Dravo Corp. v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 79 Wn.2d 214, 218, 484 P.2d 399 (1971) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Seattle, 9 Wn.2d 666, 670, 116 P.2d 280 (1941)).Clevco, Inc. v. Mun. of Metro.Seattle, 59 Wn.App. 536, 542-43, 799 P.2d 1183 (1990); Nelson Constr. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn.App. 321, 328-29, 582 P.2d 511 (1978).Dravo, 79 Wn.2d at 218 (quoting Maryland Cas. Co., 9 Wn.2d at 670); see also Basin Paving, 107 Wn.App. at 65-66; Clevco, 59 Wn.App. at 542-43; Nelson, 20 Wn.App. at 328-29.
We find both positions to be inaccurate. [3] The general rule of Dravo was stated in Nelson Constr. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 328-29, 582 P.2d 511, review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1002 (1978): The general rule is that where plans or specifications lead a public contractor reasonably to believe that conditions represented therein do exist and may be relied upon in bidding, he is entitled to compensation for extra expense incurred as a result of the inaccuracy of those representations.
But if the trial court acts as a fact-finder, appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support its conclusions of law. Nelson Constr. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 582 P.2d 511, review denied, 91 Wn.2d 1002 (1978). The entry of findings strongly suggests that the trial court weighed the evidence because no findings or conclusions are required when the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and rules as a matter of law.
CR 41(b)(3) authorizes a court to render a judgment on the merits against the plaintiff and enter findings as provided in CR 52(a). Here, the Board entered findings, indicating that it weighed the evidence. See Nelson Constr. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 582 P.2d 511 (1978). Nevertheless, the court's ultimate decision is correct. The Court of Appeals has held that generally an agency does not have authority to reopen and reconsider a final decision in the absence of a specific statute, charter, or ordinance authorizing it, though an exception exists where, through fraud, mistake, or misconception of facts an order is entered which is promptly recognized to be in error.
Where statements honestly made are neither positive nor specific, but are suggestive only, and where the parties are in an equal position as to knowledge and information surrounding the contract, California has held that a purported warranty may be disclaimed. Wunderlich v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 65 Cal.2d 777, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal.Rptr. 473 (1967). Other states have followed this rule, focusing on the specificity of the disclaimer, see, e.g., Nelson Constr. Co. v. Port ofBremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 582 P.2d 511 (Ct.App. 1978) (no recovery where explicit disclaimer included warning that conditions encountered might not be amenable to normal procedures and provided special means of compensation for this contingency), the materiality of the alleged misrepresentation, see, e.g.,Metro Sewerage Comm'n v. R.W. Constr., Inc., 72 Wis.2d 365, 241 N.W.2d 371 (1976) (material misrepresentation found where test logs indicate presence of pressurized artesian water, which is very difficult to remove, and contract drawings indicate presence of water, but omit mention of type of water condition), and the reasonableness of the bidder's reliance, see, e.g., RayD. Lowder, Inc. v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n,26 N.C. App. 622, 217 S.E.2d 682 (Ct.App.) (plaintiff reasonably relied on contract estimates based on outmoded report made by department not involved in bidding, which report was not made available to bidders), cert. denied, 288 N.C. 393, 218 S.E.2d 467 (1975). New Jersey State public contract law has evolved on
Therefore, "appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support its conclusions of law." Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 940 (citing Nelson Constr. Co. of Femdale v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn.App. 321, 582P.2d5H (1978). Substantial evidence is the
Therefore, "appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support its conclusions of law." Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 940 (citing Nelson Constr. Co. of Ferndale v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 582 P.2d 511 (1978). Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence "sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true."
When, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we review the findings for substantial evidence and the conclusions of law for sufficient support in the findings of fact. Nelson Const. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton, 20 Wn. App. 321, 326-27, 582 P.2d 511 (1978). ANALYSIS
When, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we review the findings for substantial evidence and the conclusions of law for sufficient support in the findings of fact. Nelson Const. Co. of Femdale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton. 20 Wn.App. 321, 326-27, 582 P.2d 511 (1978).
ΒΆ32 In essence, the doctrine of superior knowledge is a variety of fraud where, prior to entering a contract, one party fails to disclose information peculiarly in its possession or unavailable to the other that materially impacts the other's costs or ability to perform on the contract.SeeJordan v. Corbin Coals , 162 Wash. 503, 298 P. 712 (1931) ; Lincoln v. Keene , 51 Wash.2d 171, 316 P.2d 899 (1957) ; Nelson Const. Co. of Ferndale, Inc. v. Port of Bremerton , 20 Wash.App. 321, 582 P.2d 511 (1978) ; see alsoWalla Walla Port Dist. v. Palmberg , 280 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1960). The law of mistake allows one party to reform the contract where there has either been a mutual mistake by the parties as to the content of the contract, or one party is mistaken about material facts that the other concealed.