Unum Life points to Michigan law, a state also distinguishing between "accidental results" and "accidental means," which has held that CTS is not an "accidental bodily injury" under a disability income policy virtually identical to the Policies at issue here. See Nehra v. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co., 454 Mich. 110, 559 N.W.2d 48 (1997). In Nehra, a dentist was diagnosed with CTS and a duodenal ulcer with hemorrhage after many years of practice.

Regarding the insurance company's argument that Dr. Hallum's bodily injury had to be traceable to a discreet event, the Georgia Supreme Court found that argument was unsupported by the parties' contract and by Georgia law. Hallum, 276 Ga. at 148, 576 S.E.2d at 851. Two Michigan cases have also been decided with similar facts: Nehra v. Provident Life Accident Insurance Co., 454 Mich. 110, 559 N.W.2d 48 (1997), and Pearson v. Provident Life Accident Insurance Co., No. 204889 (Mich.App. January 22, 1999). In Nehra, a dentist developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work and claimed disability benefits under a disability insurance policy that had the same schedule of benefits as the policy schedule in the case before us and similarly hinged those benefits on whether the disability was defined as an injury or a sickness.

. Paul Revere relies on Bilezikjian v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2010) and Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 454 Mich. 110, 559 N.W.2d 48 (1997). Dr. Chapman worked for nearly thirty years as an endodontist, a specialized form of dentistry which required repetitive fine motor and delicate hand movements to perform procedures.

Similar to this case, the policy at issue in the Michigan case defined "injuries" as "accidental bodily injuries occurring while your policy is in force," and "sickness" as "sickness or disease which is first manifested while your policy is in force" while providing no further definition of "accidental bodily injuries." Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 454 Mich. 110, 112 559 N.W.2d 48, 50 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court of Michigan did not consider a dentist's occupational injury to be an "accidental bodily injury" under the applicable policy due to the lack of "an injury sustained in a single accident, having a temporal and spatial location.

Paul Revere agues the completely opposite result, and uses a case decided under Michigan law to support its position. In Nehra v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 1997), a dentist was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and a duodenal ulcer with hemorrhage and applied for total disability benefits under his insurance policy. Nehra, 559 N.W.2d at 49.

As the Williams court correctly pointed out, "if it is to be held that an activity normally engaged in by an insured becomes an `accident' because the effect thereof, without more, is on a given occasion extraordinary, the term accident has, for insurance coverage purposes at least, no meaning at all." ( Williams, supra, 158 Cal. 3d at p. 234; accord, Nehra v. Provident Ins. Co. (1997) 454 Mich. 110, 118 [ 559 N.W.2d 48, 51] [word "accidental" must include some temporal and spatial component, otherwise "the word `accidental' adds almost nothing to the phrase `accidental bodily injuries'"].) (3) Typing at a keyboard was an activity in which Gin normally engaged.

But Michigan law considers an "accidental bodily injury" to be a single concept and construes it narrowly. Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 454 Mich. 110, 559 N.W.2d 48, 51 (1997) ("[W]ithout [a] temporal/spatial component [of a single accident], the word ‘accidental’ adds almost nothing to the phrase ‘accidental bodily injuries.’ ").

But Michigan law considers an “accidental bodily injury” to be a single concept and construes it narrowly. Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Mich. 1997) (“[W]ithout [a] temporal/spatial component [of a single accident], the word ‘accidental' adds almost nothing to the phrase ‘accidental bodily injuries.'”). As discussed above, this strays from federal common law.

First, plaintiff contends the insured must not have reasonably expected the injury to occur. Second, plaintiff cites Nehra v. Provident Ins. Co., 454 Mich. 110 (1997), for the proposition that there must be some spatial/temporal element leading the average person to conclude that the death or injury was "accidental" — that is, that the cause of death did not progress over a long period of time. Applying his proposed test to the record, plaintiff concludes that Rosa Close's death, caused by a rupture of the anastomosis site which led to peritonitis and sepsis can only be reasonably understood to be accidental. Plaintiff relies primarily upon Dr. Pacris' autopsy report and the death certificate signed by Dr. John Maino, M.D. Contending the certificate and report provide unbiased, and thus superior evidence when compared with the forensic report of Dr. Lewis (relied upon by defendant), plaintiff urges the Court to find Rosa Close's death was accidental.

First, plaintiff contends the insured must not have reasonably expected the injury to occur. Second, plaintiff cites Nehra v. Provident Ins. Co., 454 Mich. 110 (1997), for the proposition that there must be some spatial/temporal element leading the average person to conclude that the death or injury was "accidental" — that is, that the cause of death did not progress over a long period of time. Applying his proposed test to the record, plaintiff concludes that Rosa Close's death, caused by a rupture of the anastomosis site which led to peritonitis and sepsis can only be reasonably understood to be accidental. Plaintiff relies primarily upon Dr. Pacris' autopsy report and the death certificate signed by Dr. John Maino, M.D. Contending the certificate and report provide unbiased, and thus superior evidence when compared with the forensic report of Dr. Lewis (relied upon by defendant), plaintiff urges the Court to find Rosa Close's death was accidental.