Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal.App.2d 24, 41 [ 278 P.2d 454].) Sufficiency of the Evidence
) C) There was evidence that on March 9, 1963, the plaintiff found her husband in bed with Lenora Armstrong, and that the two took numerous overnight trips together, and no objection was made below to any of this evidence; the parties treated the questions of fact in response to the allegation of adultery as issues in the case and it could not afterwards be claimed that these issues should be disregarded ( Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Warren, 150 Cal. 346, 353 [ 89 P. 93]; Benam v. Benam, 178 Cal.App.2d 837, 842 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 410]; Gervaise v. Brookins, 156 Cal. 110, 112 [103 P. 332]; Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771]; People v. Nahabedian, 171 Cal.App.2d 302, 306 [ 340 P.2d 1053]). The attempted point is without merit.
( Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [ 22 P.2d 715]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) p. 2264, § 96.) This rule is applicable to appeals such as those before us. (See Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771].) Licensee-respondents Lancellotti (1 Civ. 23401) who presented the same point on their appeal concede that it was not urged below by them.
(Cf. Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771].) But, aside from that matter, our attention has not been directed to any portion of the record which would support a conclusion that plaintiff possessed, or should have uncovered, knowledge of the relationship between defendant and Frances at such a time as to require, in the interests of fairness, a determination that such charges should have been earlier formulated and included in the first action.
His only defense was the novel one that he was attempting to lay low the purchaser of the dexedrine because he figured that the purchaser was "a pusher." (See Wright v. Munro, 144 Cal.App.2d 843, 848 [ 301 P.2d 997]; Marlo v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 112 Cal.App.2d 276, 278 [ 246 P.2d 69]; Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 787 [ 333 P.2d 771].) [2] The proceeding under Case Number 255 was merely a continuation of that original case.
We entertain no doubt that the respondent's decision and the judgment of the trial court should be upheld. ( Mast v. State Board of Optometry, 139 Cal.App.2d 78, 91-93 [ 293 P.2d 148]; Genser v. State Personnel Board, 112 Cal.App.2d 77, 88-89 [ 245 P.2d 1090]; Nelson v. Department Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771]; Rudolph v. Athletic Commission, supra, 177 Cal.App.2d 1, 11, 12.) The judgment is affirmed.
The commissioner's order was based upon each of nine counts, separately and severally. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining charges, as those we have discussed fully support the order of revocation ( Nelson v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 783, 788 [ 333 P.2d 771]). Judgment reversed.