Opinion
A19-1817
07-06-2020
Sharon L. Nelson, Appellant, v. Comerica Bank & Trust, NA, et al., Respondents.
Samantha J. Ellingson, Aaron R. Thom, Thom Ellingson, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Mark W. Greiner, Joseph J. Cassioppi, Emily A. Unger, Fredrikson & Byron, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion denied
Rodenberg, Judge Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-19-163 Samantha J. Ellingson, Aaron R. Thom, Thom Ellingson, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Mark W. Greiner, Joseph J. Cassioppi, Emily A. Unger, Fredrikson & Byron, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents) Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Sharon L. Nelson, an heir to the estate of Prince Rogers Nelson (the estate), appeals from the district court's order dismissing her complaint seeking relief including money damages from the personal representative of the estate for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). We deny respondents' motion to strike, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
Prince, an internationally-renowned recording artist, died without a will in 2016. A probate petition was filed in Carver County to resolve the estate's liabilities, determine heirs, distribute assets, and otherwise oversee the administration of the estate. Appellant is Prince's half-sister and an adjudicated heir. Respondent Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A., has served as the estate's personal representative since February 2017. Respondents Andrea Bruce and Angela Aycock are Comerica employees and the estate's primary trust officers (we refer to Comerica, Bruce, and Aycock, collectively, as respondents). The estate is under supervised administration by the probate court pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 524.3-501 to -505 (2018).
The Minnesota Judicial Branch established a website cataloguing redacted versions of all of the filings in the probate action. See generally Minn. Judicial Branch, 10-PR-16-46 In re the Estate of Prince Rogers Nelson, Deceased, http://mncourts.gov/inretheestateofprincerogersnelson.aspx (last visited June 23, 2020). We may take judicial notice of the probate court's orders and other filings in the probate action. Smisek v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 400 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. App. 1987).
The probate of this estate has seen a multitude of contested hearings. Two filings are most noteworthy here. First, in late 2017, appellant and two other heirs petitioned to remove Comerica as the estate's personal representative (petition to remove). Those heirs claimed that respondents "intentionally misrepresented material facts regarding its competence and intentions" before appointment as the personal representative, failed to protect and manage estate assets, created conflicts of interest, and refused to communicate with the heirs. The probate court denied the petition to remove. Second, in early 2019, several heirs jointly moved to permanently limit respondents' powers as personal representative (petition to limit powers). The probate court denied the petition to limit powers on April 23, 2019, finding that the arguments were "significantly similar to prior petitions seeking removal of the [p]ersonal [r]epresentative."
In February 2019, appellant—acting as her own attorney—sued respondents in this action in district court, separate from the probate action. The complaint asserted claims for civil assault, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, all arising from respondents' actions during estate administration. Appellant sought an order removing Comerica as the estate's personal representative, removing certain individuals and entities from their positions with the estate, awarding the estate over $138 million in damages, and awarding appellant $10 billion in "additional damages."
On March 7, 2019, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint and, in the alternative, to consolidate appellant's civil action with the probate action. Respondents argued that appellant's claims are barred by res judicata because they "derive from the same factual circumstances as the probate matter" and that appellant's complaint otherwise fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On May 6, 2019, respondents moved for sanctions on the ground that appellant filed "frivolous claims that were previously rejected by the [probate] court." Both motions were scheduled to be heard on May 20, 2019.
On May 16, 2019, four days before the hearing, appellant requested a continuance because she "had difficulty obtaining counsel and need[ed] further time to retain an attorney." Appellant appeared at the May 20 hearing with an attorney and repeated her request for a continuance. The district court did not grant a continuance but gave appellant until June 14, 2019, to submit written opposition to respondents' motions. On June 17, 2019—three days late—appellant submitted her memorandum opposing respondents' motions.
The district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed appellant's civil-assault claim without prejudice "[i]n the interest of judicial economy and to avoid confusion," while "preserving to [appellant] the option of pursuing this claim in a separate proceeding." The district court concluded that most of appellant's other claims were barred by res judicata and that those that were not so barred failed to state a claim. The district court also granted respondents' motion for sanctions and, after receiving a breakdown of respondents' claimed attorney fees and costs, awarded $28,245.35 in sanctions. The district court did not address respondents' motion in the alternative to consolidate this action with the probate file.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. Respondents' motion to strike is denied.
Respondents moved this court to strike from the appellate record appellant's memorandum of law and affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss because the documents were not timely filed or served in district court. Appellant responds that the memorandum and affidavit are part of the record because the district court received and referenced them in the order dismissing her complaint.
A document is part of the appellate record if it was "filed in the trial court." Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. That occurred here. Appellant filed her memorandum and affidavit opposing respondents' motion in district court. The fact that appellant's filing was untimely is irrelevant; rule 110.01 does not restrict the record on appeal to documents that were timely filed with the district court. See id. Respondents' contention that they were never served with the memorandum and affidavit is similarly irrelevant; rule 110.01 does not limit the record to only those documents that were served. See id. Importantly, the district court referred to and considered appellant's memorandum and affidavit in the order dismissing appellant's complaint, confirming that those documents were indeed filed and were considered by the district court in ordering the appealed-from judgment of dismissal.
The memorandum and affidavit are a part of the appellate record. Respondents' motion to strike is denied.
II. Appellant did not "lose her right to appeal" by untimely opposing the motion to dismiss.
Respondents argue that appellant has waived or forfeited her right to appeal because she did not timely file her opposition to respondents' motions with the district court. Appellant responds that she did not lose her right to appeal because the issues raised on appeal—the propriety of the dismissal under rule 12.02(e), sanctions under rule 11, and the amount of those sanctions—were addressed by the district court.
We generally "will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1999); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) ("A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it." (quotation omitted)). A party may not "obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory." Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
Worth noting is that there is a difference between what is appealable and what is reviewable. To be appealable, a ruling must be one described in Minn. R. Civ. P. 103.03 and associated authorities, as is the case for the rulings from which appellant appeals here. No authority causes a ruling to be not appealable if the party seeking to appeal fails to timely oppose a motion in district court; all that is required is that the appealed-from judgment or order be one that is appealable under the relevant authorities. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.01, subd. 1, .03 (addressing taking an appeal, and the rulings that are appealable, respectively). Scope of review, on the other hand, refers to those issues that are properly before the court for appellate consideration. Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn. 2009). The restrictions in Thiele focus on whether an "issue" or "theory" was raised in district court—not whether an opposition memorandum was filed in district court. See 425 N.W.2d at 582. Here, appellant argues the same issues on the same theories as she did in district court. And none of respondents' cited cases hold that a party who failed to oppose a motion in district court is barred from seeking appellate review of the resulting order.
Because appellant's arguments on appeal concern questions addressed by the district court, those arguments are within the scope of review in this appeal. We therefore conclude that appellant did not waive or forfeit her right to appeal by the late filing of documents that the district court considered in ordering the appealed-from judgment dismissing appellant's complaint.
III. The district court erred by dismissing appellant's civil-assault claim but did not err by dismissing all other claims.
A district court may dismiss a civil action when the pleadings fail "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). "We review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted).
A district court may dismiss claims under rule 12.02(e) according to the doctrine of res judicata, "a finality doctrine that mandates that there be an end to litigation." Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004). Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, "concerns circumstances giving rise to a claim and precludes subsequent litigation—regardless of whether a particular issue or legal theory was actually litigated." Id. Res judicata bars a subsequent claim when "(1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; [and] (4) the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter." Id. Whether res judicata is available is a question of law reviewed de novo, but a district court's determination to apply res judicata is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Perrin, 796 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. App. 2011).
Appellant challenges the district court's judgment dismissing her claims for civil assault, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation. She does not challenge the district court's judgment dismissing her civil-conspiracy claim.
A. Appellant's complaint states a claim for civil assault.
A civil assault is an unlawful threat of bodily harm to another with the present ability to effectuate the threat. Dahlin v. Fraser, 288 N.W. 851, 852 (Minn. 1939); see also 4A Minnesota Practice, CIVJIG 60.20 (2017). To succeed, a civil-assault claim requires a show of force that caused "reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm." Dahlin, 288 N.W. at 852. "Mere words or threats alone do not constitute assault." Id. Instead, words or threats constitute civil assault if they "are accompanied by a threat of physical violence under conditions indicating [a] present ability to carry out the threat." Id.; see also Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 679 (Minn. 1988) (stating that "words alone do not constitute [civil] assault").
Appellant's complaint asserts that, at a meeting in February 2017, respondent Bruce "plac[ed] her own face less than six inches in front of [appellant's] face" and "proceeded to yell in [appellant's] face that she would have no voice or influence on decisions and that there would be no distributions." The district court "question[ed] whether [appellant] can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she reasonably expected imminent harm," but recognized that the allegations of the complaint, taken as true, state a claim for relief. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed this claim "[i]n the interest of judicial economy and to avoid confusion" because of "concern[s] about the appropriateness of leaving this count of the Complaint standing on its own in the midst of the many other matters addressed in [appellant's] Complaint."
Appellant argues that the district court erred because it did not "cit[e] a legal basis for dismissal" and failed to accept the facts in the complaint as true. Respondents argue that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief because it does not allege a threat of physical violence and because it is barred by res judicata.
Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, as we must at this stage, we conclude that appellant's complaint states a claim for civil assault. Respondent Bruce is claimed to have yelled at appellant while standing in extremely close proximity, and appellant's complaint states that she "expect[ed] to be imminently harmed." Whether Bruce's words and actions together constitute a threat of bodily harm, and whether appellant reasonably anticipated immediate bodily harm, are factual questions beyond the purview of rule 12. See Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 606 (requiring reviewing courts to "accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party"). And while we understand the district court's concerns about judicial economy in the context of a probate case involving substantial artistic and monetary assets, no will, competing claims, and the associated voluminous filings and disputes, judicial economy is not a basis for dismissal under rule 12. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02.
As for respondents' res judicata argument, the probate court briefly mentioned the confrontation involving respondent Bruce in its order denying the heirs' petition to remove respondents as the estate's personal representative. But the probate court was not called on to make—and did not make—a final decision on the merits as to whether the confrontation was a civil assault, because no civil-assault claim was asserted in the probate file. Therefore, res judicata is not available. See Olson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 659 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Minn. App. 2003) ("Because there was no final judgment on the merits, . . . res judicata [is] inapplicable . . . ."), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
We conclude that the district court erred by dismissing appellant's civil-assault claim. We reverse the dismissal of that claim and remand for further proceedings.
It is worth noting that the district court "preserved" appellant's right to bring the civil-assault claim "in a separate proceeding." By our reversal and remand in this appeal, this action may be the vehicle for that "separate proceeding." Alternatively, the district court may, if on remand it grants respondents' motion to consolidate, incorporate the civil-assault claim into the probate proceedings.
B. Appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation are barred by res judicata or fail to state a claim.
Appellant argues that her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation are not barred by res judicata because they are premised on "new" facts and because she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims in the probate action. Respondents argue that all of appellant's claims are premised on "old" facts that were argued and resolved in the probate action and that appellant failed to appeal the probate court's orders, thus rendering them barred by res judicata. We begin by providing the necessary background that guides our analysis before turning to the merits.
The Minnesota Probate Code provides that an estate may proceed under supervised administration by the probate court. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-501. Supervised administration is defined as
a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and settlement of a decedent's estate under the continuing authority of the court which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative or other order terminating the proceeding. A supervised personal representative is responsible to the court, as well as to the interest parties, and is subject to directions concerning the estate made by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interest party. Except as otherwise provided in this part, or as otherwise ordered by the court, a supervised personal representative has the same duties and powers as a personal representative who is not supervised.Id. In a supervised administration, the probate court may issue "[i]nterim orders approving or directing partial distributions, sale of property[,] or granting other relief." Minn. Stat. § 524.3-505. Many of these interim orders are appealable, including orders "refusing to remove" a personal representative or directing "the payment of [the] representative's fees or attorney's fees." Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(2), (15) (2018).
A series of cases provides additional insight. In Pangalos v. Halpern, the probate court approved a settlement that awarded $9,000 in attorney fees. 76 N.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Minn. 1956). The estate's representative later challenged the amount of attorney fees in a separate civil action. Id. at 705. The district court dismissed on res judicata grounds, and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the order approving the settlement "was in essence a final judgment binding and conclusive upon the parties, and res judicata as to the point adjudicated." Id. at 705-06.
Some 20 years later, in In re Will of Kelly: Cole v. Hayes, a trust beneficiary sued the trustees for breach of fiduciary duty for allegedly making improper trust distributions. 266 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Minn. 1978). But the beneficiary had "a period . . . following the decree of distribution in which to bring an appeal," which she did not pursue. Id. Res judicata thus barred the beneficiary's claim because "[s]uch a decree, if not properly appealed, is not subject to collateral attack." Id. at 702-03.
Similarly, in In re Tr. of Ward, the holders of a remainder interest in a trust sued the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the trustee improperly distributed trust funds. 360 N.W.2d 650, 651 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1985). One of the challenged distributions was included in an annual accounting of the trust. Id. That annual accounting was approved by the probate court and was not appealed. Id. at 653. Consequently, the approved distribution was "res judicata and the trustee should have been able reasonably to rely on the court's approval." Id.
Finally, in Greer v. Prof'l Fiduciary, Inc., a formerly incapacitated person sued her former conservator and former guardian for conduct that occurred during and after the conservatorship and guardianship. 792 N.W.2d 120, 121-22 (Minn. App. 2011). The district court dismissed some of the claims as barred by res judicata. Id. at 126. On appeal, the appellant argued that res judicata did not apply because "the facts supporting her claims were not addressed or otherwise disclosed in the probate court's orders." Id. at 127. Concerning the claims against the conservator, this court concluded that, because the appellant's claims "essentially challenge[d] the propriety of actions by [conservator] that the probate court approved in its orders allowing [conservator's] accounts, those claims constitute[d] collateral attacks on those prior orders, and are barred." Id. at 129. Likewise, this court concluded that the claims against the guardian were barred because "the probate court allowed each of the accounts, essentially concluding that the [challenged actions] were reasonable." Id. at 130-31.
These cases establish that a party dissatisfied with a probate court's order in a supervised administration, including orders for interim accounting, has the opportunity to challenge the order on appeal and that failure to appeal such an order makes it final, thereby entitling it to preclusive effect and shielding it from "collateral attack." The preclusive effect extends to a separate proceeding at a later date. This is for good reason: once a probate court approves an action, the parties should reasonably be able to "rely on the court's approval." See Ward, 360 N.W.2d at 653.
During the time that the estate in this case has been under supervised administration by the probate court, since at least March 2017, the probate court has ordered that respondents are entitled to receive compensation at a fixed rate per month plus reimbursement for expenses, subject to possible repayment of overpaid fees after the probate court's review every four months. The heirs (including appellant) were allowed "14 days after service [of respondents' petition for fees] to submit written objections." Following the directives in the March 2017 order, the probate court approved payment of respondents' fees and expenses from the estate for each successive four-month period (a total of eight approved payments at the time of the district court's order). Appellant objected to the payment of respondents' fees only once. And in that isolated case of an objection, the probate court made its order and approved most of the accounting. Those approved and unappealed orders are entitled to res judicata effect here concerning all but one of appellant's other claims.
1. All of appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty are barred by res judicata or fail to state a claim.
Appellant's complaint asserts 15 ways in which respondents allegedly breached their fiduciary duties. The district court dismissed claims arising from each category of alleged breach of duties. On appeal, appellant takes issue with three "categories" of breaches: (1) self-dealing by Comerica to prolong the estate's administration to inflate its fees; (2) causing an audit by the IRS; and (3) failure to preserve the estate's assets. Further, appellant only challenges the first and fourth requirements for res judicata (same factual circumstances and full and fair opportunity to litigate), so we limit our analysis to those requirements.
All but one of the claimed breaches about which appellant argues on appeal are based on factual circumstances that have been or could have been considered by the probate court. In the first category, appellant argues that respondents have engaged in self-dealing by structuring the payoff of the estate's tax liability to occur over 14 years, inefficiently administering the estate, and making business deals with payments to be received over time instead of in a lump sum. Like the appellant in Greer, appellant "essentially challenge[s] the propriety of actions by [respondents] that the probate court approved in its orders allowing [respondents'] accounts. See 792 N.W.2d at 129. Appellant and other heirs objected to respondents' conduct in 2017 in a petition to remove Comerica as personal representative and raised "significantly similar" objections in 2019 in the petition to limit authority. The probate court denied those requests to remove or limit the personal representative, and no appeal was taken. The probate court has also approved respondents' fees at every interim accounting and every four-month review. In doing so, the probate court "essentially conclud[ed]" that respondents reasonably administered the estate during those time periods. See id. at 130-31. Appellant's self-dealing claim is inherently at odds with the probate court's multiple orders finding that Comerica's actions were reasonable at all junctures. Appellant's failure to appeal the probate court's orders made those orders final, thereby precluding appellant's claims in this action.
For the same reasons, appellant's second category of breach—that respondents have "caused" the IRS to audit the estate—is barred. The probate court has approved Comerica's fees during all time periods in question, thereby concluding that it reasonably administered the estate during those time periods. See id. Appellant's failure to appeal those orders makes them final and entitled to preclusive effect.
As for the third category, appellant argues that respondents failed to preserve estate assets by moving assets from Minnesota to California without first conducting an inventory and by allowing the estate's assets to be stored in multiple locations.
The personal representative's decision to move certain estate assets from Minnesota to California has been directly raised and addressed in the probate action. The petition to remove alleged that respondents "fail[ed] to protect and manage estate assets" and identified "one of the most significant" examples as the "unilateral decision to begin transferring the uniquely valuable and voluminous unreleased recordings" to California. The petition further alleged that respondents "failed to prepare a detailed accounting" and "failed to catalogue" the assets before moving them. The probate court denied the petition to remove Comerica, finding that Comercia "used due diligence in determining" to move the assets and stated that the probate court was "impressed with the security measures used to inventory and secure" the assets. Appellant's current claim is based on the same factual circumstances as those already raised in the petition to remove. If appellant believed the probate court to have erred concerning the moving and storing of estate assets, the proper remedy was to have appealed from the probate court's interim orders and not to commence this separate proceeding collaterally attacking the probate court's orders.
Appellant argues that the fourth requirement for res judicata is not met for any of the above-asserted breaches of fiduciary duty because she was not allowed to obtain discovery in the probate action, the probate court "disincentivized" her from raising a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, and a petition to remove a personal representative is distinct from a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a matter "focuses on whether there were significant procedural limitations in the prior proceeding, whether the party had the incentive to litigate fully the issue, or whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties." State v. Joseph, 636 N.W.2d 322, 328 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). Discovery is not required. Moreover, the probate court carefully considered and established a means for the resolution of continuing issues between heirs and Comerica—mediation. The record reveals that appellant has not availed herself of the option of mediation. And in the event appellant was dissatisfied with the result of any mediation or dissatisfied with an order of the probate court (with or without a mediation), she could have appealed. Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(1)-(17) (2018). She did not. In short, appellant has been afforded the opportunity in the supervised probate proceedings to litigate her complaints through mediation or by appealing the probate court's orders. Her failure to take advantage of those opportunities does not render the fourth res judicata requirement unsatisfied. Accordingly, res judicata is available to bar all of the claimed breaches of fiduciary duties discussed above. And we see no abuse of the district court's discretion is applying res judicata to bar these claims.
We note that appellant asked the probate court for discovery only if "an area of contention [was] not . . . fully explored to the Court's satisfaction." In other words, appellant made no explicit request to the probate court to conduct specific discovery that the probate court prevented her from pursuing.
The probate court appointed a former justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court to serve as the mediator.
We do, however, agree that appellant's claim that respondents have allowed the estate's assets to be stored in multiple locations is based on new facts that have not been previously addressed by the probate court. Our review of the record reveals no instance in which the probate court addressed this precise allegation about assets being stored in multiple locations. And the alleged removal of estate assets from the facility in California seems to fall outside the scope of the probate court's triannual review of respondents' fees in the absence of the precise issue having been brought to the probate court's attention. As a result, res judicata is not available to bar this claim.
That said, to the extent appellant intends the current location of these estate assets to serve as a basis to have Comerica removed as the estate's personal representative, she must seek that relief in the probate action. See Minn. Stat. § 524.1-302 (2018) (providing that probate court "has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to estates"); Minn. Stat. § 524.3-611(a) (2018) ("A person interested in the estate may petition [the probate court] for removal of a personal representative for cause at any time."). And more fundamentally, appellant does not assert that any moving of these assets caused damage—an element of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. This claim therefore fails except as a possible basis for removing the personal representative in the probate proceeding.
2. Res judicata bars appellant's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.
Appellant's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim stems from interviews held between the heirs and respondents before respondents' appointment in February 2017. These interviews were intended to allow the heirs to consider the available options for the estate's personal representative and then provide their endorsement to the probate court. Appellant's complaint identifies five instances of claimed fraudulent misrepresentation that occurred during these interviews: (1) that Comerica is "a full-service firm" that can administer the estate without needing outside assistance, (2) that respondents have "significant music industry experience," (3) that respondents would work with a specific named individual "in matters concerning the Estate," (4) that the heirs "would have a voice and be involved in decisions concerning the affairs of the Estate," and (5) that a "swift and expedient process" would settle the estate.
The description of the claims identified in the relevant documents in respondents' confidential addendum makes clear that this fraudulent-misrepresentation claim is premised on circumstances that have been thoroughly argued and litigated in the probate action. The probate court heard the competing arguments concerning the relevant assertions, but nonetheless denied the petition and allowed Comerica to continue to serve. Appellant had the opportunity to appeal the order denying that petition, Minn. Stat. § 525.71(a)(2), but chose not to appeal. The probate court's order became final and cannot be challenged in this separate proceeding. Kelly, 266 N.W.2d at 702-03; Pangalos, 76 N.W.2d at 705-06.
We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of appellant's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim.
C. On remand, the district court must resolve respondents' still-pending motion to consolidate.
At the same time that respondents moved to dismiss this action, they also moved in the alternative under Minn. R. Civ. P. 42.01 to consolidate this civil action with the probate action. On appeal, respondents ask that, if "any part of the district court's order dismissing all claims" is reversed, "this action be remanded with instructions for the district court to decide [their] alternative motion to consolidate." Appellant does not oppose respondents' request.
Because we are limited to resolving only those issues that were "presented and considered" by the district court, Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (quotation omitted), and because the district court did not consider or decide respondents' motion to consolidate, we remand to the district court with instructions to resolve that motion and determine whether appellant's remaining claim for civil assault should be consolidated with the probate action.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sanctions, but remand is required for the district court to recalculate the amount awarded in light of our reversal of the dismissal of appellant's civil-assault claim.
By filing a pleading with a court, a self-represented party certifies that the pleading is not being presented for an improper purpose, that the claims are warranted by existing law, and that the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(a)-(c). A party violates this rule if he or she does not have "an objectively reasonable basis" for pursuing the claim. Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 143 (Minn. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds, by Minn. Stat. § 549.21 (1990). A district court may sanction a party for violating this rule. Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03. We review a district court's order regarding an award of rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. In re Progressive Ins. Co., 720 N.W.2d 865, 874 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Nov. 22, 2006).
The district court awarded sanctions because it found that appellant's complaint "re-assert[ed] claims and arguments she has made repeatedly in connection with the Estate matter," failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and was legally and factually unwarranted. The district court then found that appellant filed her complaint "to frustrate the efforts of [respondents] after the Court refused to grant [her] Petition for removal."
Appellant argues on appeal that the sanctions award is erroneous because her claims are factually and legally sound and, even if they are not, sanctions are not warranted because she did not act unreasonably. Respondents argue that sanctions are warranted because the probate court warned appellant that she could be sanctioned if she continued to relitigate the same allegations, appellant's request for $10 billion in damages "ignored" the statute prohibiting a plaintiff from pleading specific damages above $50,000 (which respondents contend is a sign that appellant's complaint was intended to "harass and embarrass" them), and did not timely oppose respondents' motion to dismiss.
Importantly, the same district court judge has been assigned to both the probate action and this civil action during all of the history recited herein, meaning that the district court judge is familiar with the parties and the probate proceedings. We defer to the district court judge's perception of the proceedings and his efforts to regulate these complex proceedings. See Mears Park Holding Corp. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Minn. App. 1988) ("Deference must be given to a trial court's efforts to regulate the courtroom and perception of whether the litigation process has been abused."). The record in this appeal and the filings in the probate action show that appellant is frustrated with respondents' administration of the estate. The record supports the district court's finding that appellant, "[n]ot having achieved the results she sought in the Estate matter, instead of appealing the Court's decisions . . . has elected to bring a separate civil Complaint." Appellant's requested relief is indeed telling: she seeks in this action that respondents be removed as the estate's personal representative, which is the same relief she sought in the unsuccessful petition to remove in the probate action. Appellant acted contrary to statute when she requested over $10 billion in damages. See Minn. Stat. § 544.36 (2018) (requiring that a pleading that seeks recovery of money more than $50,000 "shall state merely that recovery of reasonable damages in an amount greater than $50,000 is sought"). And by appellant now making many of the same general arguments she has previously made, the district court's finding that she filed this action for an improper purpose is supported by the record.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that rule 11 sanctions are justified in this case.
Turning to the final issue, the amount of sanctions awarded, the district court awarded respondents the full amount of their claimed attorney fees incurred in defending against appellant's complaint. Because we reverse in part, we remand for the district court to determine respondents' fees and costs incurred in opposing appellant's surviving claim and remove those fees and costs from the sanctions awarded.
In sum, we reverse the district court's summary judgment dismissing appellant's civil-assault claim and remand for the district court to address respondents' motion to consolidate that claim with the probate proceeding. We reverse the amount of fees awarded as a sanction under rule 11 and remand to the district court to remove from the award respondents' fees and costs in opposing appellant's surviving civil-assault claim. On remand, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen the record concerning these matters. We deny respondents' motion to strike, and we affirm the balance of the district court's judgment dismissing appellant's claims, as discussed above.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion denied.