Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:20-CV-108
2020-12-24
Mariana NDUDZI, Petitioner, v. Orlando PEREZ, et al., Respondents.
Brian E. Casey, Pro Hac Vice, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, South Bend, IN, Charles Roth, National Immigrant Justice Center, Chicago, IL, Curtis Francis Doebbler, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Service, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner. Hector Carlos Ramirez, United States Attorney's Office Southern District of Texas, Laredo, TX, for Respondents.
Brian E. Casey, Pro Hac Vice, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, South Bend, IN, Charles Roth, National Immigrant Justice Center, Chicago, IL, Curtis Francis Doebbler, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Service, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.
Hector Carlos Ramirez, United States Attorney's Office Southern District of Texas, Laredo, TX, for Respondents.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Diana Saldaña, United States District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Mariana Ndudzi's ("Petitioner") Motion for Reconsideration. (Dkt. 18.) Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the Court's September 29, 2020 Order (Dkt. 17) denying her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1). Having been fully briefed on the issue, the Court finds that Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 18) should be denied.
Background & Procedural History
On July 7, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming both that inadequate detention conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic rendered her confinement unlawful and that the duration of her detention exceeded constitutional limits. (Dkt. 1.) The Government moved to dismiss the petition on August 12, 2020 (Dkt. 12), and Petitioner filed her opposition on October 6, 2020. (Dkt. 13.) The Court was considering the matter when, on September 18, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Hearing or For Expedited Ruling. (Dkt. 16.) Noting that she was "subject to a final removal order" and "could be deported back to Angola ... as soon as the end of th[e] month," Petitioner requested a hearing or "a decision on her pending Petition in order to avoid her potential deportation from mooting her Petition." (Id. at 2–3.)
Eleven days later, on September 29, 2020, the Court entered its order denying Petitioner's request on both asserted grounds. (Dkt. 17.) Looking to Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court caselaw, the Court determined that Petitioner's conditions of confinement claims were not cognizable in a habeas petition and should have been brought in a civil rights action instead. (Id. at 7.) Because Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the Court also concluded that Petitioner's prolonged confinement claim was "untimely" under the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). (Id. at 9.)
Following the Court's order, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 18) on October 6, 2020, urging the Court to re-evaluate its prior decision. (Id. ) The Government filed its Response in Opposition (Dkt. 19) on October 26, 2020, and Petitioner replied on October 29, 2020. (Dkt. 20.) The Motion (Dkt. 18) has been fully briefed and is now ripe for decision.
Legal Standard
Courts retain the power to revise interlocutory orders before entering judgment adjudicating the parties' claims, rights, and liabilities under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides that any court order or decision "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). "Under Rule 54(b), the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law." Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dietz v. Bouldin , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016) ("[A] district court ordinarily has the power to modify or rescind its orders at any point prior to final judgment in a civil case.")
The Court notes that no judgment was entered pursuant to the Court's September 29, 2020 Order (Dkt. 17). To comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), the Court will enter judgment in this case in a separate document. The Court also notes, however, that even if a judgment had been entered in this case, or if the Court's previous order (Dkt. 17) could be construed as a judgment, the Court would still have the authority to adjudicate Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 18) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) ("Rule 59(e) governs motions to alter or amend a final judgment.") Although the Court would apply a "more exacting" standard under Rule 59(e) to determine if Petitioner's Motion (Dkt. 18) even warranted reconsideration, because the Court denies Petitioner's Motion (Dkt. 18) on the merits, a different standard would not lead to a different result. See id.
Discussion
Petitioner argues that the Court should reconsider its order dismissing her habeas petition for three reasons. First, Petitioner contends that the Court did not apply the "same constitutional principles" it outlined in Da Silva v. Nielsen , 5:18-MC-00932 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2019) to the "analogous facts" here. (Dkt. 18 at 1.) Looking foremost to Supreme Court caselaw, the Court recognized that the petitioner in that case—an asylum seeker detained as an arriving alien not yet subject to a final removal order—enjoyed a constitutional right to an individualized bond hearing. Da Silva , 5:18-MC-00932, slip op. at 21. According to Petitioner, that logic ought to apply with equal force here because the right to due process does not "differentiat[e] between pre-removal order and post-removal order detention." (See Dkt. 18 at 7.) Second, because the Court's prior order (Dkt. 17) applied that very distinction, Petitioner relatedly complains that the Court failed to address the merits of her due process claim. (Dkt. 18 at 4.) Third, and finally, Petitioner argues that the Court failed to rule on Petitioner's claim that the conditions of her confinement are unconstitutional and warrant her immediate release. (Id. at 9.) For the reasons outlined below, each claim fails.
A. Prolonged confinement claims related to Petitioner's pre-final removal order are moot, and any Zadvydas claim is premature.
Petitioner's first argument that the Court should have applied the principles of Da Silva is unpersuasive. Petitioner maintains that, under Da Silva , she has a due process right "that requires her release from detention." (Dkt. 18 at 5–6.) In Da Silva , the Court determined that an arriving alien detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) had a constitutional right to an individualized bond hearing when her detention became unreasonably prolonged. Like the petitioner in Da Silva , Petitioner was detained by immigration authorities pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) for fifteen months after she presented herself for admission and sought asylum at a port of entry. (See Dkt. 1 at 52; Dkt. 12 at 1.) During that period, an Immigration Judge held a hearing on the merits of Petitioner's asylum claim, but subsequently denied her petition and ordered her removal. (Dkt. 12 at 2.) Petitioner appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but the BIA dismissed her claim on July 31, 2020. (Dkt. 12, Attach. 6.) Thus, for over four months, Petitioner has been detained as an alien subject to an administratively final order of removal. See id. §§ 1231(a)(1)(B)–(a)(2).
Although Petitioner relies on Da Silva to support her claim for immediate release, the Court determined that "a bond hearing before an immigration judge [was] more appropriate." Da Silva , 5:18-MC-00932, at 23.
Attachment numbers refer to the numbers automatically generated by the Electronic Court Filing System (ECF), not to the exhibit numbers generated by Parties.
The BIA's denial finalized the Immigration Judge's prior order of removal, thereby shifting the statutory basis of Petitioner's detention from § 1225(b)(1) to § 1231(a). Id. §§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(a)(2). In turn, § 1231 provides a ninety-day window for authorities to remove aliens subject to a final removal order, though the Zadvydas Court held that post-removal order detention durations do not become constitutionally suspect until after six months. Id. § 1231(a)(1); Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. According to Petitioner, in light of Da Silva and the length of her detention, the "combination of pre-final order and post-final order detention" is constitutionally impermissible. (See Dkt. 18 at 7.) In other words, the fact that Petitioner was detained under two distinct statutory authorities "is not sufficient, in and of itself, to foreclose relief to her for violation of her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights." (Id. at 6.)
This case is not like Da Silva . The Fifth Circuit has at least twice indicated that the distinction between aliens subject to an administratively final removal order and those who are not matters in how prolonged confinement claims are assessed. See Chance v. Napolitano , 453 F. App'x 535 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (concluding that the district court did not err in finding that the "challenge to [petitioner's] continued post removal detention was premature" when petitioner "had not been in post-removal-order detention longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period" authorized by Zadvydas ); Okpoju v. Ridge , 115 F. App'x 302 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (finding that a continued detention claim was "premature" because petitioner "had not yet been in custody longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month post removal order period"), cert. denied , 544 U.S. 1066, 125 S.Ct. 2528, 161 L.Ed.2d 1120 (2005). To be sure, these unpublished decisions from the Fifth Circuit are not binding. However, they are in lockstep with every other court of appeals to consider the issue, which underscores their persuasive weight.
Moreover, the Court notes that it is not bound by its prior decisions. United States v. Hanzy , 802 F. App'x 850, 852 (5th Cir. 2020).
See, e.g., Kumar v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security , 2020 WL 2904685, at *1 (6th Cir. June 1, 2020) (unpublished) (finding that a habeas petitioner's challenge to duration of confinement under § 1226 "no longer present[ed] an active controversy" once the "Board of Immigration Appeals entered a final order of removal"); Ufele v. Holder , 473 F. App'x 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[I]nsofar as [Petitioner] challenges the lawfulness of his detention pursuant to § 1226(c), and he is no longer in custody pursuant to this statute, his appeal is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."); Wang v. Ashcroft , 320 F.3d 130, 147 (2d. Cir. 2003) (explaining that prolonged confinement claim was "rendered moot" when statutory basis of detention shifted to § 1231 ); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft , 273 F.3d 1330, 1338–40 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the issuance of a final removal order mooted appeal arising from denial of release on bond due to shift in statutory basis of detention); see also Abdala v. I.N.S. , 488 F.3d 1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an alien's deportation mooted his prolonged confinement claim); Suarez-Tejeda v. United States , 85 F. App'x 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that an alien's transfer to a halfway house and subsequent release to a sponsor mooted his prolonged detention claim); Quinones-Molinar v. United States I.N.S. , 30 F. App'x 198 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that an alien's deportation mooted his prolonged detention claim).
For their part, several district courts—including some from within this circuit—have held the same. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Barr , 2020 WL 5995182, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2020) (finding that a petitioner's challenge to continued confinement under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was rendered moot when an administratively final order shifted the authority for his detention to § 1231 ); Guerra v. Doll , 2020 WL 4284123, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2020) (explaining that any claim challenging petitioner's pre-final order detention was mooted when he became subject to a final order of removal); Julian v. Sessions , 2018 WL 6038860, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 24, 2018) (concluding that a petitioner's challenge to continued detention under § 1226 was mooted when removal order became final); Carbajal v. Holder , 43 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1189 (D. Colo. 2014) ; Castillo v. Gillen , 881 F.Supp.2d 226, 228–29 (D. Mass. 2012) (same); Al-Bareh v. Chertoff , 552 F.Supp.2d 794, 797–98 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (same).
The mootness doctrine requires that the Court not ignore the statutory shift in Petitioner's detention. Under their Article III powers, "federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp. , 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). Mootness extends from this central jurisdictional premise. "[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). The application of this longstanding principle to immigration habeas petitions is not foreign to this circuit. Sixty-seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit dismissed an alien detainee's habeas petition for release on bond after the entry of a final removal order: "We think it clear ... that the deportation order is now final; that the question raised by his appeal, whether the court erred in denying him bond pending the deportation proceedings, has become moot." United States ex rel. Spinella v. Savoretti , 201 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1953). Nearly seven decades later, the application of these foundational principles is equally clear in this case. Any prolonged detention claim related to Petitioner's prior detention under § 1225(b) became moot when the BIA's dismissal of Petitioner's appeal shifted her detention to the framework erected in § 1231.
Mootness is also why Petitioner's second argument regarding the applicability of Da Silva fails. To the extent that Da Silva might have addressed a due process claim Petitioner previously might have raised when detained under § 1225(b), it is inapposite now. The Court recognized as much in its prior order (Dkt. 17) when it advised Petitioner that she could request relief under Zadvydas if she was still detained after the presumptively reasonable six-month window had run. (Id. at 9.) Once again, the Court concludes that, at this time, Petitioner has not brought a cognizable prolonged confinement claim.
B. Petitioner cannot use a habeas petition to challenge the conditions of her confinement
Petitioner's final arguments pertain to the Court's decision that habeas petitions are inappropriate vehicles to challenge the conditions of her confinement. (Dkt. 18 at 9.) To this end, Petitioner first asserts that the Court did not actually "decide" the question of whether the conditions of her confinement render her detention unlawful. (Id. ) In addition, Petitioner beseeches the Court to follow two district court decisions from within this circuit that favorably address an identical claim. (Id. at 10.) Neither argument is persuasive.
Regarding Petitioner's first argument, the Court previously observed that the writ of habeas corpus "offers a remedy, in the form of release, when the underlying cause of detention lacks footing in law." (Dkt. 17 at 6.) It further noted that Supreme Court caselaw made "plain that habeas actions are available to litigants who challenge the legal basis of their confinement." (Id. at 7.) Petitioner does not challenge the propriety of her continued detention under § 1231(a), but the constitutionality of her continued detention under certain conditions of confinement brought on by the global spread of COVID-19. (Dkt. 1 at 1.) And while Petitioner correctly notes that habeas petitions are appropriate when challenging "the very fact or duration of [ ] physical imprisonment," (she erroneously concludes that, by challenging the conditions of her confinement, she is doing exactly that. (Dkt. 18 at 9–10.)
That contention conflicts with this circuit's caselaw. The Fifth Circuit has identified civil rights complaints as "the proper vehicle to attack unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures." Carson v. Johnson , 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997). Habeas petitions, however, are reserved for challenges to the legal basis—or "cause"—of a petitioner's detention. Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976) ; see also Spina v. Aaron , 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that prisoners challenging the legal basis "underlying their confinement" must bring claims through habeas); but see Cheek v. Warden of Fed. Med. Ctr. , 835 Fed.Appx. 737, 2020 WL 6938364, at *2–4 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2020) (per curiam) (holding that a "request for release to home confinement in the context of a global pandemic" was properly brought under § 2241, though ultimately dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim). Petitioner's theory that conditions of confinement "unrelated to the cause" of her detention nullify any otherwise valid basis for detention turns the Fifth Circuit's distinction on its head. See Pierre , 525 F.2d at 935. Afterall, there would be little need for civil rights complaints about allegedly unlawful conditions if habeas could remedy those conditions by simply releasing petitioners from custody or downgrading their level of custody. Two district court decisions in this circuit have concluded otherwise, and Petitioner has hung her hat on both. See Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf , 455 F.Supp.3d 330 (S.D. Tex. 2020), appeal docketed , No. 20-20617 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2020); Dada v. Witte , 2020 WL 2614616 (W.D. La. May 22, 2020). Petitioner complains that the "Court did not address the substance" of these cases "or explain whether it disagrees with them and, if so, why." (Dkt. 18 at 11.)
It is axiomatic that this Court is not bound by the opinions of other district judges—in "either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case." Camreta v. Greene , 563 U.S. 692, 701, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed. 2011)). When the Court previously considered whether Petitioner could use a habeas petition to challenge the conditions of her confinement—or otherwise claim that such conditions rendered her detention unlawful—it looked principally to Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. (See Dkt. 17 at 6–7.)
Indeed, the Court acknowledged Dada v. Witte , 2020 WL 2614616 (W.D. La. May 22, 2020) in its prior opinion before proceeding to discuss precedential cases from the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit that militated in favor of its conclusion that habeas relief was unavailable to Petitioner based on the conditions of her confinement. (Dkt. 17 at 6.)
Although the Court is not obligated to discuss the non-precedential cases upon which Petitioner relies, it nevertheless concludes that neither Dada nor Vazquez Barrera are persuasive. First, as to Dada , the district court emphatically confined its decision to the four corners of the particular facts before it. See Dada , 2020 WL 2614616, at *1 ("All of this is to say that the PARTICULAR fact pattern upon which the court's ruling is based, that is as to these PARTICULAR plaintiffs, could well be different next week.") (emphasis in original). The Court sees no reason to stray beyond those explicit limitations.
Vazquez Barrera was not similarly constrained, but its underlying reasoning is nonetheless unpersuasive. There, the district court granted a temporary restraining order and released one alien detainee who argued that the conditions of his confinement in immigration detention violated his constitutional rights. 455 F.Supp.3d at 342. The court found that the risk of acquiring a life-threatening infection in a detention setting was unconstitutional, and that there was "no way for [petitioners] to be detained in conditions that are constitutional." Id. at 340. Thus, the court reasoned that "[b]ecause Plaintiffs are challenging the fact of their detention as unconstitutional and seek relief in the form of immediate release, their claims fall squarely in the realm of habeas corpus." 455 F.Supp.3d at 337. Central to the district court's analysis was the Fifth Circuit's observation that the line between challenges to conditions of confinement and the legal basis of detention can be "blurry." See id. at 336 (quoting Poree v. Collins , 866 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2017) ).
While the Fifth Circuit's precedent on the distinction is "less clear" than that found in other circuits, a review of the governing precedent confirms that the kind of claim levied here is not cognizable in habeas. See id. at 336 (quoting Poree , 866 F.3d at 243–44 n.28 ) First, in Cook v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Department , the Fifth Circuit explained that the "core issue" in determining habeas jurisdiction is "whether the prisoner challenges the ‘fact or duration’ of his confinement or merely the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of confinement." 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994). If a detainee brings a general challenge to "unconstitutional parole procedures or conditions of confinement" that only indirectly touch the legal basis of her detention, civil rights actions are the "appropriate legal vehicle." Id. By contrast, where she "challenges the result of a single defective parole hearing," a detainee must press her claim through habeas. Id. Habeas is also appropriate for more general, "broad-based" procedural challenges where the resolution of the claim "would automatically entitle the plaintiff to accelerated release." See id. That is because insofar as "a single defective parole hearing" or certain "broad-based" procedural challenges bear directly on the legal basis of a petitioner's continued detention, it calls into question whether the government retains authority to circumscribe her liberty. See id.
The Fifth Circuit's more recent decision in Poree v. Collins affirmed this basic logic. 866 F.3d 235, 242–44 (5th Cir. 2017). In Poree , the court of appeals concluded that a habeas petition was the correct vehicle to raise petitioner's claim that properly followed state procedure legally entitled him to a change in custodial status—namely, transition to a group home as opposed to confinement in a mental institution. Id. The State had argued that Poree's transfer request was nothing more than an appeal for different conditions of confinement (i.e., confinement in a mental institution versus confinement in a transitional living facility). Id. at 242–43. Poree maintained that his claim bore directly on the legal basis of his detention in the mental institution. Id. While Poree's claim "defie[d] easy categorization," the Fifth Circuit determined that "it was properly brought in habeas" because he "challenge[d] the fact of his confinement" at the institution based on improperly applied procedures. See id. at 243.
Petitioner correctly observes that " Poree states plainly and multiple times that ‘the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the use of habeas for other kinds of claims’ beyond ‘fact or duration’ claims." (Dkt. 18 at 11.) This allowance is insufficient grounds for the Court to ignore that Petitioner's "conditions of confinement" claim is a different species entirely from the claim at issue in Poree . Petitioner does not challenge the government's application of procedures that, if properly applied, would require her release or a categorical adjustment to the degree of her custodial status. See Poree , 866 F.3d at 244. Instead, Petitioner argues that the "fact" of an allegedly unconstitutional condition present in the detention facility displaces any independent legal basis for her confinement. (See Dkt. 18 at 10.)
The Court pauses to note that Petitioner advances the same argument that the Fifth Circuit recently upheld in Cheek v. Warden of Federal Medical Center , an unpublished and non-binding opinion. See 835 Fed.Appx. 737, 2020 WL 6938364, at *2. Like Petitioner, the prisoner in Cheek argued that no conditions of confinement could adequately prevent a violation of the Constitution's Eighth Amendment—a proposition that merited release from confinement. See id. But Cheek offered little by way of analysis and did not discuss how, if at all, finding subject matter jurisdiction over conditions of confinement claims raised in habeas comported with this circuit's controlling precedent. See id. As a result, Cheek is difficult to reconcile with Fifth Circuit precedent concluding that a prisoner demonstrating Eighth Amendment violations involving cruel and unusual punishment "is still not entitled to release from prison." Cook v. Hanberry , 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979) ; see also Schipke v. Van Buren , 239 F. App'x 85 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ("Habeas corpus is not available to prisoners complaining only of mistreatment during their legal incarceration.") (quoting Hanberry , 592 F.2d at 249 ). If, as Hanberry instructs, Eighth Amendment violations do not warrant release from prison, the Court is skeptical that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's habeas petition—through which she seeks release from immigration detention for analogous violations she has raised under the Fifth Amendment. (See Dkt. 1 at 41.)
Cheek also refrained from mentioning the many district courts within this circuit that have concluded that they lack subject matter jurisdiction over conditions of confinement claims raised in habeas. See, e.g., Nel v. Cole , 2020 WL 6535787, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2020) (dismissing a § 2241 petition for want of subject matter jurisdiction because the petition challenged conditions of confinement); Brown v. McConnell , 2020 WL 6051690, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 24, 2020) (same); Moore v. Lacy , 2020 WL 5797708, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2020) (same); Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (same); Beswick v. Barr , 2020 WL 3520312, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 29, 2020) (same); Sacal-Micha v. Longoria (Sacal-Micha II ), 2020 WL 1815691, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (same).
In addition, the Court finds that Petitioner's claim is one that the Cook court identified as properly brought through civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens. See Cook , 37 F.3d at 168 ; see also Carlucci v. Chapa , 884 F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2018) (considering a petitioner's claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs under Bivens ); Palmer v. Johnson , 193 F.3d 346, 349–50 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering § 1983 petitioner's claims related to unsanitary and cruel conditions of confinement). Petitioner's suggestion that bringing a civil rights action is an "illusory alternative" considering the Supreme Court's Bivens jurisprudence (Dkt. 20 at 2) is unavailing. Grafting habeas' characteristic remedy onto what is otherwise a Bivens complaint does not convert Petitioner's action into a habeas petition. The alternative would permit those raising civil rights claims to press for a greater form of relief than they could otherwise secure through § 1983 or Bivens actions, which aim "to enjoin the unlawful practices that make the conditions intolerable." See Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454, 460 (N.D. Tex. 2020). Thus, insofar as Petitioner suggests that, but for the state of Bivens jurisprudence, she could find safe harbor in a civil rights action, she underscores why her conditions of confinement claim is not cognizable in a habeas petition.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 18) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.