Opinion
5:22-CV-00300-TES-CHW
07-07-2023
ERIC MATTHEW NEGRIN, Plaintiff, v. Nurse BETTY EVANS, et al., Defendants.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles H. Weigle, United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 24), and Plaintiff's Motion for an Indefinite Extension of Time (Doc. 32), Defendants Betty Evans, John Gary, and James Graham's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 20), Defendants Betty Evans and James Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25), and Defendant John Gary's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30). Plaintiff did not respond to either the motion to dismiss or the motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 24) and Motion for an Indefinite Extension of Time (Doc. 32) are DENIED. It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) be DENIED as moot and that Defendants Betty Evans and James Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25) and Defendant John Gary's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendants Gary, Evans, and Graham were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs while he was in Twiggs County Jail. (Doc. 1). The Court screened Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and allowed his claims of deliberate indifference to proceed against Defendants Evans, Graham, and Gary on October 24, 2022. (Doc. 10). The Defendants collectively moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim on December 27, 2022. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff did not respond to the motion to dismiss, despite the Court's order directing response and instructing Plaintiff on his rights and obligations regarding the motion. (Doc. 21). On March 1, 2023, Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel. On April 25, 2023, Defendants Evans and Graham moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 25). On April 26, 2023, Defendant Gary moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff did not respond to the motions for summary judgment, despite receiving notice from the Clerk of Court on his rights and obligations in regards to the motions. (Doc. 27). On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff moved for an indefinite extension of time to respond. (Doc. 32).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32224 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
Although Plaintiff failed to respond to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, summary judgment is not properly awarded by default. See Trs. of Central Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs and Participating Emp'rs, 374 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, by failing to respond to the Defendants' motions, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Defendants' statement of undisputed material facts, triggering consequences under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) provides that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Rule 56(e)(2). This Court's Local Rule 56 similarly provides: “All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.” MDGA Local Rule 56. Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that the Court may “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to” summary judgment. Rule 56(e)(3). See also Urdaneta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 Fed.Appx. 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, because Defendants properly supported their factual assertions with specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond, the Defendants' facts may be accepted by the Court as undisputed.
Nevertheless, this recommendation is based on a review of the entire record of the case. If evidence in the record shows that a fact is disputed, all justifiable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff's favor for purposes of summary judgment. See United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the entry of summary judgment [cannot be based] on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion”).
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff's claims stem from his incarceration at Twiggs County Jail (“TCJ”) from July 2020 until October 2020. (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Evans, Graham, and Gary were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Id.) Southern Health Partners (“Southern Health”) is a company that contracts with county jails to provide medical services to inmates. (Doc. 25-4 ¶ 1). Southern Health maintained a contract with TCJ during the time period relevant to this case and employed Defendants Evans and Graham. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4). Defendant Betty Evans is a licensed practical nurse who worked as Southern Health's Medical Team Administrator during the relevant time period, and Defendant James Graham is a licensed medical doctor who worked as the Medical Director of TCJ during the relevant time period. (Id.) Defendant John Gary is the Captain of Jail Operations/Jail Administration at TCJ, and his job duties include overseeing the welfare of inmates. (Doc. 30-2 ¶¶ 2-3).
Plaintiff entered the Medical Center Navicent Health (“Navicent Health”) in Macon, Georgia, on July 24, 2020. (Id. ¶ 5). Plaintiff “present[ed] as a walk-in to the emergency room for chest pain” and “admitted to [taking] methamphetamines recently.” (Id.) During his time at Navicent Health, Plaintiff “became quite agitated and belligerent with staff in [the] emergency room[,] and [the] physician needed to administer Ativan [two times]” to calm him. (Id.) While at Navicent Health, Plaintiff completed a cardiology consultation which revealed “[n]o EKG changes suggestive of [acute coronary syndrome],” and his chest x-ray revealed “no acute disease process[es].” (Id. ¶ 6). Upon his discharge from Navicent Health, Plaintiff's active diagnoses included “methamphetamine abuse, methadone overdose, chest pain, anemia, and tachycardia.” (Id. ¶ 7).
Following his hospitalization, Plaintiff was released from Navicent Health into the custody of the Twiggs County Sheriff's Office because of pending charges against him. (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff claims that Defendants were notified verbally and in writing by “emergency room doctors” that Plaintiff had prescriptions that needed to be filled immediately and that Plaintiff required a “follow up stress test” for his heart immediately. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants deliberately ignored these instructions and failed to provide him with his prescriptions or the required “stress test.” (Id.) Plaintiff experienced severe chest pains that he describes as “possible heart attacks” throughout his incarceration at TCJ. (Id.) Eventually, Defendant Evans ordered an EKG, which revealed a “possible heart attack/abnormal reading.” But after Defendant Evans consulted with Defendants Gary and Graham, Plaintiff's complaints of chest pains continued to be ignored. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant refused him proper medical treatment for his heart condition for approximately three months while he was at TCJ. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims he was released from Navicent Health and incarcerated at TCJ on July 28, 2020. (Doc. 1 at 5). According to Defendants Evans and Graham, Plaintiff was actually discharged from Navicent Health on July 25, 2020, and incarcerated at TCJ the same day. (Docs. 25-4 ¶ 7; 30-2 ¶ 1). For the purposes of the pending motions, the small difference between the cited dates is irrelevant.
Defendants' accounts of Plaintiff's medical treatment differ significantly from Plaintiff's account. Defendant Evans conducted Plaintiff's intake screening at TCJ on July 26, 2020. (Doc. 25-4 ¶ 8). On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff stated that he was experiencing suicidal thoughts, and he began to behave violently towards jail staff and a nurse. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff was placed in a “suicide blanket” and put on suicide watch, where he was monitored every fifteen minutes. (Id.) On Defendant Graham's orders, Defendant Evans entered a prescription of Norvasc for Plaintiff for his blood pressure. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11). Plaintiff appeared “very agitated” during observation through July 28, 29, and 30, 2020, but he accepted his blood pressure medication and took his meals. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff continued to take his prescribed Norvasc until August 14, 2020, when Plaintiff began to refuse the medication on the basis that it “[did] not work for chest pains.” (Id. ¶ 12). After refusing his medication, Plaintiff signed a waiver form entitled “Refusal of Medical Treatment and Release of Responsibility” that stated: “I release Southern Health Partners, Inc., its staff, the County, the Sheriff, his/her staff from all responsibility and I assume personal responsibility of the conditions that may occur as a result of my refusing treatment as prescribed by the medical staff of the facility and/or outside consultation services.” (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff's Norvasc prescription was discontinued as a result of his refusal to take it. (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff continued to take various medications for other conditions, including “medication for his mental health conditions, kidney problems, and orthopedic pain.” (Id. ¶ 15). Specifically, Plaintiff took Visatril and Zoloft for anxiety and depression throughout his incarceration at TCJ. (Id. ¶ 16).
On August 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a medical request that reported chest pain and a request to see a “heart doctor, not a general practice doctor” for a “stress test.” (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff acknowledged at the time that the chest pain he experienced could be panic attacks. (Id.) On August 25, 2020, an EKG technician came to TCJ and “attempted to administer an EKG exam to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff “refused to sit still during the EKG exam and attempted to kick the EKG technician.” (Id. ¶ 19). Because Plaintiff refused to cooperate, the EKG technician was unable to obtain an accurate reading on Plaintiff. (Id.) Nothing in the EKG report generated from this incident suggested that Plaintiff suffered a “possible heart attack,” as he alleges. (Id. ¶ 20). Defendant Graham testifies that nothing in his interactions with Plaintiff or his review of Plaintiff's medical records suggests that Plaintiff ever suffered a heart attack at TCJ or had any other cardiac condition. (Id. ¶ 21). Instead, Plaintiff suffered from anxiety, a kidney condition, and several chronic conditions, including orthopedic injuries, all of which were treated while he was at TCJ. (Id.)
During Plaintiff's incarceration, Defendant Gary received nearly 150 grievances from Plaintiff. (Doc. 30-2 ¶ 12). Three of Plaintiff's filed grievances mentioned chest pains. (Id. ¶ 13). The first grievance to mention chest pains, submitted on September 21, 2020, was forwarded by Defendant Gary to the medical department. (Id.) The second and third grievances described chest pains as one of several symptoms that Plaintiff claimed were a result of COVID-19. (Id.) After each of these grievances, Defendant Gary informed Plaintiff that there were no documented cases of COVID-19 at the jail, that the medical department would address any of Plaintiff's concerns, and that Plaintiff should submit a medical request regarding his symptoms. (Id.) Plaintiff never submitted a grievance that claimed he was not receiving his prescribed heart medications or required testing for cardiac conditions. (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff also never submitted any grievance that related to a stress test or claimed that he had suffered a heart attack. (Id. ¶ 15). Defendant Gary submitted every grievance related to a medical issue to Defendant Evans in the medical department. (Id. ¶ 16).
On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff appealed several of his denied grievances related to his housing assignment, criminal charges, administrative segregation, charges related to medical care, medical care for his neck injury, COVID-19 and tuberculosis testing, and requests for more outdoor recreation time. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff did not indicate that he had been deprived of heart medication or testing in any of his appeals. (Id. ¶ 18).
Plaintiff's medical conditions were being addressed by the medical department of TCJ at all times during his incarceration. (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff had unrestricted access to Defendant Evans through computerized medical requests and in-person appointments while he was at TCJ. (Id. ¶ 19). Defendant Gary knew that Defendant Evans practices under physician supervision and that she had examined Plaintiff multiple times during his incarceration. (Id. ¶ 20). Defendant Gary had every reason to believe that the medical care provided to Plaintiff was adequate and appropriate at all times while he was at TCJ. (Id. ¶ 24).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel (Doc. 24) and for an indefinite extension of time to answer the motions for summary judgment (Doc. 32). Defendants collectively moved to dismiss (Doc. 20), and subsequently Defendants Evans and Graham jointly moved for summary judgment (Doc. 25), as did Defendant John Gary (Doc. 30). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motions for Appointment of Counsel and Motion for an Indefinite Extension of Time for Response (Docs. 24; 32) are DENIED. It is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as moot and that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 25; 30) be GRANTED.
Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel, claiming that he “need[s] legal assistance to resolve [his] § 1983 federal grievances as [he is] unable to remember or move forward on how to explain/prosecute [his] cases.” (Doc. 24 at 1). Plaintiff claims he is experiencing difficulties with his litigation responsibilities because he was assaulted twice in the six months before his filing, first by another inmate and then by correctional officers. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he sustained head injuries during these assaults that are specifically affecting his ability to continue in this case. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff has a history of dishonesty with the Court, as he failed to disclose his past lawsuits when filing this case, and the record shows that several of his allegations in this case are patently untrue, such as his claim that his EKG results showed a possible heart attack. (Docs. 1 at 2-3, 5; compare to 25-1 ¶¶ 18-20); see also Negrin v. Everidge, 5:19-cv-00354-MTT- CHW (M.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 2019); Negrin v. Felder, 5:19-cv-00391-TES-MSH (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2019); Negrin v. Gary, 5:20-cv-00428-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2020); Negrin v. Mitchum, 5:20-cv-00399-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2020); Negrin v. Felder, 5:21-cv-00017-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2021); Negrin v. Rape, 5:21-cv-00161-TES-MSH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2021); Negrin v. Chatman, 5:21-cv-00245-MTT-MSH (M.D. Ga. July 20, 2021). These facts make the Court skeptical of Plaintiff's truthfulness in his request.
Additionally, Plaintiff clearly articulated his claims and factual allegations in his complaint. (Doc. 1). Based on the clarity of the factual allegations in Plaintiff's initial filing and Plaintiff's failure to respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, there is no basis to delay this case to appoint counsel.
“Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right.” Wahl v McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1986). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances. Id. In deciding whether legal counsel should be provided, the Court considers, among other factors, the merits of Plaintiff's claim and the complexity of the issues presented. Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989). But “[t]he key” in determining whether appointed counsel is warranted “is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits his position to the court.” Nelson v. McLaughlin, 608 Fed.Appx. 904, 905 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). In accordance with Holt, and upon a review of the record in this case, the Court notes that Plaintiff has set forth the essential merits of his claims, and the applicable legal doctrines are readily apparent. In this case, the Defendants' legal arguments, undisputed statements of fact, and other record submissions provide an adequate basis for granting summary judgment. Nevertheless, Plaintiff may properly raise any remaining arguments as objections to this Recommendation. As such, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 24) is DENIED.
The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes courts to “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The statute does not, however, provide any funding to pay attorneys for their representation or authorize courts to compel attorneys to represent an indigent party in a civil case. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
Plaintiff's Motion for an Indefinite Extension of Time to Respond
Plaintiff moves for an indefinite extension to time to respond to the motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 32). Plaintiff claims that he has sustained severe damage to his neck and spine, as well as a near fatal head trauma, and that he must undergo emergency surgery “immediately.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff states that he has “not had the time or energy to even start summary judgment” and requests indefinite leave in consideration of his post-operation recovery. (Id.) The underlying injuries that Plaintiff refers to appear to be the same injuries that he describes in his Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 24). Notably, Plaintiff requested an indefinite stay for similar head injuries near the beginning of this case on September 19, 2022. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff also has a history of requesting indefinite extensions for “emergency” circumstances. See Doc. 13, Negrin v. King, Case No. 5:21-cv-269-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2022) (requesting an indefinite stay because Plaintiff was “sever[e]ly sick w/COVID); Doc. 72, Negrin v. Gary, 5:20-cv-428-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2022) (requesting indefinite leave as Plaintiff prepares for an unrelated trial); Doc. 83, Negrin v. Chatman, 5:21-cv-245-MTT-MSH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2022) (requesting an indefinite stay because of violent attacks occurring on July 31, 2022, that left Plaintiff with serious head trauma).
In this case, Plaintiff has already been granted a specific extension of time and denied an indefinite stay based on emergency medical conditions. (Doc. 8). The Court explained in its order denying the stay that it would not delay this case for an indefinite period of time and instructed Plaintiff to request specific extensions if he needed more time. (Id.) Plaintiff has also been denied indefinite extensions or stays in other cases when he has failed to indicate how long it might take him to heal or to explain in detail why his injuries prevent him from prosecuting his case. See Doc. 84, Negrin v. Chatman, 5:21-cv-245-MTT-MSH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2022). Additionally, Plaintiff has been instructed that he should request specific extensions in such circumstances in previous cases. Id.; see also Negrin v. Evans, No. 5:22-cv-248-MTT-CHW, 2022 WL 4657697, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2022); (Doc. 8).
Plaintiff also has diminished credibility in this Court, as he has repeatedly failed to disclose his litigation history, in this case and many others in this District. See Negrin v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections, No. 7:22-CV-138-WLS-TQL (detailing Plaintiff's litigation history); (compare to Doc. 1 at 2-3). Moreover, the Court has a significant interest in using “the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A district court must be able to exercise its managerial power to maintain control over its docket.”).
Finally, Plaintiff has consistently filed articulate, clear motions throughout his various medical emergencies, which contradicts his alleged inability to proceed in his cases. See Scherffius v. Smith, No. 2:13-cv-1277-JAM-DBP 2019 WL 2366959 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (denying an motion to continue indefinitely staying the case where the plaintiff failed to provide medical documentation of his medical issues and noting that plaintiff's motion to continue the stay and other filings were well-written and well-reasoned, which failed to show a basis for further delay).
In light of Plaintiff's extensive litigation history, previous warnings from the Court regarding his requests for indefinite extensions and stays, Plaintiff's diminished credibility, and the Court's interest in effectively managing its cases, an indefinite extension of time is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for an Indefinite Extension of Time is DENIED.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata because they were or could have been brought in prior lawsuits. (Doc. 20). Because Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment incorporate the res judicata argument from the Motion to Dismiss and also address Plaintiff's claims with the benefit of discovery, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as moot. (Docs. 25-1 at 8 n.2; 30-1 at 9 n.6); see Abdullah v. Cty. of Jacksonville, 242 F. App'x. 661, 662 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to dismiss as moot when granting defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Motions for Summary Judgment
Defendants Evans and Graham move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, (2) Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to disclose his litigation history, and (3) Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. (Doc. 25-1). Defendant Gary moves for summary judgment on the same grounds as Defendants Evans and Graham and also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 30-1). For reasons explained below, Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, Plaintiff's complaint could properly be dismissed for failure to disclose his litigation history, Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical need, and Defendant Gary is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 25; 30) be GRANTED.
1. Defendants have not shown that res judicata bars Plaintiff's claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata because of a prior lawsuit that concerned Defendants Evans and Gary and had substantially the same cause of action. (Docs. 10 at 2; 25-1 at 8 n.2; 30-1 at 9 n.6); see Negrin v. Gary, No. 5:20-cv-428-TES-CHW. Negrin v. Gary is a slightly older case brought by Plaintiff against Defendants Gary and Evans, as well as additional defendants who are not named in the present action. Plaintiff claimed that the named defendants failed to protect him from an attack by another inmate and provided inadequate medical treatment for the injuries he suffered after that attack during his incarceration at TCJ from July 2020 to October 2020-the same period of incarceration at issue in this case. Id., Doc. 1. Plaintiff's medical treatment claims proceeded for further development against Defendants Evans, Gary, and other defendants and were later dismissed on summary judgment. Id., Doc. 74. Although it is likely that Plaintiff's present claims could have been brought in the previous suit, Defendants have not adequately shown that Defendant Graham is in privity with Defendant Evans. Accordingly, Defendants have not shown that res judicata bars Plaintiff's claims.
Defendant Betty Evans' name was somewhat unclear in Negrin v. Gary, as she was originally named as “Nurse Betty,” and later referred to as “Defendant Davis” or “Nurse Betty Davis.” However, these discrepancies were clarified when Defendant Evans responded to Plaintiff's complaint. See Doc. 33, Negrin v. Gary, 5:20-CV-428-TES-CHW.
“Under res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action from relitigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in that action.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 224 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). “[A] party seeking to invoke [res judicata] must establish its propriety by satisfying four initial elements: (1) the prior decision must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases must involve the same causes of action.” Id. “[I]n general, [if] a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, the two cases are really the same ‘claim' or ‘cause of action' for the purposes of res judicata.” Id. “The claim preclusion doctrine turns not on the nature of the plaintiff's claims or the legal authority in which they are grounded but on whether a court has already resolved claims between the same parties arising from the same events; if so, the doctrine prohibits the plaintiff from bringing the claims again regardless of their gravity or importance to the plaintiff.” Giddens v. Lawson, 839 F. App'x. 350, 353 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the later-filed suit is barred. Thorsteinsson v. M/V Drangur, 891 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th. Cir. 1990).
Here, the first element of res judicata is met, as the federal district court is one of competent jurisdiction for such § 1983 actions. The second element is also met, as judgment has been entered on the merits in the first case. Defendants argue that the third element is also met, because Defendants Evans and Gary were also parties in the first suit, and Defendant Evans is in privity with Defendant Graham. Defendants contend that Defendant Evans was in privity with Defendant Graham in the prior case because the Court examined and referenced the medical care that Defendant Graham provided Plaintiff in the first suit, to which Defendant Graham was not a party, and Defendant Graham's interests in the prior case was adequately represented by Defendant Evans, who was a party. (Doc. 20-1 at 7). However, Defendants' argument is not supported with more than a general citation to standard privity relationships in res judicata analysis. (Id.)
Privity between a nonparty litigant and a party on record exists if “(1) the nonparty agreed to be bound by the litigation of others; (2) a substantive legal relationship existed between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment; (3) the nonparty was adequately represented by someone who was a party to the suit; (4) the nonparty assumed control over the litigation in which the judgment was issued; (5) a party attempted to relitigate the issues through a proxy; or (6) a statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by nonlitigants.” Griswold v. County of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). Defendants argue that Defendant Graham was adequately represented by Defendant Evans in the prior suit, as they worked together as medical staff at TCJ, and Defendant Evans specifically followed Defendant Graham's orders in that case. This theory of privity has little support in case law, as evidenced by Defendants' lack of citation in their legal argument. But see Brown v. Parker, No. 3:15-CV-96-LAC-EMT 2015 WL 5905099 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2015) (finding that a nurse in a current suit was in privity with defendants in the prior suit because she “was part of the same medical staff .. during the operative time, and her actions were taken in concert with the defendants from the previous action ... which resulted in [the nurse's conduct] being taken into account during the court's grant of summary judgment” in the previous suit).
In light of Defendants' sparse briefing on the privity issue and the lack of binding precedent for finding privity between Defendants Evans and Graham, Defendants have not carried their burden of showing that res judicata bars Plaintiff's present claims.
2. Plaintiff's complaint could properly be dismissed for failure to disclose his litigation history
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because of his failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history. In his complaint, Plaintiff disclosed only one former lawsuit, Negrin v. Gary, No. 5:20-cv-428-WES-TES. (Doc. 1 at 2). In reality, Plaintiff is a serial litigator who has filed many lawsuits and has had several lawsuits dismissed for failure to disclose his litigation history truthfully. See Negrin v. Ga.. Dept. of Corrections, No. 7:22-CV-138-WLS-TQL (M.D. Ga. March 7, 2023) (detailing Plaintiff's litigation history, which was also undisclosed in that case). Additionally, when asked on the form if any of his previous lawsuits had been dismissed as frivolous, Plaintiff answered no, when several of his cases have been dismissed on those grounds. (Id.)
As explained in an order denying one of Plaintiff's complaints for failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history:
A prisoner's “failure to comply with court rules requiring disclosures about [his] previous litigation” may constitute “an abuse of the judicial process warranting dismissal” of the party's pleading as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1). Sears v. Haas, 509 Fed.Appx. 935, 936 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “Although pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, a plaintiff's pro se status does not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules.” Id. (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993)). Dismissal is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 where a plaintiff engages in bad faith litigiousness or manipulative tactics. Redmon v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 414 Fed.Appx. 221, 225 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
A prisoner's failure to disclose his full litigation history, when requested to do so, is not considered a minor omission. Such information is highly relevant where, as here, a prisoner seeks to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, as the court has a duty to enforce the statutory three strikes bar, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This information is also necessary for the court to determine, prior to service, whether a prisoner's claims are related to (or should be considered in connection with) another pending action and-more importantly-whether any claims or issues in the current complaint have already been decided. Williams v. Wiggins, No. 6:09-cv-943, 2010 WL 4983665, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2010). This is especially true for a prisoner like Plaintiff, who is a serial litigator prone to filing duplicative actions. See Negrin v. Wilkinson Cnty. Jail, 5:21-cv-00279-MTT-TQL (M.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2021) (order dismissing case because it is duplicative of Negrin v. King, 5:21-cv-00269-MTT-CHW (M.D. Ga. July 30, 2021)); Negrin v. Mitchum, 5:20-cv-00399-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. June 11, 2021) (order dismissing one claim as duplicative of a claim already pending in another lawsuit and dismissing the remainder of the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Reliable disclosures are thus essential for an efficient and effective screening of the large number of pro se prisoner complaints received by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). And, as other courts within this Circuit have reasoned, if pro se plaintiffs suffered no substantial penalty for providing false or misleading information in the complaint, “there would be little or no disincentive” for prisoners to attempt to evade the requirement that such disclosures be made. Williams, 2010 WL 4983665 at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hood v. Tompkins, 197 Fed.Appx. 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (agreeing with district court's conclusion
that allowing prisoner to “acknowledge what he should have disclosed earlier would serve to overlook his abuse of the judicial process”).Doc. 6; Negrin v. Ga.. Dept. of Corrections, No. 7:22-CV-138-WLS-TQL (M.D. Ga. March 7, 2023).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint could properly be dismissed for failure to disclose his former lawsuits. However, for reasons explained below, Plaintiff's claims are subject to summary judgment on their merits.
3. Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs
Defendants have shown that, on the record before the Court, Plaintiff cannot establish, as a genuine issue of material fact, that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Three elements are required to establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need: (1) Plaintiff must satisfy the objective component of the deliberate indifference analysis by showing that he had a serious medical need, (2) Plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component of the analysis by showing that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, and (3) Plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by the Defendants' wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record reflects that Plaintiff had a serious medical need, as he has been prescribed treatment for his injuries and conditions throughout his various incarcerations. (See Doc. 25-1). Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need. But Plaintiff has not shown, however, that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. The record shows that Plaintiff's account of his medical situation is contradicted by the records of his medical treatment and that Plaintiff was consistently treated for his medical conditions while at TCJ, despite, at times, his resistance to treatment and care. (See Doc. 25-1 ¶¶ 12-15, 18-20).
Although the facts reflect that Plaintiff received substantial care at TCJ, even a failure to receive adequate medical treatment would not necessarily meet the standard for deliberate indifference. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Rather, a finding of deliberate indifference requires medical treatment that “is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). Many of Plaintiff's complaints seem to reflect that he continued to experience chest pains after receiving care, but a prison official's failure to treat an inmate's pain must be “so cursory as to amount to no care at all” to “rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Williams v. Barrow, 559 Fed.Appx. 979, 984-85 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff's complaints may also result from his dissatisfaction with the care he received or a desire for different care, but “a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the [inmate's] course of treatment [cannot] support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Regardless of the source of Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with his treatment, none of Plaintiff's pleadings show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in light of the record, which reflects consistent medical care from medical staff.
Finally, for similar reasons, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants' conduct caused his injuries. To satisfy the causation element of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's “deliberate conduct” was the “moving force” behind his injury. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004). At best, Plaintiff has shown that he continued to experience discomfort and chest pains that he was experiencing before his incarceration at TCJ. (Doc. 1 at 45). At worst, the record reflects no evidence that Plaintiff suffers from any cardiac issues at all. (Doc. 25-4 ¶ 21). In sum, nothing in the record connects Defendants' actions to any resulting injury to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, and his claims should be dismissed.
4. Defendant Gary is entitled to qualified immunity
In addition to arguing that Plaintiff has not shown that he was deliberately indifferent, Defendant Gary also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity, as Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Gary violated his clearly established rights. “Qualified immunity protects government officials if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Nam Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “A government actor can be stripped of qualified immunity only when all reasonable government actors in the defendant's place would know that the challenged discretionary conduct violates federal law.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “To be entitled to qualified immunity, a public official ‘must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Nam Dang 871 F.3d at 1279. “An official acts within his discretionary authority if his actions (1) were undertaken ‘pursuant to the performance of his duties,' and (2) were ‘within the scope of his authority.'” Id. (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Gary pertain to his actions in the course of his duties as a jail official. Additionally, Plaintiff, who failed to respond, has not argued that Defendant Gary acted outside of the scope of his discretionary authority. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant Gary has shown he was acting within his discretionary authority at the relevant times and is eligible to assert qualified immunity.
After a defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Myrick v. Fulton Co., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023). A plaintiff fulfills this burden by showing that (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the violated right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). These two elements may be addressed in any order, and if the plaintiff fails to show one is fulfilled, the Court need not reach the other. Id.
The first step of qualified immunity analysis is the identification of the “precise constitutional violation” that the plaintiff alleges and the explanation of “what the violation requires.” Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gary was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Moreover, the record shows that Defendant Gary had little to do with any of Plaintiff's medical care, as he deferred all of Plaintiff's medical care and medical grievances to medical staff at the jail. (Doc. 30-2 ¶ 25). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Gary violated his clearly established rights. Accordingly, Defendant Gary is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Because the undisputed facts do not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 25; 30) be GRANTED. It is also recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) be DENIED as moot. Plaintiff's motions for appointment of counsel (Doc. 24) and an indefinite extension of time (Doc. 32) are DENIED.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the presiding District Judge WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.