See, e.g., id. at 905 (describing expert's testimony "[w]hen given a hypothetical case based on the facts of this case" that a person's BAC was higher hours after driving but the person was nonetheless intoxicated when driving); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2017, no pet.) (describing forensic scientist's testimony regarding the average elimination rate of alcohol and extrapolation that appellant's BAC at the time of appellant's arrest was at least 0.19); Veliz, 474 S.W.3d at 358 (opinion testimony that an individual with a .081 BAC would have a BAC above 0.08 three and a half hours earlier); Owens v. State, 135 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (hypotheticals using appellant's known facts, results of breath test, and varying time of last drink to opine about BAC when driving). Whether an expert calculates the BAC level at the time of driving or at a later time, the expert still conducts an analysis that considers absorption, elimination, and the Mata factors.

The question of harm is not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763; see Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 811 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Overwhelming evidence of guilt is but only one factor in the analysis.

The State's confession of error in a criminal case carries great weight, but it is not binding. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), modified on other grounds sub silencio by Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Pickrom v. State, Nos. 02-19-00188-CR, 02-19-00189-CR, 2020 WL 1808485, at *2 n.3(Tex.

The State's confession of error in a criminal case carries great weight, but it is not binding. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), modified on other grounds sub silencio by Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Pickrom v. State, Nos. 02-19-00188-CR, 02-19-00189-CR, 2020 WL 1808485, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Even when the State makes concessions, we must independently examine the record because the proper administration of criminal law cannot be left to the parties' stipulations.

We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Interactions between police officers and civilians generally can be divided into three categories: (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigative detentions; and (3) arrests. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). An investigative detention triggers the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and therefore must be of limited scope and duration and be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

See id. Where no explicit findings of fact are made by the trial court, we infer the necessary factual findings to support the trial court's ruling if the record supports those findings. Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Testimony concerning HGN test results is scientific evidence subject to the requirements of Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

And the test results showing that appellant's BAC was over the legal limit three hours after the accident were relevant, circumstantial evidence that appellant had consumed a large quantity of alcohol before the accident; the test results tended to show that appellant was without normal use of his mental or physical faculties at the time of the accident due to excessive alcohol consumption, and his erratic driving leading up to the accident and his decision to flee the scene also were relevant to that question. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App.2010) (even absent retrograde extrapolation testimony, alcohol-level tests are often highly probative to prove both per se and impairment intoxication); State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Douthitt, 127 S.W.3d at 336.

We must independently assess the appellant's issue for error. See Neale v. State, 525 S.W.3d 800, 810 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).