Opinion
C.A. No. 05A-10-003 WLW.
Submitted: January 10, 2006.
Decided: May 1, 2006.
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas. Granted.
Scott E. Chambers, Esquire of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Defendant-Below, Appellant.
Thomas J. Eastburn, Esquire of Allmond and Eastburn, Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for the Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.
ORDER
Appellant, Jeffrey Neitzelt ("Neitzelt"), Defendant-below, filed an appeal from two decisions of the Court of Common Pleas ("Court-below"). Neitzelt argued that: (1) the Court-below erred as a matter of law in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear this action, (2) the Court-below erred as a matter of law in finding that Section 7 of the sublease did not fall within the scope of the City of Dover Ordinance 2-115, and (3) the Court-below's interpretation of Section 7 was incorrect as a matter of law and contrary to the evidence. Appellee, Meera Management, L.L.C. ("Meera"), Plaintiff-below, countered by asserting that: (1) the Court-below had jurisdiction over the matter, (2) the City of Dover Ordinance 2-115 did not preclude Meera's claim against Neitzelt for Neitzelt's share of the electric charges pursuant to Section 7 of the sublease, (3) the Court-below made no error of law in awarding damages to Meera, and (4) the decision of the Court-below meets the standard of review.
The salient facts are as follows: Meera and Neitzelt entered into a sublease agreement on September 20, 2002, whereby Neitzelt leased a portion of the Ramada Inn located at 348 North DuPont Highway from Meera for the purposes of operating a lounge in the front building. Section 7 of the sublease reads, "The Front Building in which the demised premises is located has one meter for electric and one for water and sewer. Lessee shall be liable for one third (1/3) of the utility charges as they become due for water, sewer and electric." Until June 18, 2003, Neitzelt paid one-third of all the utility bills. However, when he learned that the meters were for the entire hotel complex, including the front building that housed the lounge, the lobby, the dining room, offices and restrooms, and the two other buildings where the hotel rooms are located, he stopped paying the utility bills. Neitzelt contended that the sublease only required him to pay one-third of the utilities for the front building, not for the entire complex. Meera and Neitzelt attempted to resolve this dispute, but were unsuccessful. Consequently, Meera filed a suit against Neitzelt in the Justice of the Peace Court for summary possession and debt. The case was dismissed and Meera filed an appeal to the Court-below. Meera did not appeal to the Justice of the Peace three-judge panel, pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 5717(a), but chose to appeal to the Common Pleas Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9571. In its first decision, the Court-below determined that it had jurisdiction. In the decision after trial, the Court-below found for Meera and awarded $15,000 in damages, as well as prejudgment interest and the costs of the proceedings.
The instructions provided to the parties from the Justice of the Peace Court for filing an appeal are as follows:
FOR CIVIL ACTIONS IN DEBT, TRESPASS OR REPLEVIN:
. . .
. . .
APPEALS — Either party has 15 calendar days, starting the day after the judgment is ordered by the court, to appeal the judgment to the Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo (new trial). 10 Del. C. § 9571. . . .FOR LANDLORD/TENANT POSSESSION ACTIONS: APPEALS
FOR POSSESSION OF RENTAL UNIT — Either party has five (5) business days, starting the day after the judgment is signed by the judge, to appeal the judgment of a Justice of the Peace which relates to the possession of a rental unit and other rental matters (including back rent due) to a special Justice of the Peace court. The special court trial will be a completely new trial before three other Justices of the Peace. . . .
FOR DEBT (Rent Only) — The procedures for appealing or filing a motion for a new trial in a civil debt action explained above apply to an appeal of a landlord/tenant action involving rent or money damages only (and not possession of the rental unit).
It should be noted that the above are standard civil post-judgment procedures provided to litigants and are not judicial determinations; yet they form a part of the procedural context of magistrate practice. As one can see, rent only suits are treated as debt claims for appeal. See Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. Brown, 1999 Del. C.P. LEXIS 13, at *2.
Section 5717 reads, in pertinent part, "(a) Nonjury trials. — With regard to nonjury trials, a party aggrieved by the judgment rendered in such proceeding may request in writing, within 5 days after judgment, a trial de novo before a special court comprised of 3 justices of the peace other than the justice of the peace who presided at the trial, as appointed by the chief magistrate or a designee, which shall render final judgment, by majority vote, on the original complaint within 15 days after such request for a trial de novo. . . . (f) An appeal taken pursuant to this section may include any issue on which judgment was rendered at the trial court level, including the issue of back rent due, any other statute to the contrary notwithstanding."
Section 9571 states:
(a) From any final order, ruling, decision or judgment of the court in a civil action there shall be the right of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of the State in the county in which said order, ruling, decision or judgment was rendered.
(b) The appeal shall be taken within 15 days of the final order, ruling, decision or judgment.
(c) The appeal shall be a trial de novo.
(d) The Court of Common Pleas shall establish appeal procedures and supersedeas bond requirements by rule.
For the reasons set forth below, Neitzelt's appeal from the decision of the Court-below is granted.
Standard of Review
"The standard of review for appeals to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas is `limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support factual findings.' In its position as an intermediate appellate court, this Court "`functions in the same manner as the Supreme Court.'" This Court reviews the case on the record, not de novo.Discussion
Neitzelt's first contention is that the Court-below lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter. Neitzelt argues that Meera should have appealed pursuant to Section 5717 because Meera instituted an action for both summary possession and debt in the Justice of the Peace Court. In support of his argument, Neitzelt cited several cases wherein the appellate court did not permit the severing of summary possession and debt claims. For example, in Asset, the Court of Common Pleas stated:
Asset's argument that it should have the right to sever and to appeal the issue of the rent claim separate from the summary possession claim cannot be accepted by the Court since the Court finds no basis for the argument in the statutes governing landlord/tenant relations, in rules governing appeals to this Court, or in prior decisions of courts that have dealt with similar issues.
2003 Del. C.P. LEXIS 13, at *3.
Similarly, in Jarmon, the Court of Common Pleas determined that it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the judgment in the Justice of the Peace Court and stay the writ of possession because the defendant appealed not only the claim for rent, but also the issue of summary possession. The Court opined, "Under Bomba and subsequent Delaware cases, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the decision of the Justice of the Peace in cases involving summary possession. Additionally, an appellant cannot sever the rent claim for an appeal to this court merely because he did not obtain the desired result in the court below."
2004 Del. C.P. LEXIS 28, at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
In Marcopulos v. Eastburn, the landlord filed an action before the Justice of the Peace seeking possession, back rent and damages. The magistrate awarded possession and damages. On appeal to the three-Justice of the Peace panel, the landlord was awarded possession and rent, but not damages. The landlord then appealed to the Superior Court requesting damages in the amount of $8,767.93, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. In dismissing the landlord's appeal, this Court observed, "[t]he landlord made his decision to litigate possession and other damages before the Justice of the Peace. . . . The landlord chose his forum and is limited to the appeal process that is set forth in Section 5717 of Title 25 of the Delaware Code."
1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1189.
Id. at *6. Meera also cites Smith v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 1, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 306, for the negative inference that if issues other than possession are not appealed to the three-Justice of the Peace panel, they can be appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. It bases this argument on the statement, "[i]f other issues along with the summary possession issues are presented and appealed pursuant to § 5717, then no further right to appeal to the Superior Court exists." Id. at *11. However, the Court cites to Marcopulos for support of that statement, and nothing in Marcopulos can be interpreted to mean that if other issues are not appealed to the panel, then they may be appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. Thus, Meera's contention is inaccurate.
In Greenmeadow Realty v. Calvente, a landlord brought an action for possession and rent before the Justice of the Peace. After an adverse decision, the landlord filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. That motion was subsequently denied by the original magistrate. The landlord then appealed to the three-Justice of the Peace panel. However, the panel dismissed the landlord's appeal as untimely. The landlord then filed an appeal with the Superior Court, seeking only back rent due. In issuing its decision, this Court held, "[a]ppellant chose its forum. It chose to initiate its combined action before a justice of the peace. It cannot now claim back rent due in this appeal."
1991 Del. Super. LEXIS 384.
Id. at *2.
All of the above cases may be distinguishable from the case sub judice based on their factual patterns. However, they all demonstrate the desired intent of Section 5717, as expressed by the legislature, and the result of invoking the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court for summary possession and debt claims. Namely, that once a summary possession and debt claim is brought before the Justice of the Peace, it must be appealed pursuant to Section 5717 and there is no right to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.
There are two cases that are factually on-point with the case before me. The first case, Seaford Doughnut Company v. Wheeler, considered whether it had jurisdiction when a landlord filed a claim in the Justice of the Peace Court, then after an adverse decision, only appealed the damages issue to the Superior Court. The Court stated, "where, as here, the landlord does not appeal the rent issue to the three-judge panel, he may appeal it directly to this Court."
1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 260. The Court-below relied on this case.
Id. at *5.
The second case, Manufactured Home, also concerned a direct appeal from the magistrate's decision. After the landlord successfully sought possession of the property, back rent and incidental damages, the tenant filed an appeal with the Court of Common Pleas to litigate the merits concerning his status as a tenant and any other circumstances that may have excused his liability. In dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court opined:
In its decision on jurisdiction, the Court-below did not consider Manufactured Home. Meera also did not mention Manufactured Home in its Answering Brief.
When a combined action for possession and rent is filed, this claim may be asserted under the Landlord/Tenant Code in one suit. A "judgment" in a summary possession determines the rights of the parties. As claims for rent are includable with possession actions, the appeal is necessarily covered by the summary possession section, not the general appeals statute. This conclusion is consistent, if not mandated, by Superior Court precedent. Combined claims of rent and possession were determined to exceed its then subject matter jurisdiction. These decisions are analogous, as the general appellate jurisdiction merely substituted this Court for the Superior Court in 1995.
Can this result be avoided by the tenant's wish to concede the possession part of the proceedings? The answer is suggested by the question. No authority is needed for the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the law, not a party.
1999 Del. C.P. LEXIS 13, at *4-5.
Jurisdictional cases can be complicated and intricate, and the Court-below could certainly look to the Seaford Doughnut case for guidance. But that case, in my view, does not embody the purpose of Section 5717. Thus, this Court finds that Manufactured Home is the controlling case with respect to an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas from a decision by a magistrate of the Justice of the Peace Court for a summary possession and debt case. As Manufactured Home aptly reasoned, a party should not be able to decide what court has jurisdiction over his/her case. Instead, that decision is governed by statute, in this case Section 5717, and abundant case law supporting the proposition that if a party brings a summary possession and debt claim before the Justice of the Peace Court, the only option for appeal is to the three-judge panel pursuant to Section 5717. Neither party can elect to sever the summary possession claim from the debt claim, which were filed jointly before the Justice of the Peace Court, and appeal the debt claim to the Court of Common Pleas. Thus, the decision of the Court-below constitutes an error of law.
Because I found that an error of law occurred, the other issues on appeal are moot.
Based on the foregoing, Neitzelt's appeal from the decision of the Court-below is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.