Even the single exception we have identified tends to support our conclusion: a challenge to such an agency ruling should be made and resolved under § 14(7). See Fanion v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 391 Mass. 848, 850–852, 464 N.E.2d 69 (1984) ; Benmosche v. Board of Registration in Med., 412 Mass. 82, 88, 588 N.E.2d 621 (1992) ; Massachusetts Assn. of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 434 Mass. at 265–266, 748 N.E.2d 455 ; Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 15606 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 784, 795, 897 N.E.2d 992 (2008) ; She Enterprises, Inc. v. State Bldg. Code Appeals Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 272–273, 480 N.E.2d 39 (1985) ; Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 814–815, 626 N.E.2d 884 (1994) ; Roxbury Charter High Pub. Sch., 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 52–55, 865 N.E.2d 1183. Notably, in the Roxbury Charter High Pub. Sch. case, we held that a new financial statement showing a small surplus was not "material" evidence warranting a § 14(6) remand, "because the hearing officer expressly anticipated that possibility in his decision, and stated his view that such a result would not alter his conclusions concerning the school's prospective financial viability." Id. at 54, 865 N.E.2d 1183.

Although the supporting case law is both scant and vague, this Court has authority to remand the case to the hearing board for further proceedings pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14(6), notwithstanding the absence of a motion from the plaintiff pursuant to that section. See Northeast Met. Rep. Vocational Sch. Comm'n v. Massachusetts Comm'n against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817 (1994) citing J.C. Hillary's v. Massachusetts Comm'n against Discrimination, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 204, 207 (1989). In Northeast, the Appeals Court explained the J.C. Hillary's decision: "[b]ecause the judge had concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the hearings to receive the [additional] evidence, this court held that G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7), did not vest in [the judge] `a roving commission to undo that with which he disagreed.'"

A motion for leave to present supplemental evidence pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (6), is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. Northeast Metro. Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v.Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817 (1994). In assessing whether a judge has abused his discretion, "we do not simply substitute our judgment for that of the judge, rather, we ask whether the decision in question 'rest[s] on whimsy, caprice, or arbitrary or idiosyncratic notions.'"

The judge's disposition of the motion was based on her recognition that the hearing examiner had credited the plaintiffs progress and her determination that the plaintiff had not made a "substantial showing" that further evidence of the plaintiff's progress would have added anything to the hearing examiner's conclusion. Northeast Metro. Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 818-819 (1994). We agree.

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6), a judge has the discretion to order an agency to reopen an administrative proceeding for consideration of additional evidence so long as that evidence "is material to the issues in the case, and . . . there was good reason for failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency." See Northeast Metro. Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 813, 817 (1994) . Paiewonsky testified that she was looking for someone who was able to "communicate really well at all levels to get people moving in the same direction."

See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6) (motion for leave to present supplemental evidence). See also Northeast Metro. Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817-818 (1994).c. Summary judgment argument.

G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6). See Northeast Metro. Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817 (1994). Here, as the department notes, expansion of the administrative record to include another copy of the § 51A report "would add nothing" to the hearing officer's conclusion because she had the § 51A report before her. Commonwealth v. Roxbury Charter High Pub. Sch., 69 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 55 (2007).

See Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 444 Mass. 1009, 1009-1010 (2005); Soe, 466 Mass. at 395. See also Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational Sch. Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 818 (1994) (holding order to reopen administrative proceeding to hear additional evidence not be abuse of discretion). The plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the right against double jeopardy is implicated.

The Court must ensure, based on the content of the record, that the substantial rights of a party are not prejudiced because the decision was "unsupported by substantial evidence," or was "arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law," G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7), and may accomplish this though the authority granted it under G.L.c. 30A, § 14(6). See Northeast Met. Reg. Voc. School Distr. Comm. v. Mass. Comm. Against Discrim., 35 Mass.App.Ct. 813, 818 (1994). After review of the administrative record, the Court finds that the Hearing Officer abused her discretion in assessing a $10,000.00 penalty against a small business that had no prior record of discrimination, and where the record lacked substantial evidence to support punitive measures to prevent future unlawful acts.

A reviewing court may order that "additional evidence be taken before the agency" only upon a showing that it is "material" and that there was "good reason" for failure to present it in the original proceeding. Northeast Metro. Reg. Voc. Sch. Dist. Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 817 (1994); Benmosche v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 412 Mass. 82, 88 (1992). Larson contends that this Court should reverse and remand CRAB's decision for three reasons.