Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ct.No. RIC440321, Joan F. Burgess, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Chineze Ndukwe, in pro. per., for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Mark John Tundis and Mark John Tundis for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Respondents.
OPINION
McKinster, Acting P.J.
Chineze Ndukwe (hereafter plaintiff) appeals a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement concerning an underlying dispute over a real property purchase. Plaintiff claims that she did not understand the terms of the settlement agreement, and was forced by her attorney to sign the document. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2000, plaintiff entered into an agreement with defendants Robert and Sylvia Violette (hereafter collectively defendants) to purchase a real property home. Plaintiff believed that the intended purchase price was $120,000, the amount defendants still owed on their first trust deed.
Robert Violette testified at his deposition that the transaction was intended to be a lease, culminating in an ultimate sale of the property. A real estate agent conveyed the property, not directly to plaintiff, but to an entity called PAC Holdings or PAC Trust. PAC Holdings or PAC Trust was to collect the rents during the lease portion of the transaction, and conduct the sale to plaintiff afterward. Plaintiff took occupancy of the house in May 2000.
Under the terms of the parties’ agreement, plaintiff was to pay the amounts due on the first deed of trust to PAC Trust during the lease portion of the term. Defendants would continue to pay on the second deed of trust against the property.
In 2004, plaintiff advised defendants that she was ready to seek financing to complete the purchase phase of the contract.
A dispute arose at the end of the lease portion of the term, however. Plaintiff, as noted, believed that the purchase price was limited to $120,000, the amount owing on the first trust deed; defendants believed that they had agreed to make payments on the second trust deed only during the lease portion of the transaction, but that the purchase price would include any unpaid remaining balance on the second trust deed, as well as the first. Plaintiff thought that the payoff of the second trust deed, at the end of the lease period, was defendants’ responsibility. The second trust deed had a payoff balance of approximately $44,000 at the time of Robert Violette’s deposition.
Plaintiff filed an action for specific performance, claiming that she should be entitled to purchase the property at the $120,000 price, free of any obligation on the second trust deed. She also asked the court to order defendants to pay off the second trust deed encumbrance.
During the proceedings, the parties engaged in court-ordered mediation. All parties attended the mediation proceedings. Plaintiff was present, with her attorney, Darren Trone. The negotiations resulted in a settlement agreement. Under the settlement agreement, the purchase price was set at $120,000. Within five days, plaintiff would start refinancing, to pay off all encumbrances on the property. From the escrow, plaintiff would pay defendants $20,000 within 90 days. Plaintiff’s attorney drafted the settlement agreement. All the parties, including plaintiff, signed the settlement agreement at the mediation.
More than 90 days after the settlement agreement was signed, defendants began inquiring about the $20,000 payment that was due to them. Plaintiff explained that she was having trouble qualifying for financing. When no payment was forthcoming, defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that the written settlement agreement did not represent the terms actually agreed upon at mediation. Plaintiff asserted that her counsel had placed terms in the written settlement agreement that were different from those discussed at mediation. She claimed that her counsel had forced her to sign the agreement without explaining it to her.
The trial court found: Plaintiff had attended the settlement conference with her counsel. The terms of the settlement agreement clearly stated that plaintiff was to pay $20,000 to defendants, and also to pay off the first and second loans. The language of the settlement agreement was clear and simple. Plaintiff had signed the settlement agreement. The fair market value of the property in November 2006 was $396,986. The economic benefit to plaintiff was substantial, such that it was reasonable for her to pay off the second mortgage (approximately $50,000).
The court therefore gave a monetary judgment of $20,000 in favor of defendants, and ordered plaintiff to complete the sale, paying off the first and second loan encumbrances.
Plaintiff appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Plaintiff contends that she was forced to enter into the settlement agreement under duress and the undue influence of her former attorney, and that her counsel was “ineffective.” Such claims are predicated upon relevant findings of fact. Where the trial court has made factual findings, appellate review is limited to determining whether such findings are supported by substantial evidence. “On review for substantial evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference.” (Edwards v. Edwards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 141; see also SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 461-462.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Findings
Plaintiff’s argument both below and on appeal is framed entirely in conclusional terms. She alleges that, at the time of the settlement negotiations, she was represented by attorney Trone. She asserts that attorney Trone “placed terms in the Settlement agreement that were different [from] the ones discussed with the Plaintiff.” In her opposition to the enforcement motion below, plaintiff averred in her declaration that she had told attorney Trone that “if he could not achieve the specific orders that I requested, I wanted the action to go to trial.” Plaintiff failed to specify, however, what “specific orders” she had requested.
Plaintiff also averred that attorney Trone “failed to tell me that the amounts were different and that I was not getting my requested orders.” Once again, plaintiff failed to specify which amounts were different from her expectations, or what orders she had requested.
Plaintiff further averred that her attorney “literally threatened me into signing the agreement.” Plaintiff failed to indicate, however, what her attorney allegedly said to her. In addition, the allegations of threat seem incongruous with plaintiff’s position that she agreed to the settlement because she relied on the attorney’s representations that the agreement achieved her aims. Plaintiff did aver that her attorney “refused to allow me to get my glasses and thoroughly check the Settlement Agreement.”
The trial court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, however. Plaintiff and her attorney both attended the mediation and settlement negotiations. In fact, plaintiff was assisted at that time by her son. Plaintiff’s own attorney drafted the settlement agreement, with input from all other counsel.
Plaintiff actually signed the settlement agreement. The agreement consists of three pages, plus signatures. Its language is simple and straightforward. It plainly states that plaintiff is to pay $20,000 to defendants within 90 days, and that plaintiff shall also pay the first and second loan encumbrances on the property. There is nothing ambiguous or confusing about this provision.
Although plaintiff asserts that she did not want to be responsible for both the first and second encumbrances, as that was not, in her view, the original agreement, the settlement agreement superseded the original agreement. The trial court found that, “[w]hile the Court initially had a question as to why plaintiff would agree to pay off the approx. $50,000 second, it would appear that the increase in the fair market value of the property [i.e., to $396,986 as of November 2006] would support such an economic decision.” Plaintiff has provided no facts to show otherwise.
Plaintiff also failed to support her argument of threat and duress with any evidence.
The trial court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The order enforcing the settlement agreement is affirmed.
III. New Issues in Reply Brief
In her reply brief, plaintiff raises new issues. She argues, first, that the transaction was a sale and not a lease: “The house had a big [] sign in the front that said for sale and when it was sold it had another sign that said sold. . . . [Defendants] have agreed now that the purchase price is and was $120,000.00. How the settlement agreement addresses paying the second and paying an additional $20,000.00 makes no sense. In California after a payment price is set for a specific amount you can not change the amount after the deposit was made[;] in this case the deposit amount was $10,000.00. Not a lease.”
Plaintiff further argues that she did not understand that the arbitration or mediation would be binding.
We do not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief. (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders enforcing the settlement agreement are affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendants.
We concur: Richli, J., Miller, J.