r in a state administrative agency to make findings of fact which are final if based upon substantial evidence. ( Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 256 N.Y. 199 [ 176 N.E. 141], affirmed per curiam, 284 U.S. 594 [52 S.Ct. 202, 76 L.Ed. 511]; see, also Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. GliddenCo., 284 U.S. 151, 157-158 [52 S.Ct. 69, 76 L.Ed. 214]; LongIsland Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 [17 S.Ct. 718, 41 L.Ed. 1165]; Louisville Nashville R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 313 [34 S.Ct. 48, 58 L.Ed. 229]; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507-509 [23 S.Ct. 390, 47 L.Ed. 563]; State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 199 [ 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 95 A.L.R. 1416]; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519 [139 P. 743, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, L.R.A. 1917C, 944], affirmed, 243 U.S. 629 [37 S.Ct. 475, 61 L.Ed. 937]; People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 175 N.Y. 440, 445 [ 67 N.E. 913, 108 Am. St. Rep. 781], affirmed, 199 U.S. 552, 562 [26 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed. 305]; Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482 [148 N.E. 250, 39 A.L.R. 1057]; People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N.Y. 357 [ 9 N.E.2d 961]; General Acc. F. L. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Com., 223 Wis. 635 [271 N.W. 385]; see, 21 R.C.L. 365; 12 Am. Jur. 329; 16 C.J.S. 1287.) It has been held that the due process clause does not guarantee judicial process in all cases ( Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 [50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904]; Den ex Dem.Murray v. Hoboken Land Imp. Co., 18 How. [U.S.] 272 [15 L.Ed. 372]), and that it does not guarantee any particular procedure.
But other decisions indicate that such a distinction is without substance. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162, 53 S.Ct. 380, 77 L.Ed. 676; Nega v. Chicago Rys., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N.E. 250; Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 256 N.Y. 199, 176 N.E. 141, affd. sub nom. Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial Bd. of N Y, 284 U.S. 594, 52 S.Ct. 202, 76 L.Ed. 511. See Anno. 39 A.L.R. 1064. As a general principle of administrative law, most courts now hold that the substantial evidence rule satisfies due process and that the constitution does not mandate de novo judicial review.
n proceedings under such acts. * * *" Representative cases holding there is no unlawful delegation of judicial power, under constitutional provisions similar, and in some cases, practically identical with ours, may be cited as follows: Borgnis v. Falk Company, 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 489; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N.W. 1037, 1060-1065, 157 N.W. 145, L.R.A. 1917 D, 15; Cunningham v. Northwestern Imp. Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554; State of Washington v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wn. 581, 135 P. 645, L.R.A. 1917D, 10, affirmed 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685; Evanhoff v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 78 Or. 503, 154 P. 106; Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825; Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122; Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658; Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 71 So.2d 433; Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, 204 Ind. 122, 179 N.E. 778, 782; Nega v. Chicago Railway Co., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N.E. 250, 39 A.L.R. 1057, and Annotation in 39 A.L.R. 1057. In Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, supra, the supreme court of Indiana, touching the question at issue, said:
We are cognizant of the established distinction in the case law between the constitutional requirements for review from administrative bodies which are legislative in character and those which perform semijudicial or quasi-judicial functions. ( People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 Ill. 597; Nega v. Chicago Railways Co. 317 Ill. 482; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287.) In the Nega case the court exhaustively analyzed the cases involving the constitutionality of provisions limiting judicial review to questions of law.
Plaintiff does not charge that he has unlimited discretion, and this opinion is not to be construed as deciding the question of the constitutionality of the grant of power. Nega v. Chicago Railways Co. 317 Ill. 482, and Grand Trunk Western Railway Co. v. Industrial Com. 291 Ill. 167, are analogous. This court, in the two cases last cited, held that the Industrial Commission was an administrative board, — nonjudicial in character, — although in the exercise of its duties it performs quasi-judicial functions. It follows that the Director of Labor is not a judge attempting to appeal from the decision of a higher court, overruling his own judgment. Cases to this effect, relied upon by plaintiff, are not in point.
The decisions above, applying to cases where utility rates are involved, all apply to situations where the action of the tribunal questioned is legislative in its character and are to be distinguished from those where the questioned order is from an executive officer or a body possessing semi-judicial functions. This is clearly pointed out in Nega v. Chicago Railways Co. 317 Ill. 482, where it was claimed that the entire section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation act was void because it did not provide for a review of the findings of fact of the commission. That there is such a distinction between the requiring of review of actions purely legislative in character and those executive or semi-judicial is illustrated by Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, sustaining a deportation order by the Secretary of Labor, and Leach v. Carlile, 258 id. 138, upholding the decision of the Postmaster-General in excluding certain matter from the mail, in both of which cases the actions were challenged because there was no provision for judicial review.
The findings of the commission are in a sense akin to judicial proceedings. ( Nega v. Chicago Railways Co. 317 Ill. 482. ) Lewin Metals Corp. v. Industrial Com. 360 Ill. 371, presented a case where the employee made his application for compensation. The arbitrator found the applicant's disability was not the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Such a Board has the dignity and the form of many of our courts, the only distinction being that of name. We conclude that the points raised by the appellant are without merit, and that our Workmen's Compensation Law does not violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Nega v. Chicago Railways Co. ( 317 Ill. 482) arrived at the same conclusion. Hawkins v. Bleakly ( 243 U.S. 210); Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Comm. ( 271 U.S. 208) dealt with compensation acts which were elective on the part of the employee.
( Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140.) The proceedings of the industrial commission partake of the nature of judicial proceedings ( Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482), and the same rules of law are applicable to their awards as are applied to judgments and decrees of courts." The Armstrong v. Obucino case, supra, has been cited with approval numerous times, both by our Appellate and the Supreme Court.
( Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140.) The proceedings of the industrial commission partake of the nature of judicial proceedings ( Nega v. Chicago Rys. Co., 317 Ill. 482), and the same rules of law are applicable to their awards as are applied to judgments and decrees of courts. As a general rule the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable to infants ( Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill. 16), unless the conduct of the infant on which the estoppel is based has been intentional and fraudulent, and the infant was at the time of years of discretion.