Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted at San Francisco, California: June 16, 2011
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. Bk. No. 10-58475. Honorable Arthur S. Weissbrodt, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding.
Michael B. Stone, Esq. argued for Appellant Andre Souang.
Before: JURY, HOLLOWELL and PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.
Appellant, Andre Souang (" Souang"), appeals the bankruptcy court's order denying his motion for retroactive relief from the automatic stay. For the reasons stated, we VACATE and REMAND.
I. FACTS
Debtor Glorino F. Fularon owned property on Foothill Road in Pismo Beach, California, which was scheduled to be sold at a trustee's sale on August 16, 2010. Faced with imminent foreclosure, debtor filed his bare bones chapter 13 petition pro se on August 16, 2010, at 11:56:12 a.m. Approximately five minutes later, at 12:01 p.m., Souang was the successful bidder at the trustee's sale and tendered a cashier's check to ReconTrust Trustee Services (" ReconTrust") for the purchase price of $618, 030.
Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § § 101-1532. " Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and " Civil Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On August 17, 2010, the bankruptcy court issued an order and notice providing for automatic dismissal of debtor's case due to his failure to file required documents. The notice provided that debtor was required to file his schedules, statement of financial affairs and Form B22 (Means Test) by September 30, 2010, or otherwise his petition would be dismissed. On the same day, the court issued an order providing for dismissal unless debtor filed his chapter 13 plan within fourteen days of the notice.
On August 26, 2010, Souang filed a declaration in the bankruptcy court entitled " Proof of Equitable Interest in Real Property (11 U.S.C. § 549(c))" in which he stated that he purchased debtor's property at the trustee's sale postpetition and intended to immediately seek retroactive relief from the automatic stay. Souang further declared that neither he nor ReconTrust knew that debtor had filed bankruptcy prior to the sale.
On September 1, 2010, Souang filed a motion for retroactive relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d). Souang argued that he was entitled to retroactive relief from stay " for cause" because (1) debtor's chapter 13 filing was a sham and not filed in good faith; (2) debtor had no equity in the property and it was not required for an effective reorganization inasmuch as debtor had failed to file a chapter 13 plan; and (3) debtor's latest bankruptcy filing was part of a scheme to hinder or delay creditors. Citing Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp.), 129 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1997), Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992) and Fjeldsted v. Lien (In re Fjeldsted), 293 B.R. 12 (9th Cir. BAP 2003), Souang maintained that the balance of equities weighed in his favor for retroactive relief.
Debtor's wife, Marlyn C. Fularon, filed a chapter 7 petition pro se on October 1, 2009 (Bankruptcy Case No. 09-58425). This case was dismissed on November 19, 2009, due to her failure to file the required documents. Because she never filed her schedules, it is unclear whether the property at issue in this appeal was part of Mrs. Fularon's bankruptcy. We take judicial notice of her petition and other documents filed with the bankruptcy court through the electronic docketing system. Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
In support of his motion, Souang submitted his declaration, reiterating that he was a good faith purchaser at the trustee's sale and that he was unaware of the bankruptcy. Souang also submitted the declaration of Michael B. Stone, his attorney, who declared that debtor (or his wife) had previously filed a bankruptcy petition in 2009.
On September 15, 2010, the bankruptcy court dismissed debtor's case for failure to file his plan.
On September 29, 2010, the court heard Souang's motion. Debtor did not file opposing papers, but he appeared at the hearing with his wife. According to debtor and his wife, they faxed notice of their bankruptcy filing to ReconTrust after debtor filed his petition, but before the sale. However, they did not produce a fax confirmation.
The bankruptcy court's local rules do not require a response to a motion for relief from stay. See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 4001-1(f).
At the end of the hearing, the court gave Souang the option of having an evidentiary hearing or receiving prospective relief. Souang chose to have an evidentiary hearing. In response to debtor's question about the proposed evidentiary hearing, the court stated, " [e]ither ReconTrust or the wife is going to testify. She's going to testify and perhaps you're (referring to debtor) going to testify." Hr'g Tr. (September 29, 2010) at 10:14-15. The court informed debtor that the issue was whether debtor had notified ReconTrust of the bankruptcy before the sale occurred. The court scheduled the evidentiary hearing for October 7, 2010.
On October 1, 2010, Souang filed the declaration of his agent, Carrie Herzog. Herzog declared that she was present prior to and during the sale, but she was not aware of any bankruptcy filing affecting the sale nor did she perceive that ReconTrust was aware of any bankruptcy filing. She further testified that she texted Souang from her cell phone at 12:01 p.m. telling him that she had " got it" (referring to the property). A copy of the AT& T telephone bill showing the 12:01 time was attached to her declaration.
On October 6, 2010, Souang filed the declaration of Randolyn Logan, the Assistant Vice President of ReconTrust and the manager of the group within ReconTrust that conducted the trustee's sale of debtor's property. Logan declared that he had performed a diligent search and reasonable inquiry for all records pertaining to the sale and, to the best of his knowledge, there were none showing communication received from debtor or any other person on his behalf. He further declared that, at the time of the sale, ReconTrust was unaware that debtor had filed a bankruptcy petition.
The court held the evidentiary hearing on October 7, 2010. Souang's attorney offered three exhibits but produced no witnesses to testify. The court rejected the exhibits because they were not authenticated. The court further declined to take judicial notice of a map which showed the route between debtor's residence and the courthouse which Souang offered to show that it would have taken debtor more than five minutes to reach his home after filing his petition. The court summarily denied Souang's motion without further argument and made a notation on the minute entry that the sale was void.
Relying on the minute entry, Souang filed his notice of appeal on October 12, 2010, which was timely. Souang later submitted an order denying his motion, which was entered on January 21, 2011. Debtor has not participated in this appeal.
II. JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § § 1334 and 157(b)(2)(G). Aheong v. Mellon Mortg. Co. (In re Aheong), 276 B.R. 233, 239-40 & n.8 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction after dismissal of a bankruptcy case in some circumstances to " 'interpret' and 'effectuate' its orders, " including retroactive annulment of the automatic stay). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
Souang's motion for retroactive relief from stay was filed while debtor's case was active. However, both hearings on the motion took place after the bankruptcy court dismissed debtor's case for failure to file a plan.
III. ISSUE
Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Souang's motion for retroactive relief from stay.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A bankruptcy court's decision to deny retroactive relief from the automatic stay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d at 1054.
We follow a two-part test to determine objectively whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). First, we " determine de novo whether the bankruptcy court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested." Id . Second, we examine the bankruptcy court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id . at 1262 n.20. We affirm the court's factual findings unless those findings are " (1) 'illogical, ' (2) 'implausible, ' or (3) without 'support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.'" Id . If the bankruptcy court did not identify the correct legal rule, or its application of the correct legal standard to the facts was illogical, implausible, or without support in the record, then the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. Id.
V. DISCUSSION
Under § 362(a), the filing of debtor's bankruptcy petition operated as a stay of " any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." § 362(a)(4). Here, the foreclosure sale, conducted after debtor filed his bankruptcy case, constituted an act " to obtain possession of property of the estate" in violation of § 362. In the Ninth Circuit, actions taken in violation of the stay are void. In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 572. However, a foreclosure sale may be declared valid if cause exists for retroactive annulment of the stay.
Section 362(d), which gives the bankruptcy court authority to enter an order annulling the automatic stay, provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.
See also In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d at 572 (§ 362(d) " gives the bankruptcy court wide latitude in crafting relief from the automatic stay, including the power to grant retroactive relief from the stay.").
In analyzing whether " cause" exists to annul the stay under § 362(d)(1), the bankruptcy court is required to balance the equities of the creditor's position in comparison to that of the debtor. In re Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d at 1055. Under this approach, the bankruptcy court considers (1) whether the creditor was aware of the bankruptcy petition and automatic stay; and (2) whether the debtor engaged in unreasonable or inequitable conduct. Id . at 1055-56. In In re Fjeldsted, the Panel approved additional factors for consideration which include the number of bankruptcy filings by the debtor; the extent of any prejudice, including to a bona fide purchaser; the debtor's overall good faith; the debtor's compliance with the Code; how quickly the creditor moved for annulment; and how quickly the debtor moved to set aside the sale. 293 B.R. at 25. However, " [i]n any given case, one factor may so outweigh the others as to be dispositive." Id .; see also, Williams v. Levi (In re Williams), 323 B.R. 691 (9th Cir. BAP 2005).
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that, at bottom, balancing the equities required the bankruptcy court to reach an equitable conclusion rather than a factual or legal one. See Graves v. Myrvang (In re Myrvang), 232 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 833 F.2d 834, 836 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (appellate courts use the abuse of discretion standard to review bankruptcy court's equitable actions)). Our review of the bankruptcy court's equitable conclusion denying Souang's motion is hampered because it made no detailed findings. See Rule 9014 (incorporating Civil Rule 52 (made applicable by Rule 7052) which requires findings and conclusions in any contested matter); In re Williams, 323 B.R. at 700. " Effective review should not depend upon the intuition of the appellate judges or their ability to divine the critical facts or trial court's reasons for its judgment." Id.
Here, the record does not show that the bankruptcy court balanced the equities by considering the factors in In re Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp. and In re Fjeldsted. Indeed, the record reveals that the court's singular focus at the initial hearing was on whether the trustee, ReconTrust, had notice of debtor's bankruptcy filing. However, in the Ninth Circuit, a postpetition foreclosure sale taken in violation of the automatic stay -- even a sale executed with knowledge of the bankruptcy petition -- may be validated by annulment of the stay. Algeran, Inc. v. Advance Ross Corp., 759 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, there is no per se rule that notice of the bankruptcy case precludes retroactive relief from stay. At any rate, there are no facts in the record that would support a finding that debtor gave timely notice of his bankruptcy petition to ReconTrust.
The transcript of the evidentiary hearing does not show what was the focus of the court at that time.
Underlying the apparently deficient record of the court's analysis is the confusion about what the court expected at the evidentiary hearing and what it would consider as support for Souang's motion outside live testimony. The bankruptcy court's local rules do not define " evidentiary hearing." A fair reading of the record shows that the court only requested testimony on the single disputed issue of notice to ReconTrust. From comments made by the court, it should not have expected testimony regarding facts previously asserted by Souang in relation to debtor's alleged inequitable conduct, i.e., debtor's wife's prior bankruptcy filing and debtor's failure to submit a chapter 13 plan which resulted in the dismissal of his case. Undoubtedly, this evidence would have come from the court's files, but there is no indication in the record that the court considered it.
The bankruptcy court also misapprehended the burden of proof in retroactive relief from stay matters. Section 362(g) provides:
In any hearing under subsection (d) . . . of this section concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section -- (1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and (2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.
Under this section, the debtor bears the ultimate burden of proving that the request for retroactive relief from the stay should be denied. In re Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., 191 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (debtor has the burden of proof to demonstrate that " cause" does not exist to annul the stay under § 362(d)(1)), aff'd Nat'l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d 1052.
Debtor did not meet his ultimate burden. He neither testified at the evidentiary hearing nor did he produce the fax confirmation which allegedly gave notice to ReconTrust that he had filed for bankruptcy. Simply put, there is no evidence in the record that would support the bankruptcy court's ruling.
To be fair, the bankruptcy court terminated the hearing without giving debtor an opportunity to present any evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Souang's motion for retroactive relief from the automatic stay and finding the trustee's sale void. Therefore, we VACATE the bankruptcy court's order and REMAND this matter to the bankruptcy court to conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing, and to enter adequate findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision on the merits concerning Souang's motion.