"A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known to the person accepting." See also, Okmulgee Coal Co. v. Hinton et al., 95 Okla. 92, 218 P. 319, 322; Negim Co. v. Harp et al., 98 Okla. 261, 225 P. 347; and First Nat. Bank of Muskogee v. Clark, 93 Okla. 23, 219 P. 370. In the last cited case it is held:

In Becker v. National Refining Co., 50 S.W.2d (Mo.App.) 670, it was held that the question whether the secretary and other agents of a corporation had authority to employ counsel to represent the corporation in certain litigation was for the jury; and where there was evidence that the secretary conferred with the attorney respecting the participation of the latter in the litigation, and that the secretary had been sent by the president of the corporation to see the attorney, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the secretary and other agents of the corporation were authorized to employ the plaintiff as counsel. In Negim Co. v. Harp, 98 Okla. 261, 225 P. 347, it was held that a corporation is estopped to deny the authority of its secretary in employing attorneys to perform services for the corporation where the secretary owned practically all the stock of the corporation, was in charge of its business at the time, and it appeared that the attorneys obtained the approval of the president of the corporation, not as to the employment, but as to things they were doing pursuant thereto, and the corporation received, without objection, the benefit of the services. In Kelly v. Ning Yung Benev. Ass'n, 2 Cal.App. 460, 84 P.2d 321, the court, after stating that it was unnecessary for the purpose of making the corporation liable under the circumstances to show that there was a by-law or a form of resolution of its board of directors authorizing its secretary to employ an attorney, held that an attorney who had performed services for a corporation at the request of its secretary was entitled to recovery therefor (apparently on the basis of estoppel)