Opinion
05-19-00092-CR
08-29-2023
SYED SARTAJ NAWAZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do not publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-81120-2017
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Breedlove
The Honorable Dennise Garcia succeeded the Honorable Bill Whitehill, a member of the original panel. Justice Garcia has reviewed the briefs and the record before the Court.
The Honorable Justice Maricela Moore Breedlove succeeded the Honorable Lana Myers, a member of the original panel. Justice Breedlove has reviewed the briefs and the record before the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
BILL PEDERSEN, JUSTICE
This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for our determination of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for violation of section 22.04(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. See Nawaz v. State, 663 S.W.3d 739, 742 n.3, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
As this case is on remand and the parties are familiar with the facts of the underlying cause, we will not fully recite them in this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Instead we will incorporate the background information detailed in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, see Nawaz, 663 S.W.3d 739, and in our original opinion. See Nawaz v. State, No. 05-19-00092-CR, 2021 WL 1884551 (Tex. App.- Dallas May 11, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication), rev'd in part, 663 S.W.3d 739, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We will, however, provide supplemental facts pertinent to the issue in this appeal.
Standard of Review
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court adopts a perspective that favors the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The duty of weighing the evidence, drawing reasonable inferences, and resolving conflicts in testimony lies with the fact finder. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The reviewing court accords deference to the fact finders' credibility determinations and the weight assigned to the witnesses' testimony since they hold the exclusive authority in making such determinations. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The reviewing court considers all evidence presented in the record, regardless of its admissibility. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Additionally, the cumulative impact of the entire body of evidence is taken into account during the review process. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, a reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Additionally, the jury may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when drawing inferences. See Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Discussion
Appellant contends the evidence that he caused "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury" is insufficient as a matter of law. See Penal § 22.04(a)(2). Appellant also contends the State's evidence of developmental delay is simply additional proof of injury to a child under section 22.04(a)(1) of the penal code.
In its entirety, section 22.04(a) of the penal code provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual:
(1) serious bodily injury
(2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or
(3) bodily injury.PENAL § 22.04(a).
Specifically, appellant complains Dr. Kristine Reeder's testimony that A.R.'s cognitive and developmental deficiencies are from A.R.'s traumatic brain injury and only supports a finding of serious bodily injury under section 22.04(a)(1). We reject appellant's contention and find the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for knowingly causing serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury under section 22.04(a)(2).
The burden fell upon the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly caused "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury" to A.R., a child below the age of fourteen, as required by Section 22.04(a)(2). See Penal § 22.04(a)(2). Appellant correctly contends that the definition of "serious bodily injury" includes protracted impairment of any bodily organ but that the statute does not explicitly state a legal definition of "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury." Penal § 22.04(a)(2); see Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When there is no definition or technical meaning provided for a word or phrase, the terms are typically given their plain and ordinary meaning. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) ("Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage."); see also State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (in context of sufficiency review, stating "jurors may 'freely read [undefined] statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance'" and quoting Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 20120)). "'In determining [the] plain meaning' of an undefined statutory term, 'we can consult dictionary definitions ... read words in context, [and] apply[ ] rules of grammar[.]'" State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 138 (quoting Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d 887, 893-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).
The statutory phrase at issue here, "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury," uses terms with common meanings that are readily understandable by jurors. The term "deficiency" by itself means "the quality or state of being deficient," which in turn means "lacking in some necessary quality or element," or "not up to a normal standard or complement." Deficiency, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020). "Impairment" means "diminishment or loss of function or ability." Impairment, id. "Mental deficiency" is defined as "a deficiency in cognitive functioning, specifically, intellectual disability." Mental deficiency, id.
With the foregoing statutory terms and their ordinary meanings in mind, we now turn to consider the evidence at hand to evaluate whether any rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory element of "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury" was satisfied here.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently provided an example of what constitutes insufficient evidence of "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury." Edwards, 666 S.W.3d. 571. In that case, the State presented evidence a child had ingested "a large amount of cocaine." Id. at 576. The only additional testimony, however, described "possible" or "potential" side effects from the child's cocaine ingestion that "could" occur in the future, but without any definite testimony that the child had in fact suffered from a "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury." Id. at 576-77. The testimony in the trial below was materially different.
Testimony provided by A.R.'s pediatrician revealed that prior to the inflicted injury, the child exhibited typical growth patterns and developmental milestones, indicating good health. However, following the incident, A.R. required frequent therapy sessions to aid her in reaching an appropriate developmental level for her age.
To establish serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury, the State offered testimony from Dr. Reeder that the abusive head trauma caused the holes in A.R.'s brain that delayed her development, and may have caused cognitive impairment. Dr. Reeder opined that it was too soon to say what the extent of A.R.'s mental injury or deficiency would be. She explained that A.R. would never be completely normal and would always be at risk for seizure. A.R. was unable to track objects and never focused on anything. Dr. Reeder also determined that A.R. was developmentally delayed. A.R. had been receiving therapy multiple times a week to help her achieve age-appropriate development. According to Dr. Reeder's expert testimony, A.R. exhibited delays in meeting milestones and lagged behind developmentally, falling short of expectations for a six-month-old infant. At the time of assessment, the full extent of the consequences stemming from A.R.'s injuries could not be definitively determined, as stated by Dr. Reeder. The potential outcomes regarding A.R.'s physical capabilities, such as walking, running, climbing, as well as her cognitive abilities within an educational setting, including the possibility of normal speech, remained uncertain. These uncertainties were explicitly acknowledged during Dr. Reeder's testimony, where she expressed concerns regarding behavioral issues, learning difficulties, and hearing impairments.
The record contains legally sufficient evidence that appellant caused A.R. to experience serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury. See Pen. § 22.04(a)(2).
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 29th day of August, 2023.