"The duty is placed on the driver of an automobile to look and listen for trains, and it was one of plaintiff's duties to look, at the place where, by looking, she could have seen * * *." Citing Hinken v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 97 Iowa 603, 66 N.W. 882; McFarland v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 193 Iowa 776, 187 N.W. 947; High v. Waterloo, C.F. N. Ry. Co., 195 Iowa 304, 190 N.W. 331; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 208 N.W. 856; and Bradley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 8 Cir., Ark., 288 F. 484. In the Hinken case, supra, we said [ 97 Iowa 606, 66 N.W. 883]: "If plaintiff had stopped and looked for the train, even after he had crossed the side-track, this sad accident would not have happened.

Nor does the law specify precisely what must be done in the exercise of such care. Among the numerous cases which affirm the above propositions are Markle v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 219 Iowa 301, 304, 257 N.W. 771; Anderson v. United States R.R. Admn., 203 Iowa 715, 718, 211 N.W. 872 (Vermilion, J.); Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 290, 291, 208 N.W. 856 (DeGraff, C.J.); Alitz v. Minneapolis St. L.R. Co., 196 Iowa 437, 441, 193 N.W. 423 (Weaver, J.); Butterfield v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 193 Iowa 323, 326, 185 N.W. 151 (Weaver, J.); Wiese v. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co., 182 Iowa 508, 511, 166 N.W. 66 (Ladd, J.); Case v. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 747, 751, 752, 126 N.W. 1037 (Deemer, C.J.). Plaintiff had a right to assume, unless he knew or should have known otherwise, that the train would signal its approach by ringing the bell as required by statute and, if required by ordinary care, by sounding a whistle.

We have not yet adopted the rule in this state that a traveler is guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, if he is struck on a crossing by a train, regardless of the facts under which the collision occurred. Love v. Ft. Dodge, D.M. S.R. Co., 207 Iowa 1278, 224 N.W. 815; Laverenz v. C., R.I. P.R. Co., 56 Iowa 689, 10 N.W. 268; Artz v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 34 Iowa 153; Selensky v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., 120 Iowa 113, 94 N.W. 272; Bush v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 216 Iowa, 788, 247 N.W. 647; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 208 N.W. 856; Glanville v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 196 Iowa 456, 193 N.W. 548. Upon this question in Love v. Ft. Dodge, D.M. S.R. Co., supra, loc. cit. 1282, we said:

She was not compelled to anticipate negligence of the railroad. Saeugling v. Scandrett, 230 Iowa 153, 156, 296 N.W. 787, 788; Anderson v. United States R. Admn., 203 Iowa 715, 717, 211 N.W. 872; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 290, 291, 208 N.W. 856; Barrett v. Chicago, M. St. P. Ry. Co., 190 Iowa 509, 515, 175 N.W. 950, 180 N.W. 670; Butterfield v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., supra, 193 Iowa 323, 328, 185 N.W. 151, and citations. See also Sterlane v. Fleming, 236 Iowa 480, 491, 18 N.W.2d 159, 165; 75 C.J.S., Railroads, section 791.

In the case at bar the obstruction which prevented the appellee from seeing was not a permanent obstruction, but was a string of box cars, and there is a serious dispute in the record as to the exact location of these cars. In the case at bar we do not believe that the "physical fact" rule applies, but rather, as said in the case of Nederhiser v. C., R.I. P.R. Co., reported in 202 Iowa 285, on page 289, 208 N.W. 856, 858: "This case cannot be determined by the physical fact rule frequently invoked.

We have said that in approaching a railroad crossing a motorist's "duty to look is a continuing duty." Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 290, 208 N.W. 856, 858 (1926). See also Scherer v. Scandrett, 235 Iowa 229, 237, 16 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1944) and citations; 65 Am.Jur.2d, Railroads, § 552, page 697.

The posed photographs offered in evidence by defendant do not create a situation which would lead reasonable minds to a conclusion of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Coonley v. Lowden, 234 Iowa 731, 12 N.W.2d 870; Davitt v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., 164 Iowa 216, 217, 145 N.W. 483; Case v. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 747, 752, 126 N.W. 1037; Markle v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 219 Iowa 301, 257 N.W. 771; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 208 N.W. 856; Butterfield v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 193 Iowa 323, 325, 326, 185 N.W. 151, 153; Alitz v. Minneapolis St. L.R. Co., 196 Iowa 437, 193 N.W. 423. Justice Weaver, in Butterfield v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., supra, said: "This contention, that if, by use of engineering instruments, or by laying a `straight edge' upon a map or blueprint made at leisure after the tragedy is over, it is made to appear that, if the traveler on the highway had looked from some designated station or standpoint, and if the train had been in the direct line of vision, he could have discovered it and avoided a collision, the court must say, as a matter of law, that his failure to do so is contributory negligence, is one which has been, with great persistence and tireless repetition, urged upon the court during the half century and more of the era of railway development in Iowa; and, with here and there a slight sporadic departure from the settled rule, we have steadily held that, if the traveler is shown t

as moving at moderate speed; there was no apparent cause for alarm; decedent sat facing Faber, away from the direction from which the train came, with his left arm over the back of the front seat; he appeared to be relaxing and resting. On the question of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence, the evidence that the required signals were not given by the trainmen is also properly to be considered. Carpenter v. Wolfe, supra, 223 Iowa, 417, 424, 273 N.W. 169; Johnson v. Omaha C.B. St. Ry. Co., 194 Iowa 1230, 1234, 190 N.W. 977, and cases cited; Butterfield v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 193 Iowa 323, 328, 185 N.W. 151, and cases cited; 3 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law Practice, Perm. Ed., 155, 156, section 1757. The occupants of the automobile had a right to assume, until they had knowledge or notice to the contrary, that the required signals would be given. Saeugling v. Scandrett, supra, 230 Iowa 153, 156, 296 N.W. 787, 788; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 290, 208 N.W. 856; Barrett v. Chicago, M. St. P. Ry. Co., 190 Iowa 509, 515, 175 N.W. 950, 180 N.W. 670, and cases cited; 44 Am. Jur. 718, section 480. In support of our conclusion that contributory negligence was a question for the jury, see Finley v. Lowden, supra, 224 Iowa 999, 1003-1005, 277 N.W. 487, and authorities there cited; Johnson v. Omaha C.B. St. Ry. Co., supra, 194 Iowa 1230, 190 N.W. 977; Bradley v. Interurban Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 1351, 1354, 183 N.W. 493. See, also, Jensvold v. Chicago G.W.R. Co., supra, 234 Iowa 627, 631, 12 N.W.2d 293, 295; Teufel v. Kaufmann, 233 Iowa 443, 447, 6 N.W.2d 850, 852, 853; Muirhead v. Challis, 213 Iowa 1108, 1115, 240 N.W. 912.

Since, under the record, the issue of whether the signals were given was for the jury, almost of necessity the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was for the jury. See Corbett v. Hines, supra, 194 Iowa 1344, 1349, 191 N.W. 179; Nederhiser v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 290, 291, 208 N.W. 856; Case v. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co., 147 Iowa 747, 751, 126 N.W. 1037; Platter v. Minneapolis St. L.R. Co., supra, 162 Iowa 142, 143 N.W. 992; Anderson v. United States R. Admn., supra, 203 Iowa 715, 717, 211 N.W. 872. This court has uniformly held it to be the well-settled law that if there is any evidence tending to establish the defendant's negligence or the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence, these issues are for the jury.

We know of no method of calculation or process of deduction by which it can be determined that, unless a car was upon the short piece of track open to view from one or the other points of observation, appellant would be safe from danger from a south-bound car unless it was traveling more than 20 miles per hour. The duty to look before entering upon a railroad crossing is a continuing duty. Nederhiser v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 202 Iowa 285, 208 N.W. 856. Appellant was not required as a matter of law to look at the last possible moment before proceeding upon the tracks, nor at any particular point; neither was he required to look continuously. But he knew that for a distance, somewhat over 36 feet, before reaching the tracks, he had an unobstructed view to the north, and it was his duty, under the cases cited above, to avail himself of this opportunity for observation at some place or other, in time to avoid going upon the crossing, if danger threatened.