Nejad v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. State v. Nejad

    286 Ga. 695 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that “the burden is on the party which contends the transcript does not fully disclose what transpired at trial to have the record completed at the trial court pursuant to OCGA § 5–6–41 (f)” and “[w]here the transcript is not supplemented, the complaining party does not carry its burden of showing by the record the facts necessary to establish its point”

    DECIDED: MARCH 15, 2010. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 296 Ga. App. 163. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.

  2. Nejad v. Attorney Gen.

    830 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2016)   Cited 110 times
    Holding that the absence of documentary proof to corroborate a witness's testimony didn't constitute the sort of clear and convincing evidence necessary to reject a state court's credibility determination

    She left with her clothes in her hands, got dressed, and ran to a nearby building, where she asked the people inside to call the police because she had been raped. We take these facts from the Georgia Court of Appeals's decision. Nejad v. State (Nejad I), 296 Ga.App. 163, 674 S.E.2d 60 (2009).On June 5, 2004, Ms. Hoy—the other victim—was working as a prostitute.

  3. Nejad v. McLaughlin

    CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:12-CV-1502-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2015)

    When Nejad was arrested, a plastic pellet gun, which looked like a Glock handgun, was found in his vehicle.Nejad v. State, 296 Ga. App. 163, 164 (2009), rev'd, 286 Ga. 695 (2010), and vacated, 305 Ga. App. 883 (2010). Initially, the Court of Appeals addressed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and described the testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial as follows:

  4. Blackmon v. State

    336 Ga. App. 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble (11) ( “Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.”).In a number of cases that have come before this Court, none of the foregoing obligations appeared to have been taken as seriously as they should have been. See, e.g., Nejad v. State, 296 Ga.App. 163, 170, 674 S.E.2d 60 (2009) (Smith, J., concurring specially) (commenting that “[t]he developing trend of emphatically and even eagerly testifying to one's own incompetence or misconduct is dangerous to the administration of justice, particularly if it is allowed to continue without any consequences for the testifying trial counsel”); see also Carrie v. State, 298 Ga.App. 55, 62 n. 23, 679 S.E.2d 30 (2009) (recognizing that “[w]hether counsel's assessment of his performance was an honest admission of incompetency or a disingenuous attempt to secure a new trial for his former client is not for our determination,” but noting that it is a perversion of justice to allow such instances to continue without any consequences to trial counsel).In 2009, we noted that instances of trial counsel claiming his or her own ineffectiveness without consequence was a “worrisome trend” for this Court.

  5. Nejad v. the State

    700 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 3 times

    286 Ga. 695 ( 690 SE2d 846) (2010). 296 Ga. App. 163 ( 674 SE2d 60) (2009) ( Nejad I). The facts of this case are set forth fully in Nejad I. As stated therein, Ali Nejad was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (two counts), and aggravated battery (two counts).

  6. Smith v. State

    688 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    Specifically, Smith complains that the trial court instructed the jury that "[a] firearm when used as such is a deadly weapon as a matter of law," notwithstanding that the evidence failed to show that Smith used the handgun as a firearm. See Nejad v. State, 296 Ga. App. 163, 169 (2) ( 674 SE2d 60) (2009) (where a weapon is not per se a deadly weapon, whether it became one as used is an issue for the jury); Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 656 (4) ( 278 SE2d 386) (1981) (recognizing that whether a handgun is a deadly weapon when used "as a club" presents a jury question). The record shows, however, that when the trial court asked if there were any exceptions to the jury charge, defense counsel responded that her only exception was to the charge that referred to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and she did not reserve the right to assert additional objections at a later time.

  7. Carrie v. State

    298 Ga. App. 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that psychologist's expert testimony improperly bolstered victim's credibility, but consisted of only a single response among a six-day trial plus several witness testimonies and, thus, did not affect verdict

    However, as we have previously noted, this trend is dangerous to the administration of justice if it is allowed to continue without any consequences for trial counsel. See Nejad v. State, 296 Ga. App. 163, 169 ( 674 SE2d 60) (2009) (Smith, P. J., concurring specially).Keith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 819, 827 (6) (f) ( 632 SE2d 669) (2006).

  8. Croft v. State

    348 Ga. App. 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that plain error occurred because a jury charge relieved the State of its burden to prove an essential element of the offense

    In light of this trial counsel’s extensive experience, moreover, "[w]hether counsel’s assessment of his performance was an honest admission of incompetency or a disingenuous attempt to secure a new trial for his former client is not for our determination." Carrie v. State , 298 Ga. App. 55, 62 (5), n.23, 679 S.E.2d 30 (2009), citing Nejad v. State , 296 Ga. App. 163, 169-170, 674 S.E.2d 60 (2009) (Smith, P.J., concurring fully and specially); see also State v. Nejad , 286 Ga. 695, 690 S.E.2d 846 (2010) (reversing Court of Appeals’s determination that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to adequately explain a defendant’s right to testify). Because counsel’s decision not to attack the victim’s character to this extent or in this way was an objectively reasonable one, and because the trial court’s judgment that counsel was not ineffective in this regard was supported by some evidence, not clearly erroneous, and correct as a matter of law, we affirm the denial of the motion for new trial on this ground.

  9. Nejad v. State

    299 Ga. App. 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)

    April 1, 2009. Appeal from the 296 Ga. App. 163. Reversed, 286 Ga. 695.

  10. Nejad v. State

    298 Ga. App. 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)

    April 1, 2009. Appeal from the 296 Ga. App. 163, 286 Ga. ___. Applications to the Supreme Court for Certiorari, Supreme Court Decisions where the Writ Was Granted, Reversed.