Neal v. Dover

6 Citing cases

  1. Womack v. State

    260 Ga. 305 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 4 times

    However, we have held that the rules of this code section may not be invoked by strangers to the attorney-client relationship. Neal v. Dover, 217 Ga. 545 ( 123 S.E.2d 760) (1962); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 202 Ga. 391 ( 43 S.E.2d 329) (1947); Cleary v. Burlington Indus., 193 Ga. App. 81 ( 387 S.E.2d 36) (1989); Favors v. State, 145 Ga. App. 864 ( 244 S.E.2d 902) (1978). 3. Appellant argues that the evidence does not support appellant's convictions for malice murder and armed robbery and that the evidence does not rule out every other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of appellant.

  2. Sease v. Singleton

    271 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    We note here that no attempt was made to join the parties necessary to grant such relief. See Pindar, Ga. Real Estate Law (2d ed.) ยง 19-97.1; Czyz v. Czyz, 240 Ga. 806 ( 242 S.E.2d 585) (1978); Neal v. Dover, 217 Ga. 545 (1) ( 123 S.E.2d 760) (1962). The Georgia defendants answered the complaint and appeared for trial. The Florida defendants apparently answered the complaint but when they did not appear for trial, the trial judge struck their pleadings.

  3. Gaither v. State

    216 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 1975)   Cited 43 times

    Code ยง 81-1104. See Nixon v. State, 14 Ga. App. 261, 263 ( 80 S.E. 513). A new trial is mandatory. Neal v. State, 217 Ga. 545 ( 123 S.E.2d 760). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur in Division 1, except Gunter and Ingram, JJ. All the Justices concur in Division 2, except Hall, J., who dissents from Division 2 and the judgment of reversal.

  4. Ryder v. Schreeder

    162 S.E.2d 375 (Ga. 1968)   Cited 19 times
    In Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382 (162 S.E.2d 375), where both parties made motions for a summary judgment, this court said that "the testimony of a party offering himself as a witness in his own behalf is to be construed most strongly against him when it is contradictory, vague, or equivocal..."

    Code ยง 38-1805; Hancock v. Wilson, 214 Ga. 60 (2) ( 102 S.E.2d 551), and cases cited therein." Neal v. Dover, 217 Ga. 545 (9) ( 123 S.E.2d 760). The pleadings, deposition, and affidavits considered on the motions for summary judgment made an issue of fact which should be determined by a jury, and the trial judge erred in sustaining the motion of the defendants for summary judgment.

  5. In re All American Holding Corp.

    8 B.R. 459 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)

    The prevailing view in states which have no such statute is that such instruments are in fact security devices rather than conveyances and are called equitable liens in those states. (A representative sample of the scores of cases in those jurisdictions read by the court includes Lewis v. Miller, 226 Ark. 560, 291 S.W.2d 255 (1956); Hardy v. Neville, 261 N.C. 454, 135 S.E.2d 48 (1964); Neal v. Dover, 217 Ga. 545, 123 S.E.2d 760 (1962); Starns v. Adams, 484 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Kohler v. Gilbert, 216 Or. 483, 339 P.2d 1102 (1959); F. Gregorie & Son v. Hamlin, 257 S.E.2d 699 (S.C.1979); Swallow Ranches, Inc. v. Bidart, 525 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1975) applying Nevada law; Gibbons v. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 P.2d 105 (1943); Gagne v. Hoban, 280 Minn. 475, 159 N.W.2d 896 (1968); Greene v. Bride & Son Construction Company, 252 Iowa 220, 106 N.W.2d 603 (1960); Welsh v. Griffith Prideaux, Inc., 60 N.J.Super. 199, 158 A.2d 529 (1960); Boysun v. Boysun, 104 Mont. 85, 368 P.2d 439 (1962); Moorer v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 20 So.2d 105 (Ala.1944); In re Euclid Doan Co., 104 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1939) applying Ohio law; Parrish v. McDaniel, 358 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.1962); Foard v. Snider, 205 Md. 435, 109 A.2d 101 (1954); Kerfoot v. Kessener, 227 Ind. 58, 84 N.E.2d 190 (1949)). Apparently the Virgin Islands has no statute suc

  6. In re Estate of Olsen

    254 Neb. 809 (Neb. 1998)   Cited 3 times

    Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court improperly allowed the plaintiff to testify generally that he was the owner. Likewise, in Neal v. Dover, 217 Ga. 545, 123 S.E.2d 760 (1962), the Georgia Supreme Court addressed an ejectment action wherein the defendants claimed ownership to the property in question because the plaintiffs' title was a deed to secure a debt instead of an absolute deed. The defendants claimed the trial court erred in refusing to allow a witness to testify regarding title to the property. The court initially stated that the highest and best evidence of title was the original deed, which was stipulated to in the evidence and did not have to be proven further.