Opinion
No. 06-20-00045-CR
11-05-2020
LACHARLES NEAL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 115th District Court Marion County, Texas
Trial Court No. F15142 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LaCharles Neal entered an open plea of guilty to possession of a prohibited weapon and pled true to a single punishment enhancement paragraph. After a punishment hearing, the trial court found Neal guilty and sentenced him to twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, Neal asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of guilt. Because we find that insufficient evidence supported the finding of guilt, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial.
I. Background
In the trial court, Neal entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of possession of a prohibited weapon. He also pled true to a single enhancement paragraph that alleged he had previously been convicted of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon.
In support of the guilty plea, the State offered evidence showing that, on September 1, 2019, officers from the Jefferson Police Department responded to a reported shooting on South Jackson Street in Jefferson, Texas. Neal's family members reported that Neal had shot at a vehicle occupied by his cousin and the cousin's girlfriend. During their investigation, the officers recovered, in a shed occupied by Neal, a modified .410 caliber shotgun that had been sawed off at the barrel. The shotgun had a barrel and stock that were less than eighteen inches long.
After the State offered evidence of the prior aggravated robbery and several other felony convictions, the trial court found Neal guilty and found that the punishment enhancement allegation was true. The trial court then sentenced Neal to twenty years' imprisonment.
On appeal, Neal asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his guilty plea because (1) there was no evidence that the shotgun was not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and (2) there was no evidence that the shotgun was not classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice. The State concedes that insufficient evidence supported Neal's guilty plea.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to introduce evidence demonstrating the defendant's guilt. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15. "No trial court is authorized to render a conviction in a felony case, consistent with Article 1.15, based upon a plea of guilty 'without sufficient evidence to support the same.'" Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15). Although the State must introduce evidence demonstrating the defendant's guilt, it is not required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh'g)). However, the supporting evidence must show every essential element of the charged offense. Id. (citing Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Consequently, we are "required to determine 'whether the evidence embraces each essential element of the offense charged.'" Flores-Alonzo v. State, 460 S.W.3d 197, 203 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting Rohr v. State, No. 08-12-00219-CR, 2014 WL 4438828, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 10, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication)).
"The failure to comply with [Article 1.15] does not constitute a federal constitutional violation." Baggett v. State, 342 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref'd) (citing Bender v. State, 758 S.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). So, "[e]videntiary insufficiency to support a guilty plea is trial error that does not result in acquittal." Id. (citing Bender, 758 S.W.2d at 280-81). Rather, if we find the trial court erred, we must determine whether the error was harmless under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 176; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
III. Analysis
In its indictment, the State alleged that
[Neal], on or about the 1st day of September, 2019, did then and there intentionally or knowingly possess a short barrel firearm, and the weapon was not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the weapon was not classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice.This language tracked the language of Section 46.05 of the Texas Penal Code, which provides, in relevant part,
a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly possesses, . . . :
(1) any of the following items, unless the item is registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives or otherwise not subject to that registration requirement or unless the item is classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice:
. . . .
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.05(a)(1)(C). A "[s]hort-barrel firearm" is defined, in relevant part, as "a shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 inches, or any weapon made from a shotgun . . . if, as altered, it has an overall length of less than 26 inches." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.01(10).(C) a short-barrel firearm . . . .
Under the statute, a short-barrel firearm is a prohibited weapon only if it is not, among other things, "registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" (the NFR Record). So, under the statute's definition of what constitutes a weapon prohibited under the statute, and the State's indictment, the State was required to show not only that the weapon possessed by Neal met the definition of a short-barrel firearm, but also that the weapon was not registered in the NFR Record. As the State concedes and our review of the record confirms, there was no evidence that the weapon possessed by Neal was not registered in the NFR Record. For that reason, there was no evidence of an essential element necessary to show that the weapon possessed by Neal was a weapon prohibited under the statute. As a result, we find that the trial court erred in finding Neal guilty.
We note that, under the prior version of Section 46.05, it was a defense to prosecution under that section if the defendant's possession was pursuant to registration under the National Firearms Act. See Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, Sec. 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 964 (amended 2003, 2005, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.05). In 2015, the Legislature deleted the subsection providing for this defense and added the qualification under subsection (1) that prohibited the possession of the weapons listed under subsection (1) "unless the item is registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives or classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice" See Act of May 11, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 69, Secs. 1-2, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 1061, 1061 (amended 2017, 2019) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.05).
Since it is not necessary to our opinion, we express no opinion as to whether the State also had to show that the weapon was not classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice.
"Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), any non-constitutional error that does not affect appellant's substantial rights must be disregarded." Baggett, 342 S.W.3d at 176 (quoting Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b))). "A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the [fact-finder's] verdict." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Haley, 173 S.W.3d at 518). "A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as [a] whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the [fact-finder], or had but a slight effect." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
Our examination of the record shows that there is no evidence to substantiate that the weapon possessed by Neal was a weapon prohibited under the statute. Consequently, there was no independent evidence of an essential element of the charged offense. We, therefore, find that Neal's substantial rights were affected Having found harmful error, we sustain Neal's first issue.
"[W]here the defendant enters a plea of guilty to the court . . . the state is required to introduce evidence showing the guilt of the defendant, and if the state fails in this respect the defendant is entitled to a new trial." Baggett, 342 S.W.3d at 176 (quoting Spivey v. State, 143 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940)).
Since we have found harmful error that entitles Neal to a new trial, we need not address Neal's second issue.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for a new trial.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice Date Submitted: October 7, 2020
Date Decided: November 5, 2020 Do Not Publish