Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0471-13T2
01-20-2015
DAWN NEHRING, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and 7 OIL COMPANY, INC., Respondents.
Dawn Nehring, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Victoria R. Ply, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent 7 Oil Company, Inc. has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Accurso. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 411,080. Dawn Nehring, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Victoria R. Ply, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent 7 Oil Company, Inc. has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Dawn Nehring appeals from the final decision of the Department of Labor's Board of Review disqualifying her from unemployment benefits because she left her job without good cause attributable to the work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). She contends that the Board's decision was arbitrary because it relied on the Appeal Tribunal's "inadequate, skewed finding[s] of fact." Having considered that claim in light of the record and controlling precedent, we affirm.
Following a six-month disability leave necessitated by injuries sustained in a car accident, claimant did not return to work claiming her employer made the workplace intolerable. The deputy denied her claim for unemployment benefits, deeming her disqualified on the ground that she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Claimant appealed from that determination to the Appeal Tribunal.
The Appeals Examiner, after a two and a half-hour hearing during which claimant, her former co-worker, the employer and the employer's witnesses all testified, made detailed findings of fact affirming the determination of the deputy. Claimant and her witness testified that the owner of the company would yell and use profanity, smashed telephones, threw things in a rage and once kicked a trash can across the room. Although claimant acknowledged that the owner's ire was not usually directed at her, she testified that his outbursts were becoming a regular occurrence in the months prior to her disability leave, and they frightened her.
Acknowledging that he and others, including claimant, used profanity in the workplace, the employer denied directing foul language or derogatory comments at claimant and denied throwing things in the office. He contended that claimant was a good employee but "fragile" and overly sensitive. He claimed that she regularly approached him to request favors such as an advance on her pay or to borrow a company vehicle and questioned why she never approached him about his behavior if it disturbed her as she claimed.
Relying on the fact that claimant never addressed the owner about his conduct while she was employed, never sought medical treatment for the stress she claimed to have endured and did not leave employment during the time these outbursts were occurring, the Appeal Tribunal concluded that the work conditions were not so severe as to justify claimant leaving her job. Claimant appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal on the record below. This appeal followed.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). We also give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility. Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid.
Applying these principles, we find no error in the Board's decision to deny benefits. In order to avoid disqualification, claimant had the burden of establishing that she left work for "good cause attributable to work." Id. at 218. "Good cause attributable to such work" is defined by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." The Appeal Tribunal resolved the factual dispute over this issue adversely to claimant. The Tribunal's determination, adopted by the Board, that claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work, is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the Board's finding.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION