Opinion
CIVIL 3:24-CV-657
04-22-2024
COREY J. NELSON-PACEWICZ, SR., Plaintiff, v. LUZERNE COUNTY ETL, et al., Defendants.
Mehalchick, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Corey J. Nelson-Pacewicz, Sr., filed this action against Luzerne County ETL and Luzerne County Children and Youth Services. (Doc. 1). Pacewicz's complaint contains no factual allegations, and instead asserts his claim as “parental rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 12). He appears to seek unspecified relief for personal injury and emotional distress. (Id. at 2).
Along with this complaint, Pacewicz filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). We will conditionally grant Pacewicz's motion to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes only, but after a screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
After review, we conclude that Pacewicz's complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as he has failed to assert “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
Rule 8 dictates that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It is well established that “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citations omitted). A complaint must contain “more than unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Here, Pacewicz's complaint simply names two defendants and seeks to hold them liable for alleged “parental rights” violations. However, the complaint contains no factual averments related to either of the defendants. In fact, the complaint is completely devoid of factual allegations and instead vaguely asserts that Pacewicz is bringing a claim against these defendants related to “parental rights” under § 1983 and the ADA. This is simply not enough to comply with Rule 8's basic requirement that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
However, while we have concluded that Pacewicz's complaint does not state a claim at this time, recognizing that Pacewicz is a pro se litigant, we recommend that the court allow him an opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination because of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.