The answer remains solely the vehicle by which a defendant may assert defenses to the action, not to jurisdiction. (See Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340, 345 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905].) We recognize that the statutory language is not as clear as it might be, but we consider our construction compelled by long precedent and common sense.
It did not need to have, in addition, in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the property. ( Neihaus v. Superior Court (1997) 69 Cal.App.3d 340, 345-346 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905].) Because the People never filed a petition pursuant to section 186.11, however, it lacked jurisdiction, in the sense of authority, to order the property levied on, sold, and distributed as restitution.
(Cf. Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340, 346 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905] ["the question of whether or not an attorney is authorized to appear is a question of fact to be tried by a fact-finder, not by an appellate court. . . ."].) Accordingly, we shall reverse the order granting the motion to quash without prejudice to further proceedings in this regard.
The court in McCorkle v. City Of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453] concluded that this statute (despite its permissive language) rendered mandamus the exclusive remedy for a party who wished to assert his jurisdictional objection while nevertheless preserving his right to defend on the merits if his challenge was unsuccessful. See also Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905] [filing of answer without following statutory procedure for pursuing immediate writ petition waived jurisdictional challenge]. The statutory schemes are parallel: Both deal with issues of personal jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes; both provide that challenges not promptly interposed are waived; and both provide statutory mechanisms for immediate appellate review of challenges.
The general appearance waives irregularities in the service of process. ( Terzich v. Medak (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 636, 639 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 323]; Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905].) (1c) Here, respondents answered and by affirmative defense raised the issue of jurisdiction.
(1) Such an appearance is general; it confers jurisdiction on the court where none existed before; and it waives irregularities in the service of process. ( McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 257-258 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453]; Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340, 345-346 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 905]; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) pp. 646-647, 651-652, 656, 657-659, 662.) As pointed out in these authorities, the court acquires jurisdiction even though the appearance was preceded by the making and denial of a motion to quash and even though it was accompanied by an attempt to disclaim submission to jurisdiction.
Appellants and HIC are amendable to jurisdiction in both California and South Korea. California is a suitable forum because HIC consented to Californias jurisdiction when it answered the complaint, and thus made a general appearance. (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 1014; Neihaus v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 340, 345.) South Korea is also suitable because HIC has agreed to submit to jurisdiction there.