Opinion
CV166015765
08-05-2016
Hazel C. Negrelli, Trustee et al. v. John King, Jr
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM (#103)
Elpedio N. Vitale, J.
The plaintiff in the above captioned matter commenced a summary process action against the defendant alleging that the defendant's tenancy in the premises at issue terminated by lapse of time. The defendant filed, inter alia, a " counterclaim" against the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
The plaintiff's motion to dismiss requests that the court " dismiss" the defendant's counterclaim because " it does not implicate [the defendant's] right to possession." The plaintiff asserts that the counterclaim is legally insufficient in that it seeks " damages" and " title" to the premises, relief that the plaintiff claims is beyond the purview of C.G.S. § 47a-33a.
The defendant filed an Answer, Special Defenses, and a Counterclaim, all dated June 20, 2016. The counterclaim seeks, " a decree compelling the counterclaim defendant to perform the agreement for the sale of the premises; " a decree vesting title to the premises to the premises to the counterclaim plaintiff"; and " damages, " and " an injunction restraining the counterclaim defendants from interfering with the possession of the counterclaim plaintiffs and from encumbering or otherwise dispensing of the premises or the record title thereto."
The defendant filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion. The court heard argument on the Motion on August 1, 2016.
Discussion
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint [or cross complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Intemal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The court must " construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, supra, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).
The motion to strike requires no factual findings by the court. Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). " In determining the sufficiency of a [cross complaint] challenged by a motion to strike, as well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116-17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).
" If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in [a] complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike"; Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991); but " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 303 Conn. 205, 213, 32 A.3d 296 (2011).
" The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [cross complaint] construed in favor of the defendant, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011). " It is well established that a motion to strike must be considered within the confines of the pleadings and not external documents . . . We are limited . . . to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 268-69 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005); see also Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 278, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988) (in ruling on motion to strike, court cannot resort to information outside of complaint).
Although originally cast as a Motion to Dismiss, the parties at oral argument agreed to treat the instant motion as a Motion to Strike. Our Supreme Court has approved the procedure of treating a Motion to Dismiss as a Motion to Strike where appropriate. McCutcheon and Burr, Inc. v. Berman, 218 Conn. 512, 590 A.2d 438 (1991); see also Commissioner v. Lake Phipps Land Owners Corporation, 3 Conn.App. 100, 102, 485 A.2d 580 (1985); cf. Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991); Isaacson v. Wiese, judicial district of New London, No. 21-4837, (May 19, 1992); Colombo v. Imundi, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, No. 308843, (Apr. 16, 1993); Beazley Co. Realtors v. Business Park Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, No. 523977, 7 Conn.L.Rptr. 548, (Nov. 6, 1992); LeClaire v. Town of Vernon, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, No. 44254, 2 Conn.L.Rptr. 265, (Aug. 1, 1990); Waskevich v. Devlin, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, No. 296272, 2 Conn.L.Rptr. 159, (July 30, 1990).
" Summary Process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).
The plaintiff moves to strike the defendant's counterclaims on the ground that the counterclaims alleged are impermissible in a summary process action. In response, the defendant argues that his counterclaim is legally sufficient because (1) equitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in summary process proceedings, and (2) General Statutes § 47a-33a permits a tenant to present any legal, equitable or constitutional defense in a summary process action. Counterclaims, including those seeking money damages, were traditionally impermissible in summary process actions. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, 131 Conn. 528, 531, 41 A.2d 109 (1945); Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 551-52, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). Our Supreme Court recognized the right of a defendant in a summary process action to raise certain equitable defenses and counterclaims in Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 584 A.2d 458 (1991). In Fellows, the plaintiff and defendant were parties to a residential lease for a term of ninety-nine years. The defendant withheld $25 from one month's rent because of a dispute over parking accommodations. After the plaintiff brought a summary process action for nonpayment of rent, the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking " denial of the summary process action on equitable grounds" and money damages.
The Fellows court reviewed the history of summary process actions in Connecticut's courts: " [I]n Atlantic Refining Co. v. O'Keefe, [ supra, 131 Conn. at 531], . . . we held that neither equitable nor legal counterclaims were available in summary process actions. When Atlantic Refining Co. was decided, however, summary process actions were still decided by justices of the peace in the 'justice courts, ' which did not have jurisdiction over equitable issues . . . Summary process defendants at that time could not, therefore, raise equitable defenses, but could and did bring separate actions in equity to enjoin the prosecution of summary process actions." (Citations omitted.) Fellows v. Martin, supra, 217 Conn. at 60-61.
" In the years since Atlantic Refining Co., the legislature abolished the justice courts . . . and created the housing docket of the Superior Court. In addition to hearing summary process actions . . . 'housing court' judges hear actions on a wide range of 'housing matters' including administrative appeals, building code violations and [a]ll actions for back rent, damages, return of security deposits and other relief arising out of the parties' relationship as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) Id., at 61.
The Fellows court concluded that " there is no longer sufficient justification for the old prohibition against the application of equitable principles barring forfeitures to summary process, that the prohibition, arising from an obsolete system, is itself obsolete, and that equitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding." Id., at 62. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court should have entered judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of the defendant's counterclaim pleading the equitable doctrine against forfeitures.
It is important to note that the holding in Fellows allowing equitable defenses and counterclaims in summary process actions is limited to defenses and counterclaims " implicating the right to possession . . ." Id. The distinction between such defenses and counterclaims and those seeking money damages is clear in the court's decision, which states: " Because the trial court could not reasonably have failed to grant equitable relief to the tenant by relieving her from forfeiture of the lease, we reverse the judgment of possession on the complaint, but remand for further proceedings regarding the amount due the landlord. We affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim to the extent that it claimed damages, because its prayers for monetary relief did not implicate the right to possession." Id., at 69-70.
Since the Fellows decision, both the Appellate Court and numerous judges of this court have continued to state that claims for damages are not permitted in summary process actions. See Carnese v. Middleton, 27 Conn.App. 530, 535, 608 A.2d 700 (1992); Goodhall's, Inc. v. Dave Caron Chrysler Motors, L.L.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 072639 (June 1, 2000) (27 Conn.L.Rptr. 290, ) (Sullivan, J.); Accord Ventures v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. 105206, (December 29, 1999) (Satter, J.T.R.); Foston v. DeJesus, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. 50665, (January 21, 1998) (Levin, J.); Curnan v. Newton, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 185916 (August 15, 1997) (Pickett, J.) (20 Conn.L.Rptr. 317, 318, ); Ordway v. Collins, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Housing Session, Docket No. 16448, (June 28, 1996) (Jones, J.); Henesy v. Fleiss, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalik, Housing Session at Norwalk, Docket No. 12027, (April 26, 1996) (Tierney, J.); Thibault v. Buckmiller, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Housing Session, Docket No. 8503, (December 31, 1991) (Vertefeuille, J.).
C.G.S. § 47a-33a provides: " In any action of summary process under this chapter, the tenant may present any affirmative legal, equitable or constitutional defense that the tenant may have." By its own terms, § 47a-33a applies only to affirmative defenses, not counterclaims. An affirmative defense, called a special defense under our rules of practice, sets forth " [f]acts which are consistent with [the plaintiff's statements of fact] but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . ." Practice Book § 10-50. In the present case, the plaintiff seeks only possession of the premises. The defendant's counterclaim, seeking other affirmative relief, including damages, does not in the court's view implicate the right of possession.
Although the defendant attempts to save his counterclaim by characterizing it as " implicating possession, " in reality it seeks adjudication of an alleged contractual dispute involving an alleged agreement to sell the premises at issue. Indeed, the prayer for relief associated with the counterclaim seeks " title" and a decree of specific performance. The plaintiff's complaint merely seeks possession and alleges the defendant's tenancy terminated by lapse of time. The court has considered the authority cited by the defendant in support of his claims and does not find it to be persuasive. Plainville Police Department v. Plainville Redman Pequabuck Tribe #74, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. SPN-8307-4908, (December 8, 1983, Aronson, J.) recognized that money damages are not permissible in summary process actions. Most of the decision addressed the claimed special defense of " laches." It was decided prior to Fellows, supra, and omits any analysis of C.G.S. 47a-33a. One Sylvan Road North v. Lark International Ltd., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk, Docket No. SPNO 94-04-15626, (February 21, 1995, Tierney, J.), also cited by the defendant, is factually inapposite to the instant case.
In the matter of Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts v. Levesque et al., 88 Conn.App. 661, 673, 870 A.2d 1116 (2005) the Appellate Court addressed the issue of having legal and equitable issues tried in a single action in the context of a summary process action. In that matter, the Court noted that in making a determination as to whether both claims in equity and at law could be considered in a summary process action, the pleadings should be read as a whole. In reading the pleadings as a whole in the instant matter, it is clear the defendant should not be allowed to pursue those claims set forth by him in the counterclaim. The allegations do not sufficiently implicate the defendant's right of possession to allow the counterclaim to be heard as part of the summary process action. The defendant can pursue a separate action in Superior Court outside the statutory framework of a summary process action if he so chooses. He will not be prejudiced by not being able to proceed with this counterclaims in the summary process action as he has other adequate avenues of recourse available to him.
Additionally, the plaintiff commenced this summary process action against " John King, Jr." The counterclaim was brought in the name of " John King III." The notice to quit references " John King aka John King, Jr." and is referred to in the complaint. The defendant's Answer and Special Defense reference merely " John King, Jr., " and assert, inter alia, that " John King, Jr." did not occupy the premises. Consequently, it does not appear that " John King, III, " a named referenced only in the counterclaim, is a party to the present action.
A counterclaim cannot be asserted by a nonparty to the action. " The jurisdiction of the trial court is muted to those parties expressly before it." Exley v. Connecticut Greyhound Racing Inc., 59 Conn.App. 224, 234, 755 A.2d 990 (2000), Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Luna, 40 Conn.Supp. 89, 89-90, 481 A.2d 427 (1984). Such circumstance provides another basis warranting the granting of the plaintiff's motion to strike.
The courts conclusion as to the " nonparty" status of " John King III" at this juncture should not be interpreted as any determination of the merits of potential claims regarding the actual occupancy of any other individual for purposes of the defendant's answer or special defense. The defendant is not without recourse if the present action was instituted against the wrong party, or if other parties should have been included and were not.
For the foregoing reasons the Motion to Strike the defendant's counterclaim is granted. In light of the foregoing, the prayer for relief is also stricken.