Those cases wherein the allowance of interest was held to be within the sound discretion of the divorce court include Sutton v. Leib (7th Cir. 1952), 199 F.2d 163 (applying Illinois law), Matzen v. Matzen (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 69, In re Estate of Neirinck (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 189, Atwater v. Atwater (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 202, and Anderson v. Anderson (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 140. Other decisions hold that a divorce decree is a money decree which draws interest until satisfied. Ellingwood v. Ellingwood (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 587; Neeland v. Neeland (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 803; Gregory v. Gregory (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 262; Shuff v. Fulte (1951), 344 Ill. App. 157; Wadler v. Wadler (1945), 325 Ill. App. 83. Plaintiff relies principally on the case of Ellingwood v. Ellingwood (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 587.

We are mindful of the respondent's claim that because the children in the case at bar have all reached the age of majority and no longer receive support from the petitioner, classifying the arrearage as non-marital property would essentially give a windfall to the petitioner. We note that it has long been the law in Illinois that it is not inappropriate to pay a child support arrearage directly to the custodial parent, because that parent has necessarily expended the sums that would have been covered had the previously ordered child support payments been made when due. See, e.g., Neeland v. Neeland, 17 Ill. App. 3d 803, 806 (1974). With regard to the respondent's claim that he helped support the petitioner's children during their minority and therefore should receive some form of reimbursement from the arrearage, we note as well that Illinois has a long history of cases which state that a stepparent does not have a duty to support a stepchild.

Conversely, other appellate court decisions had held that interest was recoverable on dissolution judgments because they too were money judgments. See Ellingwood v. Ellingwood, 25 Ill. App.3d 587 (1975); Neeland v. Neeland, 17 Ill. App.3d 803 (1974); Gregory v. Gregory, 52 Ill. App.2d 262 (1964); Shuff v. Fulte, 344 Ill. App. 157 (1951); Wadler v. Wadler, 325 Ill. App. 83 (1945). After recognizing the split and analyzing other supreme court cases, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

) Reviewing courts have held that this language is positive and self-executing ( Lucas v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 398, 400, 384 N.E.2d 938, 939) and that the accrual of interest cannot be limited ( In re Marriage of Passiales (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 629, 640, 494 N.E.2d 541, 550). The supreme court in Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill.2d 317, 410 N.E.2d 12, however, while noting a split of authority on the general issue of whether allowance of interest on a judgment in a divorce proceeding is mandatory or discretionary (compare Sutton v. Leib (7th Cir. 1952), 199 F.2d 163; Matzen v. Matzen (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 69, 387 N.E.2d 14; In re Estate of Neirinck (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 189, 379 N.E.2d 356; Atwater v. Atwater (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (cases holding the allowance of interest to be discretionary), with Ellingwood v. Ellingwood (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 587, 323 N.E.2d 571; Neeland v. Neeland (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651; Gregory v. Gregory (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 262, 202 N.E.2d 139; Shuff v. Fulte (1951), 344 Ill. App. 157, 100 N.E.2d 502; Wadler v. Wadler (1945), 325 Ill. App. 83, 59 N.E.2d 505 (cases holding the award of interest to be mandatory)), held that the allowance of interest on child support arrearages is not mandatory, but within the sound discretion of the circuit court. We find that Finley is inapposite to the case at bar.

• 3, 4 When a party must go into court to vindicate his rights under a divorce decree, the party resorting to the judicial system is entitled to an award of attorney fees in a reasonable amount. ( Tippet v. Tippet (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 1018, 383 N.E.2d 13; Neeland v. Neeland (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651.) An award of attorney fees will be upheld against attack where the party attacking the award has deliberately impeded the progress of the proceedings in bad faith. Van Fleet v. Van Fleet (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 172, 365 N.E.2d 1143; Booth v. Booth (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 758, 270 N.E.2d 171.

( Heady v. Simmons (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 978, 324 N.E.2d 100; Kelleher v. Kelleher.) The burden of proof is on the petitioner to clearly show the increased need and increased ability to pay. ( Neeland v. Neeland (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651.) In the absence of evidence of defendant's increased ability to pay, it has been held that inflation alone is insufficient to show a material change in circumstance in that it affects both parties ( Nordstrom v. Nordstrom (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 181, 343 N.E.2d 640), and the mere fact that the children grew older was similarly held insufficient. ( Patterson v. Patterson (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 76, 170 N.E.2d 11.

• 2 In a post-decree divorce matter, the trial court, in its discretion, has the right to allow reasonable attorney's fees to a party, for the purpose of enforcing that party's rights under the divorce decree, where the party has no means to pay the fees. ( Neeland v. Neeland (3d Dist. 1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 803.) For the allowance of such fees, the party seeking the fees must show financial inability to pay the fees and the financial ability of the opposing party to pay such fees. ( Jones v. Jones (1st Dist. 1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 232.)

• 3 The court denied the husband's motion to modify the child-support provision of the divorce decree. Modification of a divorce decree will be granted only when the proponent establishes that a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties has rendered modification necessary ( Gregory v. Gregory, 52 Ill. App.2d 262, 202 N.E.2d 139). This rule has been followed where, as here, the issue involved the modification of a child-support provision which had resulted from an agreement of the parties ( Neeland v. Neeland, 17 Ill. App.3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651). In order to succeed in the instant case, the husband was required to prove a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.

In Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 159, 160, 117 N.E.2d 65, the court held, citing previous decisions of the supreme court, that, where a judgment called for defendant to make future payments, interest at the legal rate should run from the due date of each individual payment even though the judgment order itself did not expressly provide for such interest. (See also Neeland v. Neeland, 17 Ill. App.3d 803, 806, 807, 308 N.E.2d 651, and cases therein cited.) We believe that we have no choice or discretion in this matter.